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UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
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PRIMER  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 


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$3.00. 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  CO. 

324  DEARBORN  STREET,   CHICAGO. 


PRIMER  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


DR.  PAUL  CARUS 


REVISED  EDITION 


•      •;    -• 


CHICAGO 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1896 


Copyright,  1893. 

BY 

The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co. 
Chicago. 


-?\ 


PREFACE. 


LEST   the  title  of  this  booklet    be  misunderstood,   the  author 
J     must  state  that  he  here  means  by  "Primer"  a  presentation 
of  the  subject  in  the  plainest  and  most  lucid  form  in  which  he  could 
vi\<r^       put  it. 

' '  The  Primer  of  Philosophy  "  is  not  expressly  designed  to  give 
instruction  to  beginners  in  philosophy,  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  em.i- 
nently  available  for  that  purpose.     The  uninitiated  student  will 
not  be  bewildered  or  mystified,  in  perusing  its  pages,  by  high- 
sounding  words  or  unintelligible  phrases,  but  will,  despite  this  lack 
<.  ]         of  learned  adornment,  find  in  them  the  information  he  desires 
^         The  subject  is  presented  with  great  simplicity  so  that  its  leading 
K         idea  can  be  gathered  by  a  mere  glance  at  its  contents.     The  most 
essential  technical  terms  are  explained,  and  the  high  practical  im- 
portance of  philosophy  is  never  lost  sight  of. 

The  point  of  view  adopted  in  this,  as  in  other  publications  of 
the  author,  is  new  to  the  extent  that  it  cannot  be  classified  among 
any  of  the  various  schools  of  recent  thought.  It  represents,  rather, 
a  critical  reconciliation  of  rival  philosophies  of  the  type  of  Kantian 
apriorism  and  John  Stuart  Mill's  empiricism.  The  reconciliation 
reached  disposes  for  good  of  a  number  of  fundamental  problems, 
and,  particularly,  of  that  old  o-ux  philosophoritm,  the  question  of 
the  nature  of  reason,  and  will,  thus,  after  a  long  unsettled  period 
of  embarrassments  in  which  all  progress  has  ceased,  set  the  ship 
of  philosophy  afloat  again. 


207903 


IV  PREFACE. 

For  the  philosophy  of  these  latter  days  is  indeed  like  a  ship 
run  aground.  Her  helmsmen  themselves  have  declared  tlat  fur- 
ther headway  is  impossible  ;  that  philosophical  problems  in  their 
very  nature  are  insolvable,  and  that  there  can  be,  therefore,  but 
one  true  philosophy — the  philosophy  of  agnosticism,  which  in- 
dolently acquiesces  in  the  profession  of  a  modest  igiwrabiimis.  It 
is  but  natural  that  under  such  circumstances  the  proud  craft  was 
abandoned  by  the  most  gallant  of  her  crew.  There  was  no  work 
left  for  bold  inquirers  ;  there  was  no  hope  of  accomplishing  any- 
thing ;  the  ship  was  fast,  and  her  sailors  were  told  to  seek  conso- 
lation in  the  idea  that  she  had  reached  at  last  her  haven,  and  that 
her  present  resting  place,  the  belief  in  the  Unknowable,  was  the 
stratified  wisdom  of  all  ages. 

Philosophy  in  former  ages  boldly  led  the  van  of  human  pro- 
gress, but  it  has  now  ceased  to  be  considered  of  any  practical  im- 
portance. The  public  smile  sarcastically  at  the  perplexities  of  its 
hopeless  condition,  and  the  scientist  has  got  into  the  habit  of  ignor- 
ing it  entirely.  And  why  should  he  not  ?  Philosophy  has  become 
more  of  a  hindrance  than  a  help  to  him,  blockading  his  way  and 
spreading  a  mist  before  his  eyes.  Thus,  to  the  detriment  of  true 
science,  the  sciences  have  gradually  degenerated  into  mere  spe- 
cialties ;  with  their  philosophical  background,  the  various  branches 
of  scientific  inquiry  have  lost  all  intercoherence  and  deeper  signifi- 
cance. 

All  this  must  change  ;  and  if  the  spirit  in  which  this  book  is 
written,  be  true,  it  will  change. 

A  new  vista  is  opened  before  our  eyes  in  which  philosophy  will 
become  what  it  ought  to  be.  Philosophy  is  no  longer  doomed  to  lie 
in  the  stagnant  swamp  where  progress  has  become  impossible,  but 
strikes  out  boldly  for  new  fields  of  noble  work  and  practical  use- 
fulness. 

The  Author. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION. 

PAGE 

The  Principles  of  Philosophy  :    Positivism,  Monism,  Melior- 
ism      I 

EXPERIENCE  THE  SOLE  BASIS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Data 9 

Objectivity  and  Subjectivity 12 

Duality  and  Monism 16 

Appearance  Not  Sham 21 

Experience =     .     .  26 

Knowledge 37 

Science 4^ 

Truth 46 

THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  DERIVED  FROM 
EXPERIENCE. 

Axioms 51 

A  Priori  and  A  Posteriori 62 

The  Formal 78 

The  Problem  of  the  Three  Dimensions  of  Space       ....  89 

Reason 103 

Abstraction 118 

The  Absolute 127 

Noumena  and  Reality      .           ....                i33 


VI  7'ABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE  SOLVABLE  BY 
THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

CAUSATION.  PAGE 

Cause  and  Effect 137 

Cause  and  Reason 138 

Reason  and  Consequence 140 

A  Distinction  Needed 141 

■Aristotle  on  Causation 143 

Confused  Notions  of  Causation 145 

Causation  Not  Mere  Succession 152 

Explanation  and  Comprehension 153 

Causation  as  Transformation 155 

Teleology 156 

.  Free-Will i59 

Fatalism  and  Necessitarianism 163 

The  Character  of  Nature 165 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

The  Association  Philosophy 173 

Composites  of  Blended  Memories 178 

The  Nature  of  Perceptions 179 

Generalisation  Prior  to  Cognition 181 

Apperception  and  Consciousness 182 

Apperception  and  Will 184 

Ideas  and  the  Life  of  Ideas 187 

Psychological  Terms 189 

RELIGION. 

Christianity 196 

Idolatry i99 

The  Religion  of  Science  .............  203 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE   PRINCIPLES   OF  PHILOSOPHY:   POSITIVISM. 
MONISM,   MELIORISM. 

THE  philosophical  principles  which  dominate  mod- 
ern thought  can  be  expressed  in  the  two  names, 
Positivism  and  Monism,  the  one  being  complemen- 
tary to  the  other.  True  positivism  is  monistic  ;  true 
monism  is  positive. 

Positivism  represents  the  principle  that  all  knowl- 
edge, scientific,  philosophical,  and  religious,  is  a  de- 
scription of  facts.  Natural  laws  are  formulas  describ- 
ing facts  with  the  greatest  possible  economy,  that  is, 
in  the  most  concise  and  exhaustive  manner.  Our  ab- 
stract concepts  do  not  represent  any  absolute  or  meta- 
physical entities,  they  represent  certain  features,  qual- 
ities, or  relations  of  existence.  They  are  not  forces 
behind  nature.  There  is  not  something  beyond  that 
mysteriously  produces  natural  processes.  The  natural 
processes  themselves  are  reality. 

The  facts  of  experience  are  specie,  and  our  abstract 
thoughts  are  bills  which  serve  to  economise  the  ex- 
change of  thought.      If  the  values  of  our   abstractions 


2  INTRODUCTION. 

are  not  ultimately  founded  upon  the  reality  of  positive 
facts,  they  are  like  checks  or  drafts  for  the  payment 
of  which  there  is  no  money  in  the  bank. 

This  positivism  is  in  several  respects  different  from 
the  French  positivism  of  the  Comtian  school ;  and 
therefore  we  call  it  "the  new  positivism."  Comte's 
and  Littrd's  positivism  is  really  an  agnosticism.  In- 
stead of  solving  the  basic  problems  of  philosophy, 
Comte  and  his  school  declared  them  to  be  insolv- 
able. 

We  may  add  that  all  thinkers  imbued  with  the 
spirit  of  modern  thought  will  agree  to  the  maxim  that 
science  has  to  take  its  stand  upon  facts,  although 
a  Roman  Catholic  philosopher  may  consider  some 
things  as  facts  which  a  scientist  of  heretic  England 
does  not. 

We  regard  it  as  a  matter  of  principle  that  a  world- 
conception  cannot  be  based  upon  facts  of  a  doubtful 
character,  or  upon  historical  facts  such  as  have  hap- 
pened once  and  do  not  happen  again.  A  world-con- 
ception can  be  based  upon  such  facts  only  as  can  be 
proved  to  be  correctly  observed,  admitting  of  a  con- 
stant revision  by  experiment. 

Natural  laws,  theories,  or  interpretations  of  facts, 
not  only  have  to  be  based  upon  well-ascertained  ex- 
perience, but  must  also  not  stand  in  contradiction  to 
facts  of  any  kind.  Any  conception  of  facts  which 
makes  one  fact  appear  to  be  contradictorily  different 
from  any  other  fact  is  suspicious  and  must  be  rejected, 


INTRODUCTION.  3 

for  indeed  the  ultimate  criterion  of  truth  is  consistency 
with  those  facts  that  are  v/ell  established. 

This  implies  the  second  principle  of  philosophical 
method,  which  may  be  called,  in  one  word,  Monism. 

*  * 

Monism  is  a  unitary  conception  of  the  world.  The 
world  must  be  conceived  as  one  inseparable  and  in- 
divisible entirety. 

Monism  stands  upon  the  principle  that  all  the  dif- 
ferent truths  are  but  so  many  different  aspects  of  one 
and  the  same  truth.  Two  truths  may  be  complementary 
to  each  other,  but  there  cannot  be  two  truths  contra- 
dictory to  each  other.  There  is  but  one  truth,  and  that 
one  truth  is  eternal. 

Monism,  in  a  word,  signifies  consistency.  Those 
who  oppose  Monism  do  not  know  what  they  are  con- 
tending against.  If  they  knew,  they  would  give  up 
their  contention  ;  for  who  could  propose  so  absurd  a 
theory  as  to  establish  inconsistency  as  a  philosophical 
principle? 

The  term  Monism  is  often  used  in  the  sense  of  "  one- 
substance  "  theory,  that  either  mind  alone,  or  matter 
alone,  exists.  These  views,  generally  called  "  material- 
ism," and  "idealism"  or  "spiritualism,"  are  pseudo- 
monisms,  and  would  better  be  called  "  henism  ";  *  for 
either  view  attempts  to  explain  the  world  from  one 

♦The  word  "henism"  is  derived  from  uq,  tiioi;,  denoting  tlie  singular 
number.  "Monism"  is  derived  trom  ji6vo(;,  meaning  alone  or  one  in  the 
sense  of  unique. 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

single  concept,  deriving  therefrom  all  natural  phe- 
nomena. Monism  does  not  attempt  to  subsume  all 
phenomena  under  one  category,  but  remains  conscious 
of  the  truth  that  spirit  and  matter,  soul  and  body,  God 
and  world,  are  different.  Yet,  although  they  may  be 
different,  they  are  not  separate  entities,  but  abstract 
ideas,  denoting  certain  features  of  reality. 

Monism  is  not  a  finished  system,  but  a  reliable 
plan  for  a  system.  It  admits  of  a  constantly  increas- 
ing realisation  and  of  a  further  perfection.  Its  aim  is 
a  methodical  arrangement  of  experience  so  as  to  pre- 
sent a  unitary  or  consistent  conception  of  the  world. 

The  monistic  idea  of  a  unitary  conception  of  the 
world  has  been  constantly  corroborated  by  the  progress 
of  science.  We  are  far  from  maintaining  that  all  prob- 
lems have  been  solved,  but  we  declare  that  whenever 
science  has  made  an  indubitable  progress  it  consisted 
in  some  further  realisation  of  monism  in  this  or  that 
field,  and  we  cannot  even  conceive  of  any  future  pro- 
gress of  science  or  philosophy  that  could  be  of  a  differ- 
ent nature. 

Whenever  a  scientific  discovery  seems  to  point  to- 
ward a  dualistic  world-conception,  it  must  be  regarded 
as  an  unsolved  problem  until  the  dualism  is  overcome. 


Monistic  positivism,  or  positive  monism  is  not  a 
newfangled  philosophy.  It  is,  and  has  always  been, 
the  principle  of  all  sound  science.      The  positive  and 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

monistic  maxims  of  philosophy  were  perhaps  not  suf- 
ficiently appreciated  in  former  ages,  but  they  are  grow- 
ing to  be  clearly  understood  now,  and  will  in  time  lead 
to  the  abandonment  of  all  transcendental,  metaphys- 
ical, supernatural,  and  agnostic  speculations.  Positive 
monism  will  change  philosophy  into  a  systeraatisation 
of  positive  knowledge,  which  will  be  useful  to  the  sci- 
entist because  it  serves  him  as  a  background  to  his 
special  field  of  inquiry,  explaining  to  him  the  methods 
of  cognition.  It  will  be  useful  to  the  moralist,  because 
it  affords  him  the  most  solid  foundation  of  his  ethics  ; 
and  to  the  preacher,  because  it  will  explain  the  evolu- 
tion as  well  as  the  practical  purpose  of  religion.  It 
will  help  him  to  distinguish  between  the  essential  and 
unessential,  the  permanent  and  the  transient,  and  thus 
enable  him  to  reconcile  his  religion  with  science. 


The  truth  of  scientific  discoveries  is  tested  by  ex- 
periments, and  in  the  same  way  the  truth  of  a  philos- 
ophy is  verified  in  its  ethics.  The  best  argument  in 
favor  of  a  philosophy  is  this,  that  people  can  live  ac- 
cording to  the  maxims  derived  therefrom. 

We  call  the  ethics  which  we  derive  from  the  phi- 
losophy of  systematised  facts,  Meliorism. 

By  Meliorism  we  do  not  understand  a  modified 
optimism.  The  word  Meliorism  is  often  used  in  the 
sense  that,  though  the  world  is  full  of  evil  and  misery 
at  present,  it  will  in  time  become  good  and  perfect ; 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

that  evolution  tends  to  a  constant  amelioration  which 
by  and  by  will  lead  to  the  abolition  of  all  pain  and  a 
condition  of  undisturbed  happiness. 

The  meliorism  here  proposed  does  not  share  in  the 
fond  illusion  of  these  dreams.  We  grant,  indeed  we 
claim  that  there  is  progress  ;  we  recognise,  too,  that 
much  pain  is  lessened  and  the  enjoyments  of  man  are 
increased  as  well  as  refined.  Yet  we  recognise  at  the 
same  time  that  this  progress  is  accompanied  with  an 
increased  sensibility  to  pain,  so  that  the  average  happi- 
ness is  not  increased  even  by  the  greatest  advances  of 
civilisation. 

Meliorism  gives  up  for  good  the  idea  that  a  per- 
fect, painless,  and  undisturbed  happiness  is  attain- 
able. Meliorism  does  not  seek  the  value  of  life  in 
pleasures  and  pleasurable  feelings,  but  in  the  work  per- 
formed. Life  is  a  struggle,  and  that  which  makes  life 
worth  living  is  the  moral  aim  which  we  pursue.  Life 
has  no  value  in  itself ;  life  is  an  opportunity  for  creat- 
ing values.  Life  gains  in  value  the  more  we  fill  it  with 
worthy  actions. 

Optimism  believes  that  the  world  is  good,  or  at 
least  that  the  good  outweighs  the  evil ;  Pessimism  be- 
lieves that  the  world  is  bad,  and  that  life  is  not  worth 
living  because  the  evils  of  life  are  ineradicable.  Mel- 
iorism regards  the  world  as  neither  absolutely  good 
nor  absolutely  evil,  yet  it  recognises  that  life  has  pur- 
pose ;  the  very  existence  of  evil  imposes  duties  upon 
man,  and  the  possibility  of  building  up  the  good  im- 


INTRODUCTION,  •; 

plies  the  ideal  of  moral  aspirations.  A  careful  con- 
sideration of  the  facts  of  experience  teaches  us  to  seek 
satisfaction  not  in  the  transient  pleasures  of  enjoyments, 
which,  as  such,  are  empty  and  shallow,  but  in  attend- 
ing to  the  duties  of  life,  the  demands  of  which  are  com- 
prised in  the  one  word  "moralitj^" 


EXPERIENCE  THE   SOLE   BASIS  OF 
PHILOSOPHY. 


DATA. 


T3Y  "data"  we  understand  given  facts;  they  are  the 
^-^  material  out  of  which  we  construct  our  ideas, 
notions,  and  conceptions. 

What  are  our  data  ?  What  is  their  nature,  and  how 
have  we  to  deal  with  them  ? 


Kant  uses  frequently  the  word  Anschaicung,'^  which 
means  atsight,  understanding  thereby  the  living  pres- 
ence of  our  perceptions.  He  has  not,  however,  given 
any  further  explanation  of  the  meaning  of  the  term. 


*  The  German  word  Anschauung  is  a  translation  of  the  Latin  intuitio,  yet 
the  English  word  "  intuition  "  has  been  used  already  for  that  mystical  kind  of 
cognition,  which  is  supposed  to  take  possession  of  a  truth  by  a  direct  appre- 
hension, as  a  prophet  sees  in  his  mind  something  that  is  not  present. 

Anschauung  denotes  the  state  of  looking  at  a  thing.  It  means  originally, 
the  sensation  of  sight,  yet  its  usage  is  extended  to  comprise  any  other  kind 
of  sensation  which  apprehends  an  object  directly  by  feeling  its  presence. 

The  German  word  Anschauung  affords  to  the  German  mind  the  advantage 
of  being  vernacular.  Its  meaning  is  to  be  taken  as  the  word  implies  it,  and 
not  in  any  figurative  sense.  The  author  has  ventured  to  translate  the  German 
Anschauunghy  the  Saxon  "at-sight,"  which  is  a  neology,  but  seems  to  him 
to  express  precisely  what  Anschauung  mevins. 

For  further  particulars  see  The  Monist,  Vol.  II,  No.  4,  p.  527. 


lO 


EXPERIENCE. 


He  has  neither  analysed  it,  nor  did  he  call  special  at- 
tention to  its  paramount  importance. 

The  living  presence  of  our  perceptions,  our  at- 
sights,  that  which  we  perceive  directly,  by  sensation, 
our  meaning-endowed  feelings,  are  the  data  or  given 
facts  of  experience ;  and  the  data  of  experience  form 
the  capital  with  which  we  operate.  The  philosopher, 
the  scientist,  the  inventor,  the  preacher,  the  moralist, 
the  practical  man  of  life,  all  these  have  nothing  in  their 
mental  possession  except  the  data  of  experience,  and 
maxims,  notions,  or  theories,  more  or  less  hypothetical, 
more  or  less  true,  more  or  less  erroneous,  derived  from 
them. 

What  are  these  data  of  experience  that  form,  as  it 
were,  the  pedestal  upon  which  all  knowledge  rests. 

These  data  of  experience  are  many  different  kinds 
of  states  of  consciousness,  arid  we  can  distinguish  in 
all  of  them  three  elements  : 

(i)  The  feeling. 

That  feature  which  all  states  of  consciousness  have 
in  common  is  the  element  of  awareness,  which  consti- 
tutes that  something  by  which  sense-impressions  are 
felt.  It  is  existence  as  existence  is  in  itself.  It  is  be- 
ing as  being  is  conscious  of  itself  in  immediate  self- 
apperception.  Awareness  is,  as  it  were,  the  stuff  of 
which  consciousness  consists ;  it  is  the  substance  of 
the  data  of  experience. 

(2)  The  forms  of  feeling. 

We  distinguish   in   the   data  of  experience  those 


EXPERIENCE.  ii 

features  which  are  peculiar  to  the  various  states  of 
consciousness  constituting  their  differences  in  kind. 
There  are  sensations  of  sight,  of  hearing,  of  taste,  of 
smell,  of  temperature,  and  of  touch  or  resistance ;  and 
again  every  single  sensation  of  the  various  senses  is  of 
a  peculiar  kind,  which  is  due  to  a  different  arrange- 
ment or  combination  of  the  elements  that  compose  a 
given  sense-impression.  We  call  them  the  forms  of 
the  different  states  of  awareness. 

(3)  The  meaning  of  feelings. 

Not  the  least  important  quality  of  the  data  of  ex- 
perience is  the  meaning  which  they  possess.  A  sen- 
sation of  a  certain  kind  leaves  a  certain  trace,  and  this 
trace  constitutes  a  disposition  to  be  remembered. 
When  the  same  kind  of  sensation  is  repeated,  the 
memory  of  the  former  sensation  is  reawakened.  The 
new  sensation  fuses  with  the  memory  of  the  old  one, 
and  by  this  fusion  the  new  one  is  felt  to  be  the  same 
or  similar.  Thus  sensations  come  to  denote  the  con- 
ditions under  which  they  originate ;  they  signify  the 
presence  of  certain  somethings  that  are  faced,  of  ob- 
jects standing  opposite,  so  as  to  be  represented,  or,  as 
it  were,  mirrored,  in  feelings.  These  meanings  of  the 
data  of  experience  are  called  "the  contents"  of  the 
states  of  our  consciousness. 

The  contents  of  the  states  of  our  consciousness  are 
representations,  and  that  which  is  represented  in  rep- 
resentations is  called  the  object.     The  whole  range  of 


12  EXPERIENCE. 

the  objective  world  comprises  all  the  things  which  we 
are  wont  to  call  reality. 

The  term  "reality"  is  used  in  two  senses.  It 
means,  first,  everything  that  exists ;  and  in  this  sense 
my  states  of  consciousness  are  real.  It  means,  sec- 
ondly, thingishness  or  objectivity,  and  in  this  sense 
my  states  of  consciousness  are  not  real.  Real,  in  this 
narrower  sense  of  the  word,  is  contrasted  to  ideal,  and 
denotes  only  the  contents  of  our  data  of  experience, 
or  that  which  is  represented  in  our  representations. 

We  use  the  term  "reality,"  as  a  rule,  in  its  broader 
sense  ;  in  its  narrower  sense  it  is,  for  the  sake  of  clear- 
ness, better  called  "objectivity,"  or  the  thingishness  of 
existence ;  and  the  thingishness  or  objectivity  of  ex- 
istence shows  throughout  the  same  feature,  which 
makes  it  appear  as  matter  moving  in  space. 

By  objectivity  we  understand  that  which  the  data 
of  experience,  our  atsights,  mean  or  represent ;  by  sub- 
jectivity we  understand  that  which  constitutes  the  feel- 
ing in  which  objects  are  represented. 

OBJECTIVITY  AND  SUBJECTIVITY. 

The  terms  "subjective"  and  "objective"  have 
undergone  a  very  curious  transformation,  for  each  of 
the  two  words  denoted  in  mediaeval  times  exactly  its 
opposite. 

Duns  Scotus  was  the  first  to  call  attention  to  the 
contrast  of   subjective   and  objective  ;    yet  he  called 


EXPERIENCE.  13 

"subjectum"  that  which  underlies  our  thought  as 
its  subject-matter — a  usage  which  is  still  observed 
in  logic,  grammar,  and  common  parlance.  The  sub- 
ject is  the  thing  under  consideration,  and  we  still  speak 
of  the  subject  in  a  sentence,  of  the  subject  of  a  lec- 
ture, etc.  Subjective,  accordingly,  was  to  Duns  Scotus 
that  which  is  the  essential  nature  of  the  subject  in  this 
sense,  viz.,  that  which  characterises  the  thing  ;  it 
means  thingish,  or,  as  we  now  say,  "objective." 

Duns  Scotus  coined  the  term  "  objective  "  to  denote 
that  which  does  not  belong  to  the  thing  or  subject  of 
thought.  The  term  "objective"  characterises  to  him 
the  nature  of  thinking  beings,  that  which  pertains  to 
ideas  in  which  reality  is  represented.  It  is  that  which 
stands  opposite  the  thing,  which  faces  the  subject  under 
observation;  it  is  the  observer.  Accordingly,  in  Scotus's 
terminology  it  means  precisely  that  which  we  now  call 
"  subjective." 

Descartes  still  employs  the  term  "objective  "  in  the 
sense  of  Duns  Scotus,  and  the  word  "subject"  is,  at 
least  in  France  and  England,  used  to  this  day  in  com- 
mon parlance  in  its  old  significance. 

In  the  seventeenth  century  the  term  "  subject  "  be- 
gan to  be  used  to  denote  the  reality  of  the  soul,  and 
as  soon  as  this  usage  was  established  so  that  Leibnitz 
could  speak  of  the  subjectum  ou  Pdme  mcme,  philoso- 
phers naturally  understood  by  "  subject  "  the  think- 
ing being,  and  by  "  subjective  "  that  which  character- 
ises the  thinking  being. 


14  EXPERIENCE. 

Soon  after  Leibnitz,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  the 
term  "object"  was  used  by  German  philosophers  in 
contrast  to  subjectiwi  or  the  thinking  being  in  the  sense 
of  the  German  Gegensiand  (a  word  coined  to  translate 
''object"),  to  denote  that  which  is  objected  to  us, 
which  stands  opposite  us,  which  is  the  reality  con- 
templated and  reasoned  about ;  and  the  German  termi- 
nology has  gradually  been  adopted  by  the  other  nations. 

We  now  use  the  terms  as  the  Germans  fixed  their 
meaning.  Object  is  a  synonym  of  thing  or  Gegenstand, 
and  objective  denotes  tlie  realit}^  or  thingishness  of 
existence  as  we  perceive  it  with  our  senses,  while  sub- 
jective is  that  which  denotes  the  character  of  the  think- 
ing being,  that  which  pertains  to  the  representation  of 
things,  that  which  conceives  them  and  reasons  about 

them. 

* 

*  * 

Objects  and  the  whole  world  of  objective  existence 
appear  to  the  thinking  subject  as  matter  moving  in 
space.  Objects  are  that  which  the  meanings  of  our 
sensations,  of  our  Anschauiuigen,  of  our  atsights,  pur- 
port to  be.  Objects,  accordingly,  are  not  full  and 
whole  realities,  but  abstracts  of  reality  only.  The 
whole  reality  contains  both  subject  and  object.  On 
the  other  hand,  purely  subjective  states  and  the  whole 
realm  of  subjectivity  are  abstracts  also.  We  can  sep- 
arate the  subject  from  the  object  only  mentally,  not 
actuall5^      In  actual  reality  they  are  inseparable. 


EXPERIENCE.  15 

There  is  no  subjectivity  which  is  nothing  but  sub- 
jectivity, nor  is  there  any  objectivity  which  is  nothing 
but  objectivity.  Objectivity  in  its  nature  as  objectiv- 
ity which  appears  to  be  matter  moving  in  space,  must 
face  some  other  existence  so  as  to  be  objective,  so  as 
to  appear  as  matter  moving  in  space.  It  must  be  per- 
ceived or  at  least  it  must  affect  something  by  impact, 
i.  e.,  in  a  way  which  can  be  conceived  as  mechanical 
action. 

Suppose  that  existence  did  not  affect  other  exist- 
ence. In  that  case  it  could  not  be  said  to  exist ;  it 
would  not  be  real.  The  peculiarity  of  existence  con- 
sists in  affecting  other  existences,  and  this  constitutes 
its  objectivity.  "  Matter  moving  in  space  "  is  a  term 
by  which  we  comprehend  in  a  general  way  our  means 
of  representing  the  objectivity  of  existence. 


The  question  has  been  asked,  What  are  objects  in 
themselves?  Objects  appear  to  be  matter  moving  in 
space  ;  they  are  represented  in  the  feelings  of  a  think- 
ing subject  as  material  bodies  ;  but  what  are  they  in 
themselves?     What  is  the  nature  of  their  own  being  ? 

The  answer  to  this  question  is  suggested  by  the 
facts  of  our  own  existence.  The  thinking  subject  ap- 
pears to  other  thinking  subjects  as  an  object  in  the 
objective  world.  We  are  feelings,  but  we  appear  to 
other  subjects  as  material  bodies  moving  about  in 
space. 


i6  EXPERIENCE. 

No  one  has  ever  seen  a  feeling,  no  one  has  ever 
found  among  the  objects  of  the  objective  world  a  pleas- 
ure, or  a  pain,  or  a  sensation  of  any  kind.  We  can 
only  see  motions,  we  hear  sounds  which  are  air-vibra- 
tions, we  observe  gestures  which  being  such  as  we 
make  when  we  feel  pains,  or  pleasures,  or  sensations 
of  a  certain  kind,  we  infer  that  the  bodies  before  us 
have  analogous  sentiments.  Thus  we  conclude  that 
that  which  is  a  feeling  in  itself  appears  as  a  motion  to 
other  feeling  beings,  and  vice  versa,  that  which  appears 
to  us  as  a  motion  is  in  itself  either  a  feeling  or  some- 
thing analogous  to  feeling. 

In  other  words  :  Our  subjective  existence  appears 
objective  to  other  subjects,  and  all  objective  existence 
is  in  itself  subjective. 

DUALITY  AND  MONISM 

While  we  say  that  every  peculiar  form  of  objec- 
tivity must  be  thought  to  be  ensouled  with  an  anal- 
ogous subjectivity,  we  do  not  share  the  fantastic  no- 
tions of  the  savage  who  believes  that  a  rock,  or  a 
spring,  or  a  planet  possesses  a  soul  and  can  be  regarded 
as  a  sentient,  or  even  a  thinking  being. 

Feelings  are  the  ultimate  units  of  our  conscious 
soul-life,  but  they  need  not  for  that  reason  be  the  ulti- 
mate atoms  or  elements  of  subjective  existence.  Feel- 
ings are  most  likely  very  complex  processes  ;  and  the 
elements  of  which  a  thing  consists  need  not  be  a  min- 


EXPERIENCE.  17 

iature  of  the  thing.  The  parts  of  a  clock  are  not  di- 
minutive clocks.  Thus  the  elements  of  feeling  need 
as  little  be  actual  feelings  as  the  properly  human,  the 
characteristic  features  of  man,  can  be  found  in  the 
single  cells  of  which  a  human  being  consists. 

Accordingly  we  say  :  Subjectivity  is  that  something 
of  existence  from  which  under  special  conditions  feel- 
ings originate  ;  and  subjectivity  is  supposed  to  be  a 
universal  feature  of  existence. 

It  is  difficult  for  us  to  imagine  what  the  subjectiv- 
ity of  the  gravitating  stone  or  of  the  flame  amounts  to ; 
yet  we  do  know  that  in  inorganic  nature  there  must  be 
something  analogous  to  our  feelings  on  a  lower  scale. 
There  is  a  subjectivity  of  an  elementary  kind. 

The  subjectivity  of  a  flame  is  not  soul  as  is  our 
subjectivity,  for  the  flame's  motions  are  determined 
not  by  ideas  or  anything  like  ideas,  but  by  what  we 
call  its  physical  and  chemical  qualities.  The  subjec- 
tivity of  the  flame  is  not  endowed  with  meaning,  while 
our  soul  consists  of,  and  our  actions  are  determined 
by,  representations. 


The  duality  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity  does  not 
establish  dualism,  for  subjectivity  and  objectivity  are 
not  two  different  things  which  in  their  combination 
form  real  existence.  They  are  two  abstracts  made  of 
one  and  the  same  thing. 


i8  EXPERIENCE. 

Reality,  or  as  the  Germans  call  it,  Wirklichkeit  (i.  e., 
effectiveness),  is  a  sytem  of  interactions.  Every  fact 
is  work-like  or  wirklich  ;  it  is  a  working,  or  a  taking 
effect ;  it  is  a  process  of  causation.  As  such  it  is  a 
relation,  and  all  relations  have  two,  or  rather  three, 
aspects;  they  are  triune. 

Suppose  we  have  two  points  A  and  B.  If  A  affects 
B,  we  can  represent  their  interrelation  by  +  AB  or 
—  BA.  There  is  but  one  reality,  the  interaction  between 
A  and  B.  But  we  can  express  it  in  two  ways,  either 
from  the  standpoint  of  y^  or  of  ^  as  +  AB  or  as  —  BA ; 
the  former  is  from  the  standpoint  of  A  the  subjective, 
the  latter  the  objective  aspect.  But  the  interrelation 
that  takes  place  between  A  and  B  is  for  that  reason 
not  a  combination  of  -f  AB  and  —  BA. 

Let  AB  be  a  feeling,  or  some  subjective  aspect  of 
an  event,  and  BA  a  motion,  or  the  objective  aspect  of 
AB.  We  shall  see  at  once  that  while  AB  is  not  BA, 
the  interaction  between  A  and  B  is  but  one  reality  and 
not  a  combination  of  two  facts. 

The  thing  A  exists  in  itself  as  little  as  the  thing  B 
in  itself,  or  the  relation  between  A  and  B  in  itself.  All 
three,  A  and  B  and  the  mere  relation  between  A  and 
B,  are  abstracts.  When  speaking  of  the  one  or  the 
other  of  them  we  take  a  special  aspect  of  things  in 
which  we  neglect  the  other  aspects. 

Therefore,  when  explaining  things  and  the  nature 
of  things,  we  have  always  to  resort  to  other  things. 
We  can  characterise  the  qualities  of  things  only  by  de- 


EXPERIENCE.  19 

scribing  their  action  in  relation  with  other  things.  We 
can  explain  the  nature  of  a  chemical  element  only  by 
stating  how  it  will  behave  when  brought  into  contact 
with  other  elements. 


The  eagerness  of  reaching  a  unitary  conception  too 
quickly  has  misled  philosophers  into  two  errors,  which 
are  known  as  the  materialistic  and  the  idealistic  phi- 
losophies. 

Materialism  is  that  philosophy  which  regards  the 
objectivity  of  the  world  as  its  true  and  exclusive  real- 
ity ;  while,  vice  versa,  idealism  (or  as  we  had  better 
call  it  "spiritualism")  is  that  philosophy  which  takes 
the  subjectivity  of  the  world  as  its  true  and  exclu- 
sive reality.  The  former  regards  feeling,  conscious- 
ness, and  thought  as  a  fleeting  phenomenon  that  orig- 
inated incidentally  in  the  purely  mechanical  interac- 
tion of  blind  forces,  while  the  latter  regards  the  whole 
objectivity  of  the  world  as  a  fleeting  phenomenon,  as 
a  mere  sham,  an  illusion  or  dream  of  the  thinking  sub- 
ject. 

True  monism  does  not  forget  that  spirit  and  mat- 
ter, soul  and  body,  God  and  world  are  abstracts  and 
not  things  in  themselves.  True  monism  is  not  reached 
by  wiping  out  all  distinctions,  but  by  recognising  their 
inseparable  oneness. 

The  monistic  view  is  equally  opposed  to  idealism 
and  spiritualism  (i.  e.  subjectivism)  on  the  one  hand, 


20  EXPERIENCE. 

and  to  materialism  or  crude  realism  (i.  e.  objectivism) 
on  the  other  hand. 

The  spiritual  of  man  is  not  as  the  materialist  imag- 
ines, a  mere  accidental  by-play  of  the  material  action 
of  his  body.  The  feeling,  the  psychical,  the  mental, 
the  spiritual,  or  by  whatever  names  we  may  call  the 
subjectivity  of  existence  in  its  various  phases,  is  the 
very  heart  of  nature  ;  it  is  existence  as  it  is  in  and  to 
and  by  itself.  The  materiality  of  existence  and  the 
mechanical  display  of  nature's  forces  are  the  appear- 
ance only  as  which  existence  represents  itself.  Exist- 
ence is  spiritual  all  through  and  the  evolution  of  mind 
is  not  a  mere  incident,  a  happy  chance,  but  a  neces- 
sary outcome  of  the  very  nature  of  being. 

The  idealist,  on  the  other  hand,  proposes  a  wrong 
formulation  of  the  problem  when  he  asks  :  Does  real- 
ity or  the  objectivity  of  our  representations  exist  ?  We 
should  ask,  What  do  we  mean  by  reality  or  objectiv- 
ity ?  and  by  defining  it  as  that  which  affects  us  some- 
how so  as  to  produce  by  various  impressions  various 
kinds  of  feelings,  we  have  a  definite  and  clear  concep- 
tion of  it,  and  to  deny  the  reality  of  reality  would  be 
equivalent  to  denying  the  existence  of  existence,  in- 
cluding our  own  being. 

When  we  try  to  solve  the  problem  whether  or  not 
reality  is  real,  we  trouble  with  a  self-made  puzzle. 
The  genuine  problem  of  idealism  can  only  be  to  find  a 
criterion  between  dream-sensations  and  reality-sensa- 
tions.    That  kind  of   idealism   which  fails  to  see  the 


EXPERIENCE.  21 

difference  may  deny  regularity  in  nature,  but  it  cannot 
deny  its  reality  ;  for  even  dreams  and  hallucinations  are 
truly  real.  Dreams  and  hallucinations  are  sensations 
not  less  than  other  sensations.  The  feelings  are  actual 
and  indubitable.  The  interpretation  only  which  our 
straying  mind  puts  upon  them  is  wrong,  so  that  further 
experiences  will  not  justify  the  meaning  attached  to 
them. 


APPEARANCE  NOT  SHAM. 

Some  idealists — we  mainly  refer  to  certain  Hindu 
philosophers — have  been  fond  of  disparaging  objective 
existence  and  the  means  by  which  we  represent  it. 
Matter  moving  in  space  being  the  appearance  of  ex- 
istence, they  have  spoken  of  the  sham,  the  illusion, 
the  mockery  of  the  senses.  But  is  this  contemptuous 
attitude  justified  ? 

Is  the  world  of  matter  in  motion,  as  reality  repre- 
sents itself  to  our  senses,  really  an  untrue  picture  of 
the  world  ?  Is  sensation  a  lie?  Most  assuredly  there 
is  no  truer  or  better  representation  of  reality.  The  ob- 
jectivity of  nature  is  the  only  way  in  which  it  appears 
and,  far  from  being  a  sham,  a  mockery,  an  illusion,  or 
even  a  lie,  it  is  a  revelation. 

The  Hindu  philosophers  should,  from  their  own 
premises  think  better  than  they  do  of  the  world  of  ap- 
pearances, for  it  is  the  objectivity  in  which  the  subjec- 
tivity of  nature  presents  itself. 


22  EXPERIENCE. 

The  objective  appearance  of  things  is  not  only  the 
only  means  but  also  an  adequate  and  perfectly  reliable 
means  by  which  we  can  know  what  kind  of  reality  we 
have  before  us.  The  objectivity  of  nature  is  the  key 
to  the  world  secrets. 

Let  us  investigate  the  motions  of  matter,  let  us 
observe  and  study  natural  phenomenon,  and  we  shall 
learn  something  of  the  souls  of  other  creatures  and 
things.  This  is  a  slow  and  a  thorny  way,  but  it  is  the 
only  way,  and  it  leads  to  truth. 

Errors  do  not  exist  in  the  world  of  objective  facts. 
Errors  are  children  of  the  mind.  There  is  neither  good 
nor  bad,  neither  right  nor  wrong,  neither  truth  nor 
falsehood,  except  in  mentality.  Sensations  are  facts, 
not  interpretations  of  facts  :  but  the  meanings  attrib 
uted  to  sensations  are  of  a  mental  nature.  Sensations 
being  given  facts,  there  is  no  deception  in  them.  They 
are  the  material  out  of  which  mind  grows.  The  sig- 
nificance of  sensations,  however,  the  interpretation  of 
facts,  that  which  constitutes  the  mind  of  a  feeling 
being,  is  subject  to  misconception. 

There  exists  a  bad  habit  of  speaking  of  sense-illu- 
sion when  wrong  inferences  from  the  sense-data  are 
drawn.  But  the  sense-data  are  quite  correct,  they  do 
not  lie,  they  do  not  deceive,  the  interpretation  only  is 
erroneous  which  is  put  upon  the  sense-data. 

To  represent  sensations  as  sham  is  tantamount  to 
denying  the  reality  of  facts, 


EXPERIENCE.  23 

The  contempt  of  objective  existence  as  a  sham  and 
the  undue  prominence  which  was  given  to  subjectivity 
as  if  it  were  absolute  reality  and  being  in  itself,  led  to 
a  wrong  ethics  ;  it  led  to  world  flight  and  pessimism. 
The  material  world  as  it  appears  in  sense-perceived 
appearances,  it  may  be  granted,  is  not  and  should  not 
be  called  being  as  it  is  in  itself,  it  is  being  as  it  appears 
to  a  sentient  being.  So  we  ourselves  appear  to  other 
beings  as  material  bodies,  while  in  ourselves  we  are 
what  is  commonly  called  soul.  While  body  is  the  soul 
as  it  appears,  soul  is  the  essence  of  the  body  as  it  is  in 
itself.  Soul  and  body,  accordingly,  are  the  two  in- 
separable sides  of  our  existence  \  they  are  two  abstracts 
made  from  one  and  the  same  reality,  and  the  contempt 
of  the  one  leading  to  a  neglect  of  it  will  necessarily 
bring  about  a  degradation  of  the  other. 

Monism,  accordingly,  instead  of  leading  to  the  con- 
tempt of  either  body  or  soul,  spirit  or  matter,  should 
lead  to  their  equal  appreciation. 

Here  lies  the  one-sidedness  of  the  Brahman-mo- 
nism, and  the  fatal  results  to  which  it  led  are  suffi- 
ciently known.  The  present  state  of  India  is  the  best 
evidence.  There  are  undoubtedly  some  other  causes 
that  cooperated  to  bring  about  the  downfall  of  the 
Hindu  nations,  but  the  weakness  engendered  by  their 
pessimistic  world-conception  is  certainly  not  the  least 
among  them,  and  we  learn  from  India's  fate  how  im- 
portant are  our  basic  religio-philosophical  convictions. 
The  once  greatest  nation,  foremost  among  all  peoples 


24  EXPERIENCE. 

of  the  earth  in  learning,  literature,  science,  wealth, 
war-like  power,  and  religious  enthusiasm,  now  lies  in 
the  most  wretched  state  of  helpless  dependence.  Their 
one-sided  monism  led  to  a  dualism  and  taught  asceti- 
cism as  the  highest  virtue,  and  world-flight  as  the 
greatest  ideal. 

Taking  this  ground,  we,  on  the  one  hand,  cease  to 
speak  in  terms  of  contempt  about  matter  and  motion, 
and  the  laws  of  motion.  It  is  fashionable  among  cer- 
tain philosophers  of  high  standing*  to  regard  the  me- 
chanical as  something  low  and  anti-spiritual ;  but  their 
arguments  do  not  carry  conviction.  On  the  other  hand, 
we  appreciate  the  importance  of  the  soul,  of  thought, 
of  consciousness.  The  soul  is  not  a  mere  spectator 
superadded  to  the  body  and  being  without  conse- 
quence. Our  thoughts  are  not  a  redundant  by-play  of 
brain-motions,  and  consciousness  is  not  an  unneces- 
sary and  dispensable  superfluity. 

The  laws  of  mechanics  reveal  to  us,  not  the  essence 
of  spiritual  existence,  but,  after  all,  certain  modes  of 
its  activity.  The  essence  of  mind,  which  consists  in 
the  meaning  that  naturally  develops  out  of  feelings,  is 
not  mechanical ;  but  without  taking  into  consideration 
the  modes  of  the  mind's  activity,  we  can  never  under- 
stand its  moment  and  import. 

•  * 

*  * 

The  laws  of  mechanics,  far  from  being  anti-spiritual, 
are  the  means  by  which  we  learn  to  understand  and 

♦Charles  S.  Pejrce  in  his  articles  in  The  Monist, 


EXPERIENCE.  25 

objectively  to  represent  the  action  of  spiritual  ex- 
istence. 

If  the  sense-wrought  world  of  material  existences 
is  appearance,  it  is  at  the  same  time  a  revelation  and 
should  not  be  called  a  sham.  If  the  essence  of  the 
body,  its  inner  nature,  its  being  in  itself,  is  the  soul, 
we  can  acquire  knowledge  of  other  souls  through  a 
knowledge  of  their  bodily  forms  and  of  their  actions 
only.  Since  our  knowledge  of  self  is  insufficient,  un- 
less it  be  observed  in  its  interaction  with  other  exist- 
ences, we  cannot  even  know  our  own  soul  without 
drawing  largely  upon  the  resources  of  our  objective 
experience. 

Purely  subjective  experience  teaches  us  only  that 
we  have  feelings  of  a  special  kind  ;  it  teaches  us  the 
bare  results  and  nothing  about  their  causes.  We  feel 
something,  say,  for  instance,  a  pain.  Beyond  this  fact 
of  a  peculiar  feeling  we  know  nothing  out  of  our  own 
consciousness.  That  a  certain  pain  is  an  ache  to  be 
located  in  a  special  tooth  is  a  purely  mental  inference 
drawn  from  objective  observation  or  experiment. 

Subjectivity  forms  the  condition,  but  objectivity 
furnishes  the  means  and  methods  of  experience.  The 
development  of  mind  is  possible  only  by  the  inter- 
action of  reality,  which  to  the  acting  and  reacting  be- 
ing naturally  appears  an  innerness  and  outerness. 

Neither  innerness  nor  outerness  are  the  Vv^hole  of 
reality.     To  know  existence  and  to  understand  its  na- 


26  EXPERIENCE. 

ture,  we  must  interpret  the  one  with  the  assistance  of 
the  other. 

We  regard  the  objectivity  of  nature  as  the  great 
apocalypse  of  existence.  It  is  no  sham,  but  a  revela- 
tion ;  it  is  a  disclosure  of  its  being  and  a  display  of 
its  reality. 

EXPERIENCE. 

Experience  is  the  effect  of  events  upon  sentient 
beings. 

The  condition  of  experience  is  memory.  Grant 
that  in  a  world  of  changes  sentient  beings  are  pos- 
sessed of  memory  and  the  result  will  be  what  is  com- 
monly understood  by  "experience." 

That  experience  is  the  sole  source  of  human  knowl- 
edge has  been  doubted  by  three  classes  of  men  only  : 
(i)  by  mystics,  (2)  by  believers  in  supernaturalism, 
and  (3)  by  Kant  and  strict  Kantians. 

Mystics  believe  that  there  exists  some  kind  of  inspi- 
ration which  bestows  at  a  glance  and  in  full  complete- 
ness knowledge  v/hich  can  otherwise  be  acquired  only 
imperfectly  and  piecemeal  by  many  years  of  experience. 
This  extraordinary  means  of  knov/ledge  is  called  "in- 
tuition," because  mystics  describe  their  ecstacies  as 
visions.  We  simply  utter  a  tautology  when  we  say  that 
knowledge  derived  in  a  mystical  way  by  intuition  is 
"  visionary"  in  the  literal  sense  of  the  word  ;  but  the 
intuitionalist's  "visionary"  is  now  so  discredited  that 


EXPERIENCE.  27 

the  very  word  has  become  a  synonym  for  the  fantas- 
tic, the  unreal,  the  fabulous,  the  chimerical,  the  im- 
possible. 

Believers  in  supernaturalism  declare  that  some 
truths  were  not  acquired  in  the  natural  way  but  by  the 
special  intervention  of  an  extramundane  God.  They 
regard  7-evelation  as  a  better  and  more  reliable  source 
of  knowledge  than  experience. 

Of  the  truth  v/hich  supernaturalists  claim  has  been 
acquired  by  special  revelation,  two  kinds  may  be  dis- 
tinguished :  first,  such  moral  truths  as  love  of  enemies 
and  self-sacrifice  for  ideals  higher  than  self,  and  sec- 
ondly, mysterious  statements  concerning  extramun- 
dane affairs.  The  former  have  been  proved  to  be  of 
natural  growth  ;  for  they  have  been  developed  without 
any  supernatural  intervention  among  people  who  are 
entirely  without  the  pale  of  the  Israelitic,  Christian, 
and  Mohammedan  religions. 

The  maturest  and  most  careful  investigations  of 
ethical  science  show  that  all  vices  lead  to  destruc- 
tion, and  we  have  to  regard  the  noblest  and  most  ele- 
vated virtues  as  exactly  those  which,  according  to 
natural  laws,  possess  the  power  of  preservation.  Moral 
truths,  accordingly,  are  not  unattainable,  and  if  it  were 
true  that  Jews,  Christians,  and  Moslems  did  not  and 
could  not  naturally  develop  their  moral  ideas,  which 
in  a  less  complete  form  were  naturally  developed 
among  other  nations,  this  would  prove  only  the  men- 
tal or  moral  inferiority  of  these  races. 


28  EXPERIENCE 

The  second  class  of  supernatural  truths,  i.  e.,  mys- 
tical statements  concerning  extramundane  affairs,  are 
partly  vague  and  partly  absurd,  so  that  they  can  neither 
be  explained  nor  understood  :  they  have  simply  to  be 
believed.  And  this  is  the  opinion  of  the  supernatural- 
ists  themselves,  stated  in  the  sentence  :  Credo  quia  ab- 
surdum. 

Kant  is  neither  a  mystic  nor  a  supernaturalist ;  yet 
he  objects  to  the  proposition  that  experience  is  the  sole 
source  of  knowledge  ;  and  Kant's  objection  is  charac- 
teristic of  his  entire  philosophy — indeed,  it  forms  its 
starting-point. 

Let  us  briefly  review  the  antecedents  of  Kant's  ideas. 

Locke  merely  followed  the  old  tradition  of  philo- 
sophical thought  as  handed  down  from  Aristotle,  as  in- 
sisted upon  by  Bacon,  as  held  by  Spinoza,  that  experi- 
ence is  the  sole  source  of  knowledge.  "  Our  observa- 
tion," Locke  said,  "employed  either  about  external 
sensible  objects,  or  about  the  internal  operations  of  our 
mind  perceived  and  reflected  on  by  ourselves,  is  that 
which  supplies  our  understanding  with  all  the  materials 
of  thinking."  (Italics  are  ours.)  "Essay  on  Human 
Understanding,"  II,  ch.  i. 

Locke  discards  the  theory  of  innate  ideas  proposed 
by  Descartes  and  compares  the  mind  to  a  tabula  rasa, 
a  white  sheet  of  paper,  on  which  all  ideas  are  written 
through  sense-experience.  His  theory  is  founded  upon 
the  principle  of  the  peripatetical  philosophy :  Nihil 
est  in  intellectu  quod  non  antea  fuerit  in  sensu. 


EXPERIENCE.  29 

The  weakness  of  Locke's  system  is  apparent.  If 
sense-impressions  are  comparable  to  the  writing  on  a 
sheet  of  paper,  whence  is  the  mind  that  receives  these 
sense-impressions  !  It  may  be  granted  that  nothing  is 
in  the  intellect  but  that  which  has  been  before  in  the 
senses.  This  explains  how  the  intellect  can  acquire 
knowledge  by  impressions,  but  it  does  not  explain  the 
intellect  itself.  Leibnitz  accordingly  extended  the  sen- 
tence into  this  form  :  Nihil  est  in  inicUectu  quod  noti  antea 
fuerit  in  se/isu, — excipe  nisi  ipse  intellectus.  (Noth- 
ing is  in  the  intellect  which  was  not  before  in  the 
senses — except  the  intellect  itself.) 

This  weakness  in  Locke's  system  became  apparent 
in  his  followers,  especially  in  Hume.  Hume  granted 
that  all  ideas  might  be  resolved  into  impressions  ex- 
cept one,  viz.,  that  of  necessary  connection.  We  meet 
with  "constant  conjunctions"  in  experience,  but  not 
with  necessity,  and  thus  the  basis  of  all  science,  the 
law  of  cause  and  effect,  remains  a  mere  assumption. 
This  consideration  made  of  Hume  a  sceptic. 

Kant  was  aroused  from  his  dogmatic  slumber,  as 
he  states  himself,  by  Hume's  scepticism.  But  Kant 
saw  what  Hume  had  overlooked  :  that  there  are  many 
more  conjunctions  to  which  we  attribute  necessity  ; 
foremost  among  which  are  mathematical  theorems,  the 
certainty  of  which  was  never  doubted,  even  by  Hume. 

Mathematical  truths  are  not  products  of  sense-im- 
pressions. Mathematical  reasoning  is  purely  formal. 
The  sense-element  is  carefully  eliminated  from  them. 


30  EXPERIENCE. 

And  yet  we  have  ideas  of  purely  formal  reasoning, 
and  these  ideas  are  not  only  perfectly  clear,  but  have 
also  been  regarded  since  times  immemorial  as  the 
model  of  all  reliability.  We  do  not  hesitate  to  attribute 
to  them  universality  and  necessity. 

Thus  Kant  concludes  that  there  is  another  source 
of  knowledge,  which  cannot  be  resolved  into  and 
which  does  not  rise  out  of  the  experience  of  sense  im- 
pressions. This  other  source  is  the  pure  understand 
ing  or  pure  reason.*  Kant's  "Critique  of  Pure  Rea- 
son "  was  the  result  of  this  suggestion  received  from 

Hume. 

* 
*  * 

We  have  now  to  call  attention  to  the  ambiguity  with 
which  the  term  "experience"  is  used. 

Locke  might  have  accepted  our  definition  of  experi- 
ence, viz. :  as  the  effect  of  events  upon  sentient  beings ; 
but  the  school  to  which  he  belonged  regarded  the 
sensational  element  of  impressions,  caused  by  these 
events,  as  sufficient  to  explain  the  rise  of  ideas.  Hence 
the  name  Sensationalism.  Hume  and  Kant  followed 
Locke  and  the  so-called  school  of  sensationalism  in  the 
usage  of  the  term  "experience." 

Kant  understands  by  experience,  as  a  rule,  sense- 
experience.  He  defines  it  in  his  "Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  "as  "a  cognition  which  determines  an  object 
by  means  of  perception,"  meaning  thereby  the  sensory 
element  of  sensations,  for  he  contrasts  experience  with 

*  Kant  fails  to  make  a  clear  distinclion  between  reason  and  understanding. 


EXPERIENCE.  31 

the  formal  cognition  of  mathematics,  arithmetic,  logic, 
and  other  sciences  of  pure  reason. 

But  Kant  is  by  no  means  consistent.  On  the  con- 
trary, he  is  very  ambiguous  in  his  usage  of  the  word 
"experience";  and  this  is  undoubtedly  one  main 
source  of  confusion,  from  which  his  dualistic  concep- 
tion of  the  a  priori  arises. 

In  one  place  Kant  speaks  of  "experience  as  the 
product  of  our  understanding  after  having  worked  out 
the  raw  materials  of  our  sensations,"  while  in  another 
place  he  identifies  it  with  sensuous  impressions,  say- 
ing that  "empirical  knowledge  has  its  sources  a  pos- 
teriori, i.  e.  in  experience,"  and  distinguishing  from 
this  kind  of  experience  the  a  priori  or  purely  formal. 
Thus,  experience  is  in  one  place  the  product  of  our 
mental  activity  and  sensations,  and  in  another  only  the 
sensuous  impressions  from  which  part  of  our  knowledge 
comes,  viz.,  the  a  posteriori.  In  the  former  sense  the 
formal  knowledge  of  the  a  priori  has  been  worked  into 
"experience";  in  the  latter  sense  "experience  "  is  the 
sensory  source  of  knowledge.  In  the  former  sense  it 
is  identical  with  knowledge;  in  the  latter  sense  it  is 
identical  with  sensation;  and  experience-in-the-latter- 
sense  is  one  of  the  two  sources  of  experience-in-the- 
former-sense. 

Kant  uses  experience  in  a  third  sense,  which  comes 
nearest  the  popularly  accepted  meaning  of  the  word. 
The  third  sense  of  the  term  slips  in  unawares,  so  that 
Kant  does  not  feel  a  need  of  explaining  it,  as  he  inci- 


32  EXPERIENCE. 

dentally  does  with  experience  in  the  sense  of  knowl- 
edge and  of  sensuous  impressions.  Experience  in  the 
third  sense  covers  the  meaning  of  the  term  as  we  use 
it ;  and  we  define  experience  as  the  (whole)  effect  of 
events  upon  sentient  beings.  This  includes  the  sensory 
as  well  as  formal  elements  of  our  sensations  and  also 
the  conclusions  which  we  draw  from  them. 

Kant  says  that  all  knowledge  begins  with  expe- 
rience-in-the-third-sense  (viz.,  sense-impressions  of  va- 
rious forms  to  which  we  attribute  various  meanings). 
But  it  does  not  rise  out  of  experience-in-the-second- 
sense  (viz.,  sensuous  impressions  only),  for  he  says 
experience-in-the-first-sense  (viz.,  knowledge)  is  the 
product  of  our  understanding  and  of  experience-in-the- 
second-sense,  i.  e.  sense-impressions. 

The  following  words  of  Kant  are  the  original  of  our 
paraphrase  : 

"  That  all  our  knowledge  begins  with  experience  there  can  be 
no  doubt.  For  how  is  it  possible  that  the  faculty  of  cognition 
should  be  awakened  into  exercise  otherwise  than  by  means  of  ob- 
jects which  affect  our  senses  and  partly  of  themselves  produce 
representations,  partly  rouse  our  powers  into  activity  to  compare, 
to  connect,  or  to  separate  these,  and  so  to  convert  the  raw  material 
of  our  sensuous  impressions  into  a  knowledge  of  objects  which  is 
called  experience  ?"     (Second  edition.)* 

We  have  italicised  the  word  "awakened"  because 
it  is  no  mere  figure  of  speech.  According  to  Kant,  the 
faculty  of  cognition  exists,  although  in  a  latent  state, 

♦See  also  the  beginning  of  the   Introduction  lo  Ksini's  Critiijjte  o/ Pure 
Reason.    The  second  edition  deviates  considerably  from  the  first. 


EXPERIENCE.  33 

and  has  to  be  roused.  It  is  its  business  to  add  some- 
thing out  of  its  a  priori  stock  to  the  sensations  offered 
a  posteriori.  The  first  edition  is,  perhaps,  plainer  in 
actually  and  unequivocally  stating  the  preexistence  of 
our  understanding: 

"Experience  is  without  doubt  the  first  product  which  our 
understanding  brings  forth  in  working  out  the  raw  materials  of 
sensations." 

The  a  priori  is  supposed  to  exist  in  a  latent  form. 
It  is  roused  by  producing  experience  under  the  stimu- 
lus of  sensations,  the  latter  being  experience  in  the 
second  sense. 

Sometimes  it  appears  that  experience  in  the  sec- 
ond sense  is  most  prevalent  in  Kant's  philosophy,  be- 
cause he  does  not  tire  of  telling  us  that  the  a  priori  does 
not  arise  out  of  experience  ;  and  then  again  he  em- 
phasises his  definition  of  experience  in  the  first  sense. 

When  Professor  Kiesewetter  visited  Kant  (in  1788 
-'89,  and  again  in  1791)  they  discussed,  every  second 
day,  between  11  and  12  a.  m.,  philosophical  topics,  and 
Kant  used  to  work  out  brief  answers  to  questions  pro- 
posed in  the  previous  hours.  In  the  first  of  these  essays 
(the  MSS.  of  which  remained  in  the  possession  of 
Kiesewetter)  Kant  gives  the  following  series  of  defini- 
tions : 

"An  empirical  representation  of  which  I  am  conscious  is  per- 
ception.   That  which  I  add  in  thought  to  the  representation  of  the 
imagination,  by  dint  of  conception  and  comprehension  {compre 
hensio  asthetica)  of   the  manifold   of  perceptions,  is  the  empirical 


34  EXPERIENCE. 

cognition  of  the  object,  and  the  judgment  which  expresses  an  em- 
pirical cognition  is  experie^tce." 

This  is  experience  in  the  first  sense  ;  it  does  not 
mean  sense-impressions  or  sensations,  but  knowledge. 

It  is  natural  that  this  ambiguous  usage  of  the  term 
"experience  "  is  a  constant  source  of  confusion,  which 
proves  very  perplexing  to  the  student  of  Kant's  phi- 
losophy. 

*  * 

If  by  experience  is  to  be  understood  the  sense- 
element  of  experience  only,  it  is  quite  natural  that 
purely  formal  knowledge  cannot  be  resolved  into,  or 
explained  as  arising  from,  experience.  If,  however, 
experience  is  "  the  judgment  which  we  pass  upon  em- 
pirical cognition,"  we  can  derive  formal  knowledge 
from  experience. 

Experience,  as  we  use  the  term,  is  not  restricted 
to  the  sense-element  alone.  Sense-impressions  possess 
certain  shapes;  they  stand  in  relations  among  them- 
selves ;  they  are  not  merely  sensory,  but  contain  also 
a  formal  element.  And  this  formal  element  of  expe- 
rience is  not  less,  but  rather  more,  important  than  the 
sense-element. 

At  a  certain  stage  of  the  evolution  of  mind,  a  sen- 
tient being  learns  to  think  in  such  abstracts  of  purely 
formal  ideas  as  numbers.  Numbers  are  abstracts  of 
pure  form.  They  are  derived  from  experience,  i.  e., 
not  from  the  sensory  features  of  experience,  not  from 
experience  as  Kant  uses  the  term,  but  from  the  formal 


EXPERIENCE.  35 

element  of  experience.  By  counting,  we  construct  a 
system  of  numbers  which  soon  becomes,  as  a  schedule 
of  reference,  a  most  essential  part  of  the  mind. 

When  stating  that  my  table  has  four  legs,  I  do  not 
derive  the  idea  "four"  by  a  direct  abstraction  from  the 
entire  sense-impression  called  "table,  "but  by  refer- 
ence to  that  system  of  numbers  in  the  mind  which  ex- 
isted a  priori  to  the  present  experience,  i.  e.,  long 
before  I  saw  this  table. 

The  same  is  true  of  other  pure  forms.  As  num- 
bers have  naturally  arisen  by  viewing  acts  of  counting 
abstractly,  so  all  the  other  formal  sciences  are  domains 
of  wholesale  abstraction.  Mathematics  starts  with 
purely  formal  space-relations  and  constructs  of  them 
systems  which,  in  the  same  way  as  numbers,  serve  as 
models  and  schedules  of  reference.  Logic  starts  with 
purely  formal  thought-relations  and  constructs  such 
frameworks  of  thought  as  the  categories,  which  serve 
as  mental  shelves  or  pigeon-holes  for  an  orderly  and 
systematic  arrangement  of  ideas. 

According  to  Kant,  sense-experience  by  itself  is 
blind,  and  formal  cognition  by  itself  is  empty ;  and  in- 
deed perfect  knowledge  would  not  be  possible  if  ex- 
perience consisted  either  of  its  sense-elements  alone 
or  of  the  formal  alone.  A  perfect  knowledge  of  real- 
ities becomes  possible  only  by  a  cooperation  of  both. 
The  formal  and  the  sensory  are  the  web  and  woof  of 
knowledge. 

Kant  saw  that  the  formal  and  the  material  (viz.,  the 


36  EXPERIENCE. 

sense-element  of  experience)  are  inseparable  in  the 
subjective  realm  of  thought,  but  he  did  not  see  that 
they  are  also  inseparable  in  the  objective  realm  of  real 
existence.  He  regarded  the  formal  element  of  real 
things  as  added  to  the  material  by  the  mind,  as  if 
formless  things  could  exist.  Considering  the  fact  that 
events  can  be  explained  only  when  conceived  as  trans- 
formations, the  tracing  of  form  being  the  method  of 
cognition,  we  can  no  longer  wonder  that  things  be- 
come unknowable  to  Kant. 

Kant  is  a  very  great  philosopher  ;  he  is  a  giant 
among  thinkers.  Nevertheless,  it  is  true  that  his  great 
fame  was  not  so  much  due  to  his  greatness,  as  to  his 
mistakes.  He  propounded  a  problem  to  mankind  which 
has  kept  philosophical  minds  busy  ever  since.  His 
ability  consisted  in  seeing  the  problem,  not  in  solving 
it.  His  own  solution,  or  rather  lack  of  solution,  (for 
he  never  inquired  into  the  origin  of  what  he  termed 
the  a  priori),  cast  a  glamor  of  mysticism  over  his  phi- 
losophy which  had  not  been  intended  by  him  but 
proved  a  source  of  great  fascination  to  all  those  minds 
who  take  delight  in  the  chiaroscuro  of  a  systematic,  or 
apparently  systematic,  ignorance.  And  this  class  of 
thinkers — the  philosophasters  of  mankind — are  still  in 
the  majority.  Their  applause,  like  that  of  the  galleries 
in  the  theatre,  counts  most. 

After  this  exposition  of  the  objections  made  to  the 
doctrine  that  experience  is  the  sole  source  of  human 


EXPERIENCE.  37 

knowledge,  we  need  hardly  add  that  modern  science 
and  philosophy  are  to  be  based  upon  experience. 

No  other  source  has  as  yet  been  proved  reliable. 
That  which  Kant  calls  the  a  priori  is  a  systematic 
construction  of  the  formal  elements  of  experience. 
The  visionary  knowledge  of  intuition  has  been  entirely 
abandoned,  and  the  theory  of  a  supernatural  revela- 
tion is  an  erroneous  interpretation  of  the  religious  ex- 
periences of  past  ages.  God  reveals  himself  to  man- 
kind in  exactly  these  data  of  experience  ;  and  religion 
will  not  be  free  from  pagan  elements  until  this  truth 
is  recognised. 

KNOWLEDGE. 

We  define  knowledge  (i)  as  a  representation  of  facts 
in  sentient  symbols  ;  and  (2)  as  a  description  of  facts 
(Kirchhoff).  In  the  form.er  sense  we  limit  the  term  to 
sentient  beings,  in  the  latter  we  apply  it  generally.  The 
usage  of  the  verb  '*to  know"  is  limited  exclusively  to 
the  former  sense,  for  we  do  not  say,  for  instance,  that  a 
book  "knows"  something.  The  latter  sense  is  more 
general.  We  say  that  a  man  has  knowledge,  and  also 
that  a  book  contains  knowledge. 

The  root  of  the  words  to  know,  gnoscere,  yiyrcoff- 
xeiv,  erkennen,  etc.,  is  the  same  as  in  ken,  can,  konnen, 
denoting  an  ability  to  do  something.*    It  signifies  the 

*  The  verb  "  to  know  "  is  used  in  Genesis  iv,  i,  in  the  sense  of  "  causing 
to  bring  forth,  or  to  produce."  So  the  German  erkennen  (a  reflex  causative  form 
ot  kennen,  meaning  "causing  one's  self  to  know")  and  the  Greek  -jiyixjaKiiv 
have  the  same  double  meaning.    Is  it  a  strange  coincidence  only  or  a  fact  of 


207'90.'J 


38  EXPERIENCE. 

mental  disposition  which  makes  a  man  fit  to  accom- 
plish his  purpose.  It  is  his  state  of  being  acquainted 
with  the  facts  with  which  he  has  to  deal. 

What  is  the  nature  of  this  state,  and  how  does  it 
originate  ? 

The  origin  of  knowledge,  i.  e.,  the  act  of  becoming 
acquainted  with  things,  of  acquiring  knowledge,  of 
perceiving,  is  called  cognition. 

A  sentient  being  is  exposed  to  impressions  of  the 
surrounding  world.  The  various  objects  make  various 
impressions  upon  the  different  senses,  and  these  im- 
pressions are  remembered.  Certain  characteristic  fea- 
tures of  their  forms  remain  and  can  be  revived  by  an 
appropriate  stimulus,  so  as  to  be  felt  again.  As  soon 
as  a  certain  event  (say  a  ray  of  sunshine  previously 
registered  by  the  eye  as  light  and  by  the  skin  as  a  pe- 
culiar kind  of  warmth)  impresses  itself  upon  the  sense- 
organs,  it  revives  the  memory-structures  of  the  same 
kind.  The  feeling  of  the  present  sense  impression  is 
felt  to  be  the  same  in  kind  as  those  prior  sense-im- 
pressions, the  vestiges  of  which  are  preserved  in  the 
revived  memory-structures.  The  reference  of  a  sense 
impression  to  the  memory-structure  of  its  class  is  a 
primitive  perception,  and  perception  is  the  simplest 
act  of  cognition. 

deeper  significance  that  these  verbs  are  used  to  express  two  so  heterogeneous 
acts  as  "  knowiDf^  and  begetting  "?  If  it  is  a  confusion  between  two  roots  of  a 
similar  or  the  same  sound,  it  is  certainly  very,  very  old  and  dates  back  to  the 
period  before  the  separation  of  the  various  ."iryan  branches.  Should  the  co- 
incidence arise  from  the  same  conception  which  in  more  recent  times  gave 
two  meanings  to  the  words  "potent  "  and  "  impotent  "? 


EXPERIENCE.  39 

Facts  are  pictured  in  sensations,  and  these  pictures 
represent  the  facts.  A  certain  feeling  has  come  to 
stand  for  a  certain  object,  event,  or  phenomenon.  The 
presence  of  this  feeling  signifies  the  presence  of  its 
respective  and  analogous  object,  event,  or  phenome- 
non, and  this  state  of  representativeness  of  various 
feelings,  in  its  higher  perfection,  is  called  knowledge. 
On  a  higher  level  of  mentality  facts  are  described  in 
names  or  word-symbols,*  and  these  names  represent 
whole  classes  of  facts. 

Knowledge  is  rendered  definite  by  naming.  A  sen- 
tient being  can  be  said  to  really  know  a  thing  only  when 
he  has  named  it.  We  know  only  that  which  we  can 
clearly  describe  in  words.  Names  label  things  and 
enable  us  to  handle  them  in  our  minds  without  diffi- 
culty. They  are  symbols  of  the  essential  features  of 
things. 

Briefly,  knowledge  is  an  appropriate  representation 
of  facts  in  mental  symbols,  and  the  purpose  of  knowl- 
edge is  the  ability  to  deal  appropriately  v/ith  facts. 

The  amount  of  mentality  in  a  mental  being  is  meas- 
ured by  its  knowledge,  or  rather  by  its  ability  of  operat- 
ing with  knowledge.  Knowledge  is  that  which  consti- 
tutes the  power  of  mental  beings,  and  without  knowl- 
edge man's  dignity  would  be  naught.  Knowledge  is 
and  must  be  the  basis  of  all  action  ;  for  actions  with- 
out knowledge  are  mere  reflex  motions. 

*  Mathematical  and  algebraic  symbols  must  in  this  connection  also  be 
regarded  a^  words. 


40  EXPERIENCE. 

Knowledge  being  of  paramount  importance,  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge  forms  an  indispensable  and 
the  most  prominent  department  in  human  life.  The 
acquisition  of  knowledge  is  the  sphere  of  science. 

The  aim  of  science  is  to  make  knowledge  not  only 
rehable,  but  also  handy.  The  former  is  obtained  by 
criticism,  the  latter  by  classification,  and  the  two  to- 
gether are  called  "system." 

System  means  the  arrangement  of  all  parts  into  one 
whole.  A  set  of  facts  or  events,  in  order  to  be  sys- 
tematic, must  be  formulated  so  as  to  include,  in  a 
methodical  order,  all  possibilities.  This  will  exhaust 
the  subject  and  at  the  same  time  allow  us  to  survey 
the  whole  field,  as  it  were,  at  a  glance.  System  ren- 
ders facts  iibersichtlich.  *  Having  knowledge  systemat- 
ically arranged,  we  can  readily  assign  new  facts  of  a 
well-known  class  to  their  proper  places  in  the  system  ; 
we  understand  them  at  once  and  can  predetermine  the 
course  of  the  events  of  such  a  class  even  previous  to 
observation.  We  can  also  exercise  criticism.  We  can 
judge  of  the  reliability  of  accounts  concerning  facts, 
for  we  recognise  at  once  contradictory  elements  as  in- 
harmonious with  the  rest. 

Thus,  on  the  one   hand,  system  implies  the  com- 


*  An  appropriate  word  is  missing  in  English  to  denote  the  German  iiber- 
sichtlich and  Uebersichtlichkeit,  "  surveyable  and  surveyability."  Surveyabil- 
ity  is  more  than  "clearness"  or  "  perspicuity  "  ,  it  is  a  systematic  arrange- 
ment in  which  one  readily  finds  one's  bearings.  It  is  that  order  which  makes 
a  domain  of  science  easily  surveyed.  Surveyability  is  attained  by  methodical 
arrangement ;  it  is  the  product  of  "system  ";  it  is  the  advantage  derived  from 
methodical  arrangement. 


EXPERIENCE.  41 

pleteness  of  parts  presented  with  greatest  economy, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  affords  a  means  of  criticism 
for  the  elimination  of  faulty  statements,  contradictions, 
and  errors. 

SCIENCE. 

We  propose  the  following  five  definitions  of  science  : 
(i)  Knowledge,  i.  e.,  a  description  of  facts.  (2)  Truth, 
i.  e.,  a  correct  description  of  facts.  (3)  The  search  for 
truth.  (4)  The  methodical  search  for  truth.  (5)  The 
methods  of  searching  for  truth. 

The  Latin  scientia,  from  which  the  word  "science" 
is  derived,  bears  a  similar  etymological  relation  to 
scire  (i.  e.,  "to  know")  as  the  German  Wisseiischaft 
to  wissen  and  the  English  noun  knowledge  to  its  verb 
to  know.*  It  means,  originally,  the  stock  of  knowledge 
we  have,  and  knowledge  is  "a  description  of  facts." 

Knowledge,  it  must  be  understood,  has  to  be  a 
correct  description  of  facts  ;  it  must  be  true.  The  facts 
must  be  well  ascertained  and  unmistakably  stated. 
Knowledge  means,  eo  ipso,  correct  knowledge  ;  and 
correct  knowledge  is  called  "truth." 

Science,  however,  as  the  term  is  commonly  used, 
is  not  only  the  stock  of  knowledge  on  hand,  but  also 
and  especially  our  endeavor  to  acquire  knowledge  ;  it 
is  "the  search  for  truth." 

*  The  ending  "ledge"  is  a  distorted  form  of  M.  E.  leche  or  lac,  which  ap- 
pears also  in  wedlock.  Its  root,  like  that  of  lay,  a  song,  denotes  sporting  or 
playing.  It  is  connected  with  Germ.  Leich,  a  song  of  irregular  construction, 
the  root  of  which  is  found  in  Goth,  laikan,  to  dance,  and  Anglo-S.  lacan,  to 
frolic. 


42  EXPERIENCE. 

Science,  as  the  search  for  truth,  presupposes  our 
desire  for  truth  and  includes  the  way  to  reach  it.  The 
methods  of  science  demand  :  (i)  The  exact  observa- 
tion of  phenomena ;  (2)  the  tracing  out  of  their  deter- 
minative factors ;  (3)  a  discriminative  statement  of  the 
phenomena  under  observation  in  comprehensive  form- 
ulas, called  natural  laws  ;  (4)  a  systematising  of  nat- 
ural laws  ;  (5)  if  possible,  tests  by  experiment,  and  (6) 
the  applications  of  the  results  of  science  to  practical 
life. 

As  the  total  amount  of  matter  and  energy  remains 
constant  in  the  whole  universe,  science,  in  order  to 
trace  the  determining  factors,  has  to  deal  with  changes 
of  form,  which  in  their  succession  are  called  causes 
and  effects. 

Science,  above  all,  widens  the  range  of  experience, 
by  the  discovery  of  new  facts  ;  it  further  purifies  our 
knowledge  by  the  elimination  of  contradictions  and 
errors  ;  it  also  systematises  the  description  of  facts,  so 
as  to  survey  them  with  the  greatest  economy  possible  ; 
moreover,  it  aims  at  completeness,  so  as  to  exhaust 
the  subject  and  comprehend  in  its  formulas  all  possible 
cases  ;  finally,  it  makes  its  statements  serviceable  to 
practical  ends. 

It  is  the  methods  of  searching  which  make  the 
search  for  truth  truly  scientific,  and  when  we  wish  to 
emphasise  this,  we  define  science  as  "the  methodical 
search  for  truth." 

The  methods  of   science  have  come  to  be  called 


EXPERIENCE.  43 

"  science"  themselves,  because  of  their  importance  in 
the  search  for  truth,  as  forming  the  essential  charac- 
teristic of  that  which  is  to  be  regarded  as  scientific. 
In  this  sense  we  say:  Science  is  "the  methods  of  search- 
ing for  the  truth  ";  and  these  methods  consist,  as  Mach 
has  observed,  in  an  "economy  of  thought." 

The  purpose  of  science  is  and  remains  truth,  i.  e., 
correct  knowledge,  or  an  accurate  and  exhaustive  state- 
ment of  facts.  And  the  purpose  of  truth  is  its  appli- 
cation to  practical  life  in  the  various  fields  of  industry, 
of  art,  and  of  moral  conduct. 

*  * 

The  basis  of  science  is  experience.  Experience  be- 
ing the  effect  of  events  upon  sentient  beings,  is  a  psy- 
chical phenomenon,  and  thus  it  is  obvious  that  all  sci- 
ence has  a  psychical  basis.  This,  however,  does  not 
imply  the  conclusion  that  all  sciences  are  merely 
branches  of  psychology. 

Every  single  science  investigates  a  special  prov- 
ince of  facts,  and  the  limits  of  this  province  are  arti- 
ficially established  by  abstraction.  Chemistry  investi- 
gates the  chemical  qualities  of  things,  physics  the 
physical,  and  psychology  the  psychical.  Botany  col- 
lects and  systematises  all  knowledge  concerning  plant- 
life,  zoology  does  the  same  for  animal  life,  and  so  on. 
But  there  is  nothing  in  the  world  which  consists  of 
chemical  qualities  alone.  The  chemist  confines  his 
attention  only  to  the  chemical  qualities  of  his  objects 
of  investigation,  and  leaves  out  of  sight  their  psychical 


44  EXPERIENCE. 

or  any  other  properties.  The  domains  of  the  different 
sciences  overlap  one  another,  and  their  barriers  are 
erected  simply  for  the  sake  of  order  and  arrangement. 
We  have  to  build  up  our  knowledge  piecemeal  by  limit- 
ing our  attention  now  to  this  and  now  to  that  fact,  and 
the  limitation  of  each  special  science  is  a  wholesale  act 
of  abstraction. 

Thus  psychology,  although  psychic  facts  are  the 
basis  of  all  experience,  has  quite  a  special  province  of 
its  own.  Psychology  is  the  science  which  deals  with 
the  functions  of  the  soul,  i.  e.,  it  investigates  the  prov- 
ince of  meaning-freighted  feelings.  The  domain,  for 
instance,  of  the  physicist  is  limited  to  the  physical 
qualities  of  things  ;  so  he  excludes  all  the  rest  and 
accordingly  also  neglects  the  fact  that  all  our  physical 
knowledge  is  possible  only  because  we  are  sentient  be- 
ings. He  takes  for  granted  the  whole  state  of  things 
which  make  physics  as  a  science  possible  and  leaves 
their  investigation  to  other  men,  or,  if  he  desires  to  un- 
dertake it  himself,  defers  it  to  another  occasion.  If  this 
were  not  so,  a  general  confusion  would  prevail  and  we 
might  consider  any  science  as  a  part  of  any  other  science. 
We  might  regard  astronomy  as  a  branch  of  logic,  be- 
cause the  astronomer  has  to  think  in  words  (mathe- 
matical symbols  being  here  included  under  the  term 
"word"),  or,  vice  versa,  logic  as  a  branch  of  astron- 
omy, because  the  logician  exists  only  as  an  inhabitant 
of  one  of  the  celestial  bodies, 


EXPERIENCE.  45 

The  world  being  thus  divided  among  the  sciences, 
must  not  philosophy,  like  the  poet  in  Schiller's  poem, 
"X>/>  Theilung  der  Erde"  leave  the  throne  of  Zeus 
empty-handed  ?  There  is  seemingly  nothing  left ;  in- 
deed, according  to  the  Comtian  idea  of  positivism, 
philosophy  is  nothing  but  a  hierarchy  of  the  sciences. 
Comte,  in  order  to  elaborate  a  positive  philosophy, 
thought  it  necessary  to  present  in  a  very  voluminous 
work  abstracts  of  the  various  sciences.  This  was  a 
mistake,  for,  first,  abstracts  of  the  various  sciences  are 
better  made  by  specialists,  and,  secondly,  philosophy 
has  other  duties  than  that  of  dabbling  in  the  spheres 
of  the  different  sciences. 

What,  then,  is  the  domain  of  philosophy  ? 

Although  all  the  different  sciences  have  taken  away 
their  parts,  there  are  left  some  very  important  objects 
for  investigation:  (i)  The  relations  among  the  sciences, 
which  make  of  them  a  systematic  whole,  so  that  their 
unity  is  conceived  as  a  consistent  world-conception ; 
(2)  the  basis  of  all  the  sciences,  and  the  scientific 
method,  including  the  tools  of  scientific  inquiry,  which 
are  such  ideas  as  cause  and  effect,  natural  law,  knowl- 
edge and  cognition,  experience,  reason,  truth,  the  cri- 
terion of  truth,  etc.;  and  (3)  the  practical  application 
of  the  sciences  as  a  world-conception  to  our  own  ex- 
istence, with  a  view  to  gaining  an  insight  into  the  na- 
ture of  being,  and  the  duties  which  it  imposes. 

An  investigation  of  these  subjects  is  of  great  im- 
portance and  constitutes  an  abstract  domain  of  its  own. 


46  EXPERIENCE. 

Yet,  as  all  the  sciences  are  inseparable  from  each  other, 
so  philosophy  is  inseparable  from  the  sciences.  Its 
field  is  not  outside  them,  but  Vv^ithin  them.  A  philoso- 
pher must  also  be  a  scientist ;  he  must  be  imbued  with 
the  spirit  of  exact  scientific  inquiry,  as,  %nce  versa,  the 
scientist  must  be  a  philosopher;  he  must  understand 
the  relation  of  his  specialty  not  only  to  the  other  spe 
cialties,  but  also  to  the  whole  system  of  their  common 
philosophical  world-conception. 

TRUTH. 

Truth  is  correct  knowledge,  i.  e.,  a  statement  of 
facts  that  is  perfectly  reliable.  In  other  words  :  Truth 
is  the  agreement  of  a  representation  with  the  object 
represented. 

No  objection  can  be  made  to  Thomas  Aquinas  when 
he  defines  truth  as  ''  adcequatio  intcUecius  et  rei,"  which, 
in  more  modern  form,  means  "conformity  of  thought 
to  thing."  Intellectus,  or  thought,  is  the  mental  sym- 
bol, the  idea,  the  conception  of  something,  and  res  is 
the  reality  represented  in  the  mental  symbol  of  an 
idea,  it  is  the  object  thought  of. 

Truth,  accordingly,  is  the  adequateness  of  a  relation, 
to  wit,  of  a  mental  relation.  Without  mind  no  truth. 
Truth  does  not  dwell  in  non-mental  facts.  It  is  a  mis- 
nomer to  speak  of  objects  or  objective  facts  as  being 
true.  Facts  are  real,  while  the  facts  represented,  i.  e., 
statements  of  fact,  if  correct,  are  true. 


EXPERIENCE.  47 

A  single  sense-impression  is  a  fact,  but  the  percep- 
tion of  a  sense-impression  as  a  certain  object  is  either 
true  or  untrue.  Facts  are  real,  or,  if  they  do  not  exist, 
unreal ;  ideas  are  true  or  untrue. 

There  is  a  great  difference  betv*^een  truth  and  real- 
ity. The  facts  of  reality  are  always  single,  concrete, 
and  individual.  Every  fact  is  a  hie  and  7iunc.  It  is  in 
a  special  place,  and  it  is  as  it  is  at  a  certain  time.  All 
facts  are  definite  and  of  a  particular  kind.  Yet  truth, 
although  representing  facts,  i.  e. ,  objects,  or  relations 
among  objects,  is  never  a  concrete  object,  nor  is  it  a 
hie  or  a  )iunc.  It  rises  above  facts,  and  views  facts 
from  a  higher  standpoint. 

The  simplest  truths  are  statements  as  to  the  reality 
of  facts  ;  they  are  declarations  that  a  certain  thing,  or 
event,  or  relation,  does  or  did  or  will,  does  not  or  did 
not  or  will  not,  obtain.  Higher  truths  are  the  state- 
ments of  natural  laws,  describing  certain  regularities 
of  facts  in  general  formulas.  Truth  accompanies  mind 
in  its  growth  ;  and  the  higher  a  mind  rises,  of  the  more 
consequence  will  be  the  truth  or  untruth  of  its  ideas. 

The  kinship  of  truth  with  mind  endows  truth  with 
a  generality  that  is  lacking  in  the  particularity  of  the 
single  facts. 

We  cannot  speak  of  the  truth  of  mere  sensations. 
The  sense-organs  furnish  us  with  facts  ;  they  present 
certain  data  ;  and  if  our  sense-organs  perform  their 
work  with  sufficient  regularity,  they  furnish  under  the 
same  conditions  the  same  sensations.    Properly  speak- 


48  EXPERIENCE. 

ing,  we  cannot  say  that  there  is  truth  in  these  sensa- 
tions ;  they  are  as  yet  non-mental  realities.  Yet,  when 
sensations  are  recognised  as  representing  certain  ob- 
jects, i.  e.,  when  they  become  perceptions,  they  ac- 
quire the  power  of  being  either  true  or  untrue.  Per- 
ceptions are  elementary  judgments  ;  they  are  the  first 
mental  functions,  and  from  them  the  mind  rises  into 
existence.  Should  it  happen  that  a  sensation  is  regis- 
tered in  a  wrong  place,  it  will  be  mistaken;  it  will 
cause  errors.  Thus  truth  originates  together  with  mind. 
Truth  and  error  are  the  privilege  of  mind. 

The  development  of  mind  means  the  development 
of  truth.  Sentient  beings  observe  in  a  certain  group 
of  facts,  in  spite  of  all  variety,  some  features  of  same- 
ness. Such  features  are  noted  by  brutes,  then  named 
by  man,  and,  finally,  in  the  scientific  phase,  they  are 
expressed  in  exact  formulas.  These  formulas  are 
called  natural  laws.  If  a  natural  law  describes  all  the 
cases  precisely  and  exhaustively,  we  call  it  a  truth. 

Truth  in  one  sense  is  objective  ;  it  represents  ob- 
jects or  their  relations  conceived  in  their  objectivity, 
in  their  independence  of  the  subject.  This  means 
that  the  representation  of  certain  objective  states  will, 
under  like  conditions,  agree  with  the  experience  of  all 
subjects — i.  e.,  of  all  feeling  beings  having  the  same 
channels  of  information. 

Truth,  in  another  sense,  is  subjective.  Truth  ex- 
ists in  thinking  subjects  only.  Truth  affirms  that  cer- 
tain subjective  representations  of  the  objective  world 


EXPERIENCE.  49 

can  be  relied  upon,  that  they  are  deduced  from  facts 
and  agree  with  facts.  Based  upon  past  experience, 
they  can  be  used  as  guides  for  future  experience.  If 
there  were  no  subjective  beings,  no  feeling  and  com- 
prehending minds,  there  would  be  no  truth.  Facts  in 
themselves,  whether  they  are  or  are  not  represented  in 
the  mind  of  a  feeling  and  thinking  subject,  are  real, 
yet  representations  alone,  supposing  they  agree  with 
facts,  are  true. 

We  have  distinguished  between  true  and  real.  We 
have  further  to  distinguish  between  true  and  correct. 
Purely  formal  statements,  such  as  5  x  5  =  25,  have  no 
direct,  but  only  indirect  reference  to  objects.  They  are 
empty  forms  which  have  to  be  filled  with  contents  from 
the  realm  of  our  experience.  General  usage  agrees  in 
denominating  such  statements  of  purely  formal  con- 
struction, if  made  with  strict  consistency,  according  to 
the  rules  of  our  mental  operations,  not  as  "true,"  but 
as  correct. 

The  very  name  of  truth  has  something  holy  about 
it.  And  rightly  so  !  For  if  the  All-existence  in  which 
we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being  is  God,  truth, 
viz.,  the  representation  of  this  All-existence,  is  God's 
revelation.  Christian  mythology  calls  God  our  father, 
and  the  word  of  truth,  or  the  Logos,  his  only  begotten 
son.  It  is  the  mission  of  Christianity  to  found  an  em- 
pire of  truth,  the  kingdom  of  heaven  upon  earth,  and 
this  empire  of  truth  which  is  within  us  (i.  e.,  in  the 
souls  of  men)  must  be  acquired  by  our  own  efforts,  or, 


50  EXPERIENCE. 

to  use  the  words  of  Christ,  "The  kingdom  of  heaven 
suffers  violence,"  whenever  men  are  eagerly  searching 
for  the  truth.* 

Considering  the  relation  between  mind  and  truth, 
it  is  natural  that  tnind yearns  for  truth.  The  yearning 
for  truth  constitutes  the  deepest  impulse  of  the  mind. 
It  cannot  be  otherwise,  for  truth  is  the  fulfilment  of 
mind.  Truth,  however,  is  a  correct  representation  of 
facts  not  only  as  they  are  now  and  here,  but  also  as, 
according  to  the  conditions  which  constitute  a  given 
state  of  things,  they  must  be  here  and  everywhere. 
Mind  expands  in  the  measure  that  it  contains  and  re- 
flects the  eternity  and  universality  of  truth. 

The  criterion  of  truth  is  the  perfect  agreement  of 
all  facts,  of  all  interpretations  and  explanations  of  facts, 
among  themselves.  If  two  facts,  such  as  we  conceive 
them,  do  not  agree  with  each  other,  we  must  revise 
them  ;  and  it  may  be  stated,  as  a  matter  of  experience, 
that  our  mind  will  find  no  peace  until  a  monistic  con- 
ception is  reached.  A  monistic  conception  is  the  per- 
fect agreement  of  all  facts  in  a  methodical  system,  so 
that  the  same  law  is  recognised  to  prevail  in  all  in- 
stances, and  the  most  different  events  are  conceived 
as  acting  under  different  conditions,  yet  in  accordance 
with  the  same  law. 


*  We  read  in  Matthew  ii,  12 :  "And  from  the  days  of  John  the  Baptist  until 
now  the  kingdom  of  heaven  suffereth  violence,  and  the  violent  take  it  b> 
force,"  which  means  that  it  is  obtained  only  by  strenuous  effort. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  DE- 
RIVED FROM  EXPERIENCE. 


AXIOMS. 


SUPERSTITIONS  are  much  more  common  than  is 
generally  assumed,  for  they  not  only  haunt  the 
minds  of  the  uneducated  and  uncivilised,  but  also 
those  of  the  learned.  Science  is  full  of  superstitions, 
and  one  of  the  most  wide-spread  of  its  superstitions 
is  the  belief  in  axioms. 

"Axiom  "  is  defined  as  "a.  self-evident  truth." 
It  is  not  the  peasantry  who  believe  in  axioms,  but 
some  of  the  most  learned  of  the  learned,  the  mathema- 
ticians; and  since  mathematics,  with  all  its  branches, 
is  a  model  science,  the  solid  structure  of  which  has  al- 
ways been  admired  and  envied  by  the  representatives 
of  other  sciences,  so  that  they  regarded  it  as  their  high- 
est ambition  to  obtain  for  the  results  of  their  own  in- 
vestigations a  certainty  equal  to  the  certainty  of  math- 
ematical arguments  ;  not  much  offense  was  taken  by 
any  one  at  the  notion  that  all  the  sciences  might  start 
with  axioms,  and  that  there  are  some  simple  and  self- 
evident  truths,  which  need  not  and  cannot  be  proved. 


52  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Euclid  does  not  use  the  term  "axiom."  Euclid 
begins  his  geometry  with  "definitions"  (opoi),  "pos- 
tulates" (aiTi^juaTa),  and  "  common  notions  "  {uoivai 
evvoiai).  Aristotle,  however,  repeatedly  uses  the  term 
and  defines  it  in  his  Analytics  once  as  "the  common 
principles  from  which  all  demonstration  takes  place  " 
(I,  lo,  4),  and  in  another  passage  as  "that  immediate 
principle  of  syllogistic  reasoning,  which  a  learner  must 
bring  with  him  "  (I,  2,  6). 

Some  of  Euclid's  postulates,  and  his  common  no- 
tions, were  collectively  called  axioms  by  his  followers; 
the  latter  are  "axioms"  1-9,  the  former  10-12.  The 
most  important  of  the  common  notions  is,  "Things 
which  are  equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  an- 
other"; the  most  important  of  the  postulates,  "Two 
straight  lines  cannot  enclose  a  space." 

That  Newton  called  the  laws  of  motion  "  axioms," 

need  not  be  mentioned  here.      His  usage  of  the  word 

is  simply  a  misnomer. 

* 
*  * 

It  is  a  strange  idea  that  there  can  be  truths  which 
need  no  proof,  but  millenniums  have  passed  without 
its  being  scarcely  doubted.  If  the  fundamental  truths 
of  mathematics,  with  the  assistance  of  which  all  the 
theorems  are  to  be  proved,  must  be  taken  for  granted, 
does  not  the  whole  of  mathematics  remain  unproved  ? 
And  if  mathematics  be  permitted  to  start  with  axioms 
which  must  be  taken  for  granted,  why  should  not  phi- 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  53 

losophy  and  religion  have  their  confessions  of  faith, 
too? 

Schopenhauer,  one  of  the  most  radical  philoso- 
phers, does  indeed  take  the  view  that  the  whole  of 
mathematics  remains  unproved.     He  says  : 

"  That  that  which  Euclid  demonstrates  is  correct,  we  must 
concede  according  to  the  principle  of  contradiction  ;  but  why  it  is 
so,  we  are  not  informed.  Accordingly,  we  almost  have  that  un- 
comfortable sensation  which  we  experience  after  a  trick  of  leger- 
demain, and,  indeed,  Euclidean  proofs  are  remarkably  similar  to  it. 
Almost  always  truth  comes  in  through  the  back  door.  It  is  found 
per  accidens  from  some  incidental  circumstance.  Sometimes  apa- 
gogic  argument  closes  the  doors,  one  after  the  other,  and  leaves 
open  only  one  into  which  we  enter  for  no  other  reason.  Often,  as  in 
the  Pythagorean  theorem,  lines  are  drawn,  and  we  know  not  why. 
Afterwards  we  notice  that  they  were  snares,  which  unexpectedly 
close,  and  thus  compel  the  assent  of  the  student,  who  now  has 
to  accept  what  remains  to  him  in  its  interconnection  perfectly  in- 
comprehensible. Thus  we  can  go  over  the  whole  Euclid  without 
really  acquiring  a  true  insight  into  the  laws  of  spatial  relations,  or, 
instead  of  them,  learn  by  heart  only  some  of  their  results.  This 
kind  of  cognition,  which  is  rather  empirical  and  unscientific,  is 
comparable  to  the  knowledge  of  a  physician,  who  is  acquainted 
with  diseases  and  cures  without  knowing  their  connection. 

"Euclid's  logical  method  of  treating  mathematics  is  unneces- 
sary trouble  and  crutches  for  healthy  legs.  .  .  .  The  proof  of  the 
Pythagorean  theorem  is  stilted  and  insidious."  (Schopenhauer, 
"Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung,"  Vol.  I,  p.  83.) 

Schopenhauer's  view  is  not  without  foundation. 
Grassmann,  one  of  our  greatest  mathematicians  and 
the  pathfinder  of  new  roads  in  his  science,  says,  con- 
cerning mathematical  arguments; 


54  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

"  Demonstrations  are  frequently  met  with,  where,  unless  the 
theorems  were  stated  above  them,  one  could  never  originally  know 
what  they  were  going  to  lead  to ;  here,  after  one  has  followed 
every  step,  blindly  and  at  haphazard,  and  ere  one  is  aware  of  it,  he 
at  last  suddenly  arrives  at  the  truth  to  be  proved.  A  demonstra- 
tion of  this  sort,  leaves,  perhaps,  nothing  more  to  be  desired  in 
point  of  rigidity.  But  scientific  it  certainly  is  not.  Uebersichtlich- 
keii,  the  power  of  survey,  is  lacking.  A  person,  therefore,  that 
goes  through  such  a  demonstration,  does  not  attain  to  an  untram- 
melled cognisance  of  the  truth,  but  he  remains — unless  he  after- 
wards, himself,  acquires  that  survey — in  entire  dependence  upon 
the  particular  method  by  which  the  truth  was  reached.  And  this 
feeling  of  constraint,  which  is  at  any  rate  present  during  the  act  of 
reception,  is  very  oppressive  for  him  who  is  wont  to  think  inde- 
pendently and  unimpedediy,  and  who  is  accustomed  to  make  his 
own  by  active  self-effort  all  that  he  receives."  (Grassmann,  "Die 
lineale  Ausdehnungslehre,  ein  neuer  Zweig  der  Mathematik,"  In- 
troduction, page  xxxi.) 

Schopenhauer's  criticism  is  good,  but  his  method 
of  mending  the  fault  is  not  satisfactory.  He  makes 
of  the  whole  structure  of  mathematics  one  great  axiom 
and  proposes  to  treat  all  mathematical  truths  in  the 
same  way  as  axioms.  He  proposes  to  prove  them 
directly  by  intuition,  to  let  them  appear  as  self-evident, 
and  imagines  that  no  further  argument  is  needed. 

Saj's  Schopenhauer  : 

"  In  order  to  improve  the  methods  of  mathematics,  it  is  above 
all  necessary  to  give  up  the  prejudice  that  proved  truths  have  any 
superiority  over  those  which  are  intuitively  known,  or  the  logical 
argument,  resting  upon  the  principle  of  contradiction,  over  the 
metaphysical,  which  is  immediately  evident  ;  and  the  pure  intui- 
tion of  space  belongs  to  the  latter  class. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  55 

"That  which  is  most  certain  and  always  incomprehensible  is 
the  contents  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason."  (1.  c,  Vol.  I, 
pp.  87-88.) 

Grassmann  pursues  the  opposite  method.  While 
Schopenhauer  makes  all  mathematical  theorems  axio- 
matic, thus  introducing  into  it  a  peculiar  mysticism  ; 
Grassmann  proposes  to  discard  axioms  altogether. 
He  says: 

"  Geometry  at  the  present  day,  still  lacks  a  scientific  begin- 
ning. The  foundation  on  which  the  entire  structure  rests,  suffers 
from  a  flaw  that  necessitates  a  complete  reconstruction  of  the 
system.  .  .  . 

"  The  flaw,  the  presence  of  which  I  propose  to  show,  is  most 
easily  recognisable  in  the  concept  of  the  plane.  Taking  the  defini- 
tion given  in  the  systems  of  geometry,  with  which  I  am  acquainted, 
I  find  it  to  be  assumed  fundamentally  therein,  that  a  straight  line 
which  has  two  points  in  common  with  a  plane  falls  wholly  within 
the  plane  ; — be  it  that  this  is  tacitly  accepted  (as  Euclid  has  done), 
or  embraced  in  the  definition  of  a  plane,  or  propounded,  finally, 
as  a  distinct  axiom.  The  first  case, — where  the  assumption  is 
tacitly  made, — is  on  its  face  unscientific  ;  while  the  second,  as  I 
shall  presently  show,  can  with  no  more  reason  pretend  to  the  requi- 
sites of  scientific  character.  .  .  . 

"  The  only  remaining  course,  therefore,  in  case  we  wished  to 
hold  to  the  method  of  geometry  hitherto  pursued,  would  be  to  con- 
vert that  proposition  into  an  axiom.  But,  if  an  axiom  can  be 
avoided,  without  having  to  introduce  a  new  one  in  its  stead,  it  must 
be  done  ;  even  though  it  should  bring  about  a  complete  recon- 
struction of  the  whole  science.  For,  in  this  way,  the  science  must 
gain  substantially  in  simplicity.  .  .  . 

"  The  abstract  methods  of  mathematical  science  know  no 
axioms  at  all;  the  initial  proof,  in  thet^e  methods,  is  brought  aboqt 


56  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

by  the  combination  of  predications  ;  use  being  made  of  no  other 
law  of  progression*  than  the  universal  one  of  logic  that  that  which 
is  predicated  of  a  series  of  objects  so  as  to  apply  to  each  separately, 
can  be  predicated  in  fact  of  each  separate  object  belonging  to  that 
series.  To  set  up  as  an  axiom  this  law  of  progression,  which,  as 
we  find,  embraces  merely  an  act  of  reflection  upon  what  was  in- 
tended to  be  said  by  the  general  proposition,  can  occur  to  no 
mathematician  ;  this  is  done,  improperly,  in  logic  ;  and  sometimes 
even  it  is  attempted  to  be  proved  in  that  science." 

Grassmann  finds  that  "in  geometry  only  those 
truths  are  left  as  axioms  which  are  derived  from  the 
conception  of  space."  Such  truths,  however,  are  not 
axioms  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  but  statements 
of  fact  which  are  true  if  verified  by  experience. 

The  methods  of  mathematical  reasoning  are  rigidly 
formal  thought-operations;  they  are,  to  use  Kant's 
terminology,  '' absolutely  a /r/^r/";  but  the  material 
which  forms  the  substratum  of  mathematics  consists 
only  in  part  of  products  of  rigidly  formal  thought- 
operations.  Some  notions  concerning  space  which 
have  been  derived  by  experience  slip  in  unawares, 
which,  according  to  Grassmann's  method,  had  better 
have  been  systematically  formulated  and  propounded 
at  the  very  beginning. 

The  notion  of  space  upon  which  mathematics  is 
based  may  briefly  be  formulated  thus  : 

The  constitution  of  space  is  throughout  the  same, 

♦  What  Grassmann  calls  the  law  of  progression,  is,  as  we  should  say,  the 
consistency  of  mental  operations,  the  nature  of  which,  as  we  shall  see  in 
the  articles,  "The  Formal"  and  "Reason"  of  this  book,  may  be  formulated 
as  a  sameness  o£  operation  producing  a  sameness  of  result, 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  57 

being  in  all  its  places  and  directions  three-dimensional, 
which  means  that  three  coordinates  are  needed  to  de- 
termine from  any  given  point  an}^  other  point. 

This  implies  that  equality  is  conceivable  with  dif- 
ference of  place  and  direction  ;  so  that  the  products  of 
the  same  constructions  in  different  places  will  be  the 
same — a  maxim  formulated  in  Euclid's  eighth  axiom. 

Geometry,  now  generally  called  Euclidean  geom- 
etry, presupposes  the  existence  of  a  plane.  The  nature 
of  a  plane  is  described  in  Euclid's  eleventh  and  twelfth 
axioms  as  follows  :  "Two  straight  lines  cannot  enclose 
a  [finite]  space." 

All  the  proofs  by  which  it  is  attempted  to  demon- 
strate these  axioms  either  presuppose  what  they  are 
meant  to  prove  or  fail  to  prove  it. 

How  can  we  escape  the  difficulty? 

Suppose  we  construct  with  a  pair  of  compasses  a 
circle  by  keeping  one  point  steady  and  allowing  the 
other  to  describe  a  line  which  will  return  into  itself. 
We  might  rack  our  brains  in  vain  to  find  a  logical  proof 
for  the  statement  that  all  the  circle's  radii  will  be  equal, 
without  assuming  that  all  the  points  of  the  circumfer- 
ence remain  at  an  equal  distance  from  the  centre.  This 
latter,  however,  is  the  same  as  the  former  ;  and  both 
aie  such  as  they  are  by  construction. 

The  so-called  Euclidean  plane  must  be  made  such 
as  it  is  by  construction,  and  the  possibility  of  con- 
structing other  planes  is  by  no  means  excluded.  How 
this  construction  is  to  be  accomplished  it  is  not  for  us 


58  THE  METHODS  OE  PHILOSOPHY. 

to  say.  Euclid's  eleventh  and  twelfth  axioms  simply 
serve  to  characterise  the  nature  of  the  plane  in  which 
we  proceed  to  construct  our  geometrical  figures. 


It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  axioms,  being  out  of 
place  in  mathematics,  are  out  of  place  in  any  of  the 
sciences  and  also  in  philosophy. 

The  bottom  rock  to  which  we  have  to  dig  down  in 
all  our  investigations  are  not  principles,  or  maxims, 
or  axioms,  but  facts.  Such  things  as  principles  and 
maxims  have  to  be  derived  from  facts,  and  axioms 
must  be  dispensed  with  altogether. 

Obviousl}^,  Euclid's  "common  notions"  are  not  ax- 
ioms ;  but  must  we  not  regard  his  postulates  as  such  ? 

Euclid's  postulates  are  rules  of  reasoning  specially 
adapted  to  mathematics,  which,  however,  in  a  general 
form,  are  universally  applicable  in  all  logical  reasoning. 

Are  not  these  rules  of  reasoning  self  evident?  Are 
they  not  principles  which  must  be  granted  before  we 
begin  to  agree,  and  must  they  not  therefore  be  accepted 
as  axioms  ? 

The  rules  of  reasoning  have  often  received  the 
name  of  axioms,  but  we  cannot  allow  that  their  author- 
ity can  be  regarded  as  above  investigation  and  proof. 

The  philosophical  world  has  always  vaguely  felt 
that  axioms  are  inadmissible  in  philosoph)^  The  vari- 
ous philosophers  have  tried  either  to  prove  them  or  to 
do  without  them,  to  evade  them. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  59 

At  present  it  is  generally  supposed  that  we  have  to 
accept  either  the  one  or  the  other  horn  of  this  dilemma  : 
either  axioms  are  the  result  of  an  elaboration  of  par- 
ticular experiences,  i.  e.,  are,  like  all  other  knowledge 
concerning  the  nature  of  things,  a  posteriori,  or  they 
are  conditioned  by  the  nature  of  human  reason,  they 
are  a  priori.  The  most  prominent  representative  of 
the  former  view  is  John  Stuart  Mill;  of  the  latter,  Kant. 

Kant  replaces  the  name  axioms  in  mathematics  by 
the  word  "principles"  of  mathematics,  but  the  fact 
remains  the  same  ;  he  regards  the  mathematical  prin- 
ciples as  self-evident  and  directly  apprehended  by  way 
of  intuition.  Being  necessary  and  universally  valid 
they  are  a  priori.  Indeed,  to  Kant,  the  whole  field 
of  the  a  priori  is  an  empire  of  axiomatic  truths,  and 
Schopenhauer,  his  disciple,  was  more  consistent  than 
the  master,  as  he  accepted  this  consequence. 

Mill  discards  not  only  axioms,  but  also  the  neces- 
sity and  universal  validity  which  should  be  the  distinc- 
tive feature  of  axioms.  To  him  axioms  are  general- 
isations of  single  experiences,  but,  being  exceptionally 
simple  and  frequent,  they  possess,  though  not  neces- 
sity, yet  after  all  a  quite  exceptionally  strong  certainty. 

Kant's  weakness  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  still  ac- 
cepts, if  not  in  name  yet  in  fact,  principles  or  axioms, 
as  truths  that  are  immediately  certain,  while  it  is  urged 
against  Mill,  tliat  our  certainty  of  axioms,  so  called, 
does  not  rest  upon  experience.  No  amount  of  past  or 
additional  experience  makes  them  more  certain,  and 


6o  rilE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

in  case  experiences  arise  contradictory  to  them,  we 
do  not  doubt  our  axioms,  but  distrust  our  observa- 
tion. 

The  author  of  the  article  "  Axiom  "  in  the  "  Ency- 
clopaedia Britannica"  (Prof.  G.  C.  Robertson)  still 
regards  the  question  as  unsettled.  He  says  of  the 
claims  of  these  rival  schools  : 

"  The  question  being  so  perplexed  no  other  course  seems  open 
than  to  try  to  determine  the  nature  of  axioms  mainly  upon  such 
instances  as  are,  at  least  practically,  admitted  by  all,  and  these 
are  mathematical  principles." 

Our  solution  of  this  perplexing  problem  is  to  regard 
the  rules  of  reasoning,  such  as  Euclid  has  formulated 
under  the  name  of  postulates,  as  products  of  rigidly 
formal  reasoning. 

Man's  reasoning  consists  of  his  mental  operations, 
and  man's  mental  operations  are  acts. 

The  mere  forms  of  mental  acts  are  such  as  advanc- 
ing step  by  step  from  a  fixed  starting-point.  We  thus 
create  purely  formal  magnitudes.  We  can  name  every 
step  and  can  combine  two  and  more  steps.  This  is 
not  all.  We  can  also  revert  step  by  step ;  we  can  dis- 
associate our  combinations  and  again  separate  our 
magnitudes  partly  or  entirely  into  their  elements. 
Purely  mental  acts  are,  as  acts,  not  different  from  any 
other  happenings  in  the  world.  The  sole  difference 
consists  in  their  being  conscious,  and  that  for  con- 
venience sake  a  starting-point  is  fixed  as  an  indispens- 
able point  of  reference.   The  starting  point  may  be  any 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  6i 

point ;  the  names  of  the  products  of  our  mental  opera- 
tions may  be  any  names  \  yet  it  is  requisite  that,  once 
taken,  the  point  of  reference  shall  remain  the  same, 
and  also  the  names  of  the  same  magnitudes  must  re- 
main the  same. 

Our  mental  operations,  by  which  the  rigidly  formal 
products,  commonly  called  a  priori,  are  produced, 
being  the  given  data  out  of  which  mind  grows,  and  as 
regards  their  formal  nature  being  the  same  as  any 
other  operations  in  the  world,  we  say  that  the  products 
of  these  operations  are  ultimately  based  upon  expe- 
rience. However,  they  are  not  experience  in  the  usual 
(i.  e.  Kant's)  sense  of  the  word  ;  they  are  not  information 
received  through  the  senses.  They  are  due  to  the  self- 
observation  of  the  subject  that  experiences,  and  this 
self  observation  is  something  different  from  the  mys- 
terious intuition  in  which  the  intuitionists  believe.  The 
subject  that  experiences  does  not  take  note  of  ex- 
ternal facts,  but  of  its  own  acts,  constructing  general 
schedules  of  operations  which  hold  good  wherever  the 
same  operations  are  performed. 

Thus  on  the  one  hand  we  deny  that  the  rigidly 
formal  truths  are  generalisations  abstracted  from  in- 
numerable observations ;  and  on  the  other  hand  that 
they  are  axioms  or  self-evident  truths,  or  principles 
acquired  by  some  kind  of  immediate  intuition.  We 
recognise  their  universality  and  necessity  for  all  kinds 
of  operations  that  take  place,  and  yet  escape  the  mys- 
ticism that  our  surest  and  most  reliable  knowledge 


62  J' HE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

must  be  taken  for  granted,  that  it  is  unproved,   un- 
provable and  without  any  scientific  warrant. 

We  have  to  devote  special  chapters  to  a  further 
explanation  of  this  view  of  the  a  priori,  of  the  formal, 
and  of  the  methods  of  pure  thought  or  reason. 


A  PRIORI  AND  A  POSTERIORI. 

It  is  very  doubtful  whether  the  two  terms,  a  priori 
and  a  posteriori,  have  been  of  more  good  than  evil. 
Having  gradually  dropped  the  usage  of  Latin  as  the 
language  of  science  and  philosophy,  we  can  at  the 
present  day,  at  any  rate,  do  without  them ;  we  can  re- 
place them  by  more  modern,  more  definite,  and  less 
obscure  expressions,  and  it  seems,  thus,  advisable  to 
discard  them.  However,  as  they  have  played  an  im- 
portant part  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  and  as  they 
are  still  much  in  vogue,  we  must  understand  them.  As 
they  are  very  expressive  and  concise,  we  may  use  them 
whenever  they  cannot  be  misinterpreted.  At  any  rate 
we  must  know  for  what  purposes  they  were  coined,  in 
what  sense  they  have  been  used,  properly  and  improp- 
erly, and  by  what  modern  terms  they  are  to  be  re- 
placed. 

The  terms  were  invented  by  scholastic  philoso- 
phers, and  are  an  attempt  to  translate  the  contrast  be- 
tween the  order  of  things  and  the  order  of  cognition, 
as  described   by  Aristotle   in  the  two  phrases,   ''prio- 


THE  METHODS  OE  PHILOSOPHY.  63 

by  nature,"  or  npoTspov  tFi  q)vffei,  and  "prior  to  us," 
or   TtpoTSpov  Ttpo^  yi-ias.     Aristotle  sa3's  : 

"Prior  is  that  which  is  nearer  to  a  certain  principle  .... 
either  according  to  place  ....  or  time  ....  or  order  ....  Some 
are  according  to  reason,  and  some  according  to  sense  ;  for,  cer- 
tainl}',  according  to  reason,  things  that  are  universal  are  prior  ; 
but  according  to  sense  the  singulars  are  prior." 

Aristotle  regards  the  general  law  or  principle  from 
which  we  explain  a  particular  fact  as  logically  prior  ; 
the  former  conditions  the  latter.  In  our  experience, 
however,  we  confront  single  facts  and  rise  from  them 
by  induction  to  the  principles.  Thus,  what  in  nature 
appears  to  be  first,  is  last  in  our  mind,  and  what  is 
first  in  our  mind  appears  to  be  a  mere  application  of 
the  laws  of  nature. 

During  the  thirteenth  century  the  terms  a  prioribus 
and  a posterioribus,  were  employed  by  Albertus  Mag- 
nus, to  denote  respectively  the  methods  of  deductive 
reasoning,  which  starting  from  principles  goes  down 
to  consequences,  and  of  inductive  reasoning  which 
starts  from  single  instances  and  rises  up  to  general 
principles.  Albert  of  Saxony  in  the  fourteenth  century 
used  the  terms  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  in  the  same 
sense  as  Albertus  Magnus.  And  this  usage  was  uni- 
versally adopted  and  adhered  to,  until  shortly  before 
Kant  the  meaning  of  the  terms  was  changed. 

Leibnitz  uses  the  term  a  priori  as  equivalent  to 
pure  reason,  and  Wolf  says  "that  which  we  add  to  our 
knov/ledge  by  experience  {quod  experiundo  addiscimus) 


64  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  called  a  posteriori,  that  which  becomes  known  to  us 
by  reasoning  a  priori.^' 

Kant  regarded  this  usage  of  the  terms  as  popularly 
accepted.      He  says  : 

"  If  a  man  undermined  his  house,  we  say,  'he  might  have 
known  a  priori  that  it  would  have  fallen,'  that  is,  he  needed  not  to 
have  waited  for  the  experience  that  it  did  actually  fall." 

Lambert,  whose  modes  of  thought  exercised  a  strong 
influence  upon  Kant,  says  in  the  Neue  Organon,  §639, 
"  only  that  can  be  called  strictly  and  absolutely  a  priori 
which  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  experience." 

A  priori  and  a  posteriori  were  formerly  applied  to 
the  two  methods  of  reasoning.  Lambert  made  them 
have  reference  to  the  products  of  reasoning,  and  Kant 
followed  his  example.  He  uses  "a  priori^^  to  denote 
such  knowledge  "as  is  altogether  independent  of  ex- 
perience and  of  sensuous  impressions." 

Commenting  upon  the  example  of  the  man  who 
undermined  his  house,  Kant  continues: 

"  But  still,  a  priori,  he  could  not  know  even  this  much.  For, 
that  bodies  are  heavy,  and,  consequently,  that  they  fall  when  their 
supports  are  taken  away,  must  have  been  known  to  him  previously, 
by  means  of  experience. 

"By  the  term  'knowledge  a  priori,'  therefore,  we  shall  in 
the  sequel  understand,  not  such  as  is  independent  of  this  or  that 
kind  of  experience,  but  such  as  is  absolutely  so  of  all  experience. 
Opposed  to  this  is  empirical  knowledge,  or  that  which  is  possible 
only  a  posteriori,  that  is,  through  experience." 

Kant  makes  a  further  distinction  of  pure  and  im- 
pure knowledge  a  priori.      He  says  : 


THE  METHODS  OE  PHILOSOPHY  65 

"  Knowledge  a  priori  is  either  pure  or  impure.  Pure  knowl- 
edge a  priori  is  that  with  which  no  empirical  element  is  mixed  up. 
For  example,  the  proposition,  'Every  change  has  a  cause, 'is  a 
proposition  a  priori,  but  impure,  because  change  is  a  conception 
which  can  only  be  derived  from  experience." 

The  human  intellect,  according  to  Kant,  is,  even  in 
an  unphilosophical  state,  in  possession  of  certain  cog- 
nitions a  priori;  and  he  finds  that  the  criterion  of  these 
a  priori  truths  consists  in  their  necessity  and  univer- 
sality. Empirical  cognition  is  neither  necessary  nor 
universal;  we  cannot  declare  that  "it  could  not  pos- 
sibly be  otherwise,"  and  all  we  can  say  is,  that  "so 
far  only  as  we  have  hitherto  observed  there  is  no  ex- 
ception to  this  or  that  rule."  When  we  confront  truths 
to  which  we  have  to  attribute  necessity  and  univer- 
sality, Kant  proposes  to  call  them  a  priori. 

Upon  a  closer  investigation,  Kant  found  that  man 
is  in  possession  of  quite  a  number  of  such  truths,  to 
which  universality  and  necessity  are  unhesitatingly 
attributed.  They  cover  the  whole  domain  of  the  formal 
sciences,  of  arithmetic  and  mathematics,  including  also 
the  idea  of  causation  and  the  purely  formal  modes  of 
logical  thought.  All  these  truths,  Kant  argued,  can- 
not have  been  derived  from  experience,  for  by  ex- 
perience we  can  never  attain  to  necessity  and  univer- 
sality. Moreover,  experience  becomes  possible  only  on 
the  supposition  of  these  a  priori  truths.  Only  by  con- 
ceiving sensations  as  effects,  can  we  think  of  their 
causes  as  objective  realities.   Thus  the  ideas  of  causa- 


66  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

tion  and  of  all  other  a  priori  truths  are  the  conditions 
of  experience,  and  as  such,  as  conditions  of  experience, 
they  can,  according  to  Kant,  not  be  found  in  experi- 
ence ;  they  are  prior  to  experience. 

Kant  does  not  (as  is  often  imputed  to  him)  under- 
stand the  a  priori  in  a  temporal  sense  ;  his  a  priori  is 
prior  logically  or  according  to  reason.  Yet  he  regards 
it  as  conditioned  by  and  dependent  upon  the  constitu- 
tion of  our  minds. 

Those  ideas  which  as  the  condition  of  experience 
are  prior  to   experience  Kant  calls  "transcendental." 


Kant  regarded  all  purely  a  priori  knowledge  as 
empty,  and  all  purely  a  posteriori  experience  as  blind. 
Transcendental  ideas  have  no  other  application  than 
to  the  data  of  the  a  posteriori ;  and  the  a  posteriori 
alone  is  a  mere  chaos  of  incoherent  feelings. 

The  principles  a  priori  constitute,  as  it  were,  the 
organ  of  cognition,  which  serves  to  give  connection 
to  our  sense-impressions. 

Kant's  apriorism  was  free  from  mysticism,  but 
the  disciples  of  the  great  master  looked  with  a  cer- 
tain awe  upon  the  a  priori,  and  regarded  it  as  some- 
thing that  was  not  begotten  in  the  natural  way,  but 
came  into  this  world  of  ours  through  some  mysterious 
spiritual  channels.  And  Kant's  unfortunate  term, 
"transcendentalism,"  helped  much  to  increase  the 
mist   in    their   minds.      The   term    "transcendental" 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  67 

sounds  very  much  like  "transcendent,"  but  while  the 
former,  in  Kant's  terminology,  comprises  the  most 
lucid  and  indubitable  truths,  (viz.,  those  of  the  formal 
sciences,)  the  latter  denotes  that  which  transcends  all 
comprehension.  In  English,  the  term  "transcenden- 
tal "  is  not  only  similar  in  sound  to,  but  is  actually 
used  as  a  synonym  of,  "transcendent,"  and,  indeed, 
"transcendental"  is  a  more  common  and  more  popu- 
lar expression  than  "transcendent."  Here  is  cause 
enough  for  confusion,  and  those  who  love  confusion 
have  not  failed  to  avail  themselves  of  this  splendid 
opportunity. 

It  would  lead  us  too  far  should  we  venture  into 
the  labyrinth  of  errors  built  by  Kantians  with  the  mas- 
ter's perplexing  terminology.  Moreover,  it  requires 
not  a  little  trouble  to  trace  all  the  mistakes  to  their 
various  sources.  Thus  we  are  satisfied  with  a  gen- 
eral warning  and  wish  only  to  add  that  transcenden- 
talism, in  its  post-Kantian  editions  (especially  in  the 
revised  Oxford  version  of  Prof.  T.  H.  Green)  is  greatly 
interested  in  the  demonstration  of  an  ego,  and  the  mys 
ticism  of  the  misconstrued  meaning  of  the  a  priori, 
supplies  for  this  the  most  imposing  argument.  For, 
surely,  if  the  connection  of  the  sense-impressions, 
which  changes  them  into  coherent  experience,  is  fur- 
nished from  the  resources  of  the  mind  alone,  the  mind 
must  be  something  radically  different  from  the  world, 
and  the  dualism  of  spirituality  and  materiality  is  firmly 
established. 


68  THE  METHODS  OF  PHITOSOPHY. 

The  idea  of  an  a  priori  is  freighted  with  additional 
dangers.  Every  idea,  to  which  any  philosophising  Tom, 
Dick,  and  Harry  attributed  necessity  and  generality, 
was  declared  to  be  of  such  an  a  priori  nature,  and 
thus  it  happened  that  any  inveterate  error  established 
by  tradition  and  instilled  into  the  mind  from  early 
childhood,  either  actually  was,  or  at  least  easily  could 
be,  sanctioned  with  a  certain  show  of  philosophical 
profundity.  The  a  priori  became  a  kind  of  special 
revelation  and  was  employed  as  a  reliable  evidence  of 
the  supernatural.  It  was  used  as  the  cornerstone  of 
dualism.  And  it  was  a  source  of  constant  worry  to 
this  class  of  Kantians  that  Kant  himself  had  not  only 
not  drawn  these  consequences,  but  actually  disavowed 
them.  Kant  had  declared  that  the  ego  (the  unity  of  the 
soul)  was  a  mere  paralogism,  a  fallacy,  of  pure  reason. 
The  unity  of  the  soul,  he  said,  is  a  mere  synthesis. 


No  wonder  that  those  who  distrust  the  soundness 
of  dualistic  and  mystical  conclusions  have  acquired  an 
aversion  towards  the  very  idea  of  the  a  priori  and  sus- 
pect it  as  a  fraud.  August  Comte  discards  the  a  priori 
without  any  ado.  To  him,  everything  a  priori  is  meta- 
physical. He  and  his  school  discredit  all  argumenta- 
tion by  pure  reason  as  purely  subjective  and  unwar- 
ranted. 

Among  English  philosophers  no  one  has  denounced 
and  ridiculed  the  a  priori  '^\\\\  more  vigor   than  John 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  69 

Stuart  Mill.  Like  the  French  positivists,  he  stands 
on  the  principle  of  sensationalism,  that  all  knowledge 
has  been  derived  from  sense-experience.  To  him  the 
a  priori  is  an  unmitigated  error  and  a  philosophical 
superstition.  He  sees  in  it  not  the  slightest  inkling  of 
truth. 

Mr.  Mill  sets  forth  the  motives  that  induced  him  to 
reject  the  a  priori  \x\  his  autobiography. 

'There  is  not  any  idea,  feeling,  or  power,  in  the  human  mind, 
which,  in  order  to  account  for  it,  requires  that  its  origin  should  be 
referred  to  any  other  source  than  experience. 

"Whatever  may  be  the  practical  value  of  a  true  philosophy  of 
these  matters,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  exaggerate  the  mischiefs  of  a 
false  one.  The  notion  that  truths  external  to  the  mind  may  be 
known  by  intuition  or  consciousness,  independently  of  observation 
and  experience,  is,  I  am  persuaded,  in  these  times  the  great  intel- 
lectual support  of  false  doctrines  and  bad  institutions.  By  the  aid 
of  this  theory  every  inveterate  belief  and  every  intense  feeling,  of 
which  the  origin  is  not  remembered,  is  enabled  to  dispense  with 
the  obligation  of  justifying  itself  by  reason,  and  is  erected  into  its 
own  all-sufficient  voucher  and  justification." 

Mr.  Mill  is  justified  in  rejecting  anything  that  can- 
not be  reduced  to  experience,  viz.,  experience  in  the 
sense  in  which  we  use  the  term.  He  is  further  justi- 
fied in  rejecting  any  theory  or  idea  that  claims  to  be 
true  by  intuition  or  consciousness.  Unproved  truths 
and  axioms  have  no  place  in  science  or  in  the  philoso- 
phy of  science.  But  Mill  rejects  anything  that  cannot 
be  reduced  to  sense-experience.  He  discards  the  a 
priori,  and  all  that  which,  in  Kant's  sense  is  implied 


70  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

by  the  a  priori,  viz.,  necessity  and  universality.  Mill 
went  so  far  as  to  declare  boldly  that  we  could  not  know 
whether  twice  two  will  always  and  everywhere  be  four. 
It  might  be  five  in  other  parts  of  the  universe.  To- 
gether with  the  errors  of  Kantism  he  rejected  its  truths 
and  attacked  the  latter  not  less  impatiently  than  the 
former. 

Such  is  the  contrast  that  has  been  artificially  pro- 
duced between  Empiricism  and  Apriorism  ;  and  there 
are  many  thinkers  of  weight  to-day  who  believe  that 

the  differences  of  these  two  schools  are  irreconcilable. 

* 
*  * 

Let  us  go  back  to  Kant,  for  there  is  so  much  sys- 
tem about  his  thought  that  a  criticism  of  his  ideas  will 
be  the  best  method  of  setting  us  aright. 

The  main  problem  of  the  a  priori  and  a  posteriori 
is  whether  or  not  there  is  any  knowledge  to  which 
we  can  rightfully  attribute  necessity  and  universality. 
This  is  tantamount  to  the  problem,  Does  reality  pos- 
sess certain  features  which  cannot  be  otherwise,  but 
must  be  such  as  they  are  in  any  one  of  its  parts?  If 
there  are  such  necessary  and  universal  features,  we 
can  apply  the  knowledge  thereof  a  priori  to  any  pos- 
sible experience,  and  these  features,  being  something 
that  is  known  even  of  otherwise  unknown  objects,  will 
thus  form  the  connecting  link  by  which  we  can  ap- 
proach the  unknown. 

This  is  the  old  problem  of  mediaeval  Realism  ver- 
sus Nominalism.     We  cannot  deny  that  the  realists 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  71 

propounded  many  fantastic  theories  about  the  exist- 
ence of  universals,  which  to  some  of  them  appeared  as 
entities  or  things  in  themselves  ;  and  Nominalism  may 
be  regarded  as  a  wholesome  reaction  against  the  errors 

of  Realism.  Nevertheless,  Realism  was  the  sounder 
doctrine. 

The  formal  sciences  actually  afford  such  informa- 
tion about  things  as  can  be  a  priori  applied  to  any 
possible  experience.  Logical,  mathematical,  arithmeti- 
cal principles  are  universal  and  necessary.  And  the 
question  is  only,  whence  does  our  knowledge  of  them 
come  and  how  can  we  prove  their  universality  and 
necessity? 

These  important  questions  were  neither  asked  nor 
answered  by  Kant ;  he  left  them  as  a  great  blank  in 
his  theory,  and  this  is  the  reason  why  his  followers 
so  easily  drifted  into  mysticism. 

Kant  seems  to  assume  that  that  faculty  which  con- 
nects, compares,  and  separates  sensuous  impressions 
exists  independently  of  all  experience  ;  it  only  needs  to 
be  awakened  or  roused  into  activity.  But  it  is  obvious 
that  it  develops  together  with  the  increasing  product 
of  experience. 

Kant's  fundamental  mistake  in  his  premises  is  that 
he  regards  experience  as  a  number  of  single  sense- 
impressions  which  remain  unconnected,  yet  there  can 
be  no  doubt  about  it  that  they  are  naturally  connected 
in  every  organism.  Every  sense-impression  leaves  a 
trace,  and  all  succeeding  sense-impressions  leave  other 


72  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

traces,  and  all  these  traces  blend,  or  become  otherwise 
associated  among  themselves.  Our  sensations  are  as 
naturally  arranged  into  a  system  as  are  our  limbs  into 
an  organism  ;  and  there  is  no  need  of  assuming  the 
existence  of  a  special  connecting  faculty. 

Kant  overlooks  the  fact  that  there  is  form  and  co- 
herence in  the  world  of  objects,  and  that  the  human 
mind  is  in  possession  of  the  conditions  by  which  it  can 
construct  all  kinds  of  formal  combinations,  and  that 
these  conditions  are  parts,  not  only  of  the  mind's  ex- 
istence but  of  existence  in  general. 

Sense-impressions  are  not  without  form.  The 
sense-impression  of  a  rose  is  not  merely  a  sensuous 
impression,  it  possesses  also  a  definite  form,  and  sev- 
eral sense-impressions  are  not  isolated  single  phe- 
nomena, but  inter-related  events.  Form  and  inter- 
relation are  objective  qualities,  which  are  imported 
into  the  mind  by  experience,  and  distinguished  from 
the  purely  sensory  elements  by  abstraction. 

There  is  a  peculiar  contrast  between  the  formal 
and  the  sensory  elements  of  experience.  The  formal 
is  empty  of  contents.  Its  entire  substance  consists  of 
mere  relations,  and  when  we  construct  in  our  mind 
such  empty  relations,  so  as  to  note  the  conditions 
which  they  constitute,  the  materials  of  our  investiga- 
tion are  complete.  We  need  not  wait  for  additional 
information  from  other  sources.  Thus  our  knowledge 
of  the  product  of  every  special  construction  is,  in  its 
way,  exhaustive,  and  v/e  can  proceed  systematically. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  73 

The  intrinsic  emptiness  of  the  purely  formal  im- 
plies a  samenoss  of  its  nature,  all  differences  being  due 
to  construction.  The  sameness,  found  in  the  a  prio7-i, 
implies  the  universality  of  its  laws,  which  means  that 
the  same  constructions  are  always  and  everywhere  the 
same.  As  they  are  in  one  case,  so  they  are  in  all  cases. 
The  result  is  rigidly  and  unequivocally  determined. 
They  furnish  us  with  methods,  schedules  of  reference, 
and  plans  which  like  blanks  have  to  be  filled  out. 


The  terms  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  may  still  be 
popularly  used  in  the  scholastic  sense,  the  former  as  a 
reasoning  from  a  general  principle  to  its  consequences, 
the  latter  from  single  instances  to  a  general  principle. 
In  philosophy  they  denote  the  formal  and  the  material ; 
and  the  formal  sciences  (arithmetic,  mathematics,  logic, 
etc.),  offering  systematic  statements  of  universal  ap- 
plication, constitute  the  organ  and  the  condition  of  all 
scientific  experience.  There  is  no  science  without 
counting,  or  measuring,  or  classification. 

The  problem  of  the  a  priori  (or  rather  of  man's 
ability  to  know  something  beforehand  concerning  the 
subjects  of  his  investigation,  even  concerning  those 
which  he  never  as  yet  has  met  with  in  experience)  is 
the  most  fundamental  problem  of  philosophy.  It  lurks 
everywhere,  and  no  philosophy  can  avoid  it.  It  is  the 
cornerstone  of  the  other  problem,  How  is  knowledge 
possible? 


74  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  data  of  our  experience  are  single  sense-im- 
pressions ;  how  can  they  be  changed  into  a  system  of 
knowledge  which  may  be  used  as  a  guide  for  future 
experience  ? 

This  is  the  basic  problem  of  philosophy,  and  this 
v/as  Kant's  problem.  It  may  be  difficult  to  under- 
stand the  solution  of  Kant's  problem,  but  it  seems  to 
us  not  difficult  to  understand  the  problem  itself  and 
also  the  inevitableness  of  the  problem. 


Prof.  J.  G.  Schurman  presents  in  The  Philosophical 
Review  for  March,  1893,  a  very  lucid  exposition  of 
"Kant's  Critical  Problem."  It  is  remarkable,  how- 
ever, that  he  does  not  recognise  its  true  nature.  He 
says  : 

"For  my  own  part  I  am  not  more  certain  of  a  demonstration 
of  Euclid  than  of  a  chemist's  analysis  of  water  into  hydrogen  and 
oxygen." 

While  we  may  not  be  more  certain  about  the  cor- 
rectness of  a  mathematical  demonstration  than  about 
the  truth  of  the  statement  of  a  chemical  analysis,  we 
ought  to  know  that  the  nature  of  these  two  operations 
are  radically  different.  The  former  is  a  mental  con- 
struction, which,  if  correct,  is  applicable  to  any  expe- 
rience ;  the  latter  is  the  statement  of  a  group  of  ex- 
periences, which,  if  it  appropriately  describes  them, 
is  called  true.  We  know  the  former  to  be  correct,  be- 
cause we  made  it  ourselves,     We  know  the  latter  to 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  75 

be  true,  because  we  saw  it,  or  observed  it.  The  prob- 
lem is.  How  can  the  products  of  purely  mental  con- 
struction (even  those  into  which  no  elements  of  a 
knowledge  by  experience  enter)  be  applicable  to  ex- 
perience, and  this  is  a  problem  which  demands  an  an- 
swer. It  is  a  problem  which  was  and  is  still  over- 
looked or  misunderstood  by  the  English  school,  repre- 
sented by  Locke,  Hume,  Mill,  and  the  great  bulk  of 
modern  thinkers. 

Professor  Schurman  regards  the  problem  as  con- 
ditioned by  "the  rationalism  which  shaped  all  Kant's 
speculations — a  dogmatism  boasting  a  rational  knowl- 
edge of  things  without  the  aid  of  sense-experience." 
Thus  it  is  in  his  opinion  "not  merely  obsolete,  but  so 
unintelligible  that,  without  reading  into  it  an  esoteric 
meaning,  it  is  often  difficult  to  justify  the  composition 
of  the  'Critique  '." 

Professor  Schurman  adds  : 

"Whoever,  therefore,  denies  the  universality  and  necessity  of 
judgments,  whether  the  so-called  veritcs  de  fait  or  the  verites  de 
raison  must  find  Kant's  '  Critique  '  in  large  part  superfluous  and 
irrelevant." 

Certainly,  he  who  denies  the  universality  and  ne 
cessity  of  the  veritcs  de  raison  must  find  Kant's  "  Cri 
tique  "  superfluous  and  irrelevant.  This  is  Mill's  po- 
sition. He  actually  denied  the  universality  and  neces- 
sity of  even  such  a  statement  as  2  x  2  =  4.  But  is  there 
any  one  who  would  take  the  consequences  of  Mill's 
view  seriously  ?    The  fact  remains  that  all  our  science 


76  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

is  built  upon  the  conceptions  of  universality  and  ne- 
cessity. Take  away  our  trust  in  universality  and  ne- 
cessity, and  we  can  draw  no  conclusions  whatever. 
We  could  not  formulate  our  experiences  in  general 
laws,  we  should  be  confronted  with  single  experiences 
only  and  be  not  entitled  to  suppose  them  to  contain 
any  other  than  accidental  uniformities. 

The  fact  remains,  that  the  so-called  "dogmatism 
boasting  of  a  rational  knowledge  without  the  aid  of 
sense-experience  "  does  form  the  basis  of  all  our  sci- 
ences. There  is  no  sense-experience  in  counting  and 
measuring,  there  is  no  sense-experience  in  a  syllogism 
nor  in  any  purely  formal  operations  of  reason  ;  and 
yet  we  apply  them.  Why  can  they  be  applied  ?  That 
is  the  question. 

The  truths  of  reason  (although  in  themselves  mere 
empty  forms)  are  the  cement  of  our  knowledge.  Deny 
their  universality  and  necessity  and  you  make  knowl- 
edge impossible.  But  if  knowledge  were  unreliable, 
if  its  reliability  were  merely  a  happy  incident,  man's 
very  existence,  his  reason,  his  rational  soul;,  his  hu- 
manity would  become  an  insolvable  problem. 


The  terms  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  have  been  used 
to  approach  the  fundamental  problem  of  philosophy 
demanding  an  explanation  of  the  question,  How  is 
reason  (or  rational  knowledge)  at  all  possible  ? 

Thought  is  not  sensation.    Thought  is  the  interac- 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  77 

tion  that  takes  place  among  sensations  or  the  mem- 
ories of  sensations.  Thought  is  not  possible  and  would 
never  have  risen  into  being  without  the  sense-material 
furnished  by  the  senses.  But  thought  does  not  consist 
of  the  sense-material.  Thought  is  the  formal,  the  re- 
lational elements  in  the  minds  of  sentient  beings. 

That  body  of  truths  which  Kant  called  a  priori  yfe 
prefer  to  call  "formal  knowledge,"  A  denial  of  the 
existence  or  applicability  of  that  which  in  Kant's  awk- 
ward terminology  is  called  a  priori,  i.  e.  a  denial  of 
formal  knowledge,  is  tantamount  to  a  denial  of  the  ex- 
istence and  applicability  of  reason. 

Whatever  Kant's  errors  may  have  been  in  the  so- 
lution of  the  problem,  he  was  right  in  his  statement  of 
the  fact  that  there  is  a  priori  knowledge.  Kant  says 
in  the  preface  to  his  "Critique  of  Practical  Reason" 
(a  passage  which  Professor  Schurman  quotes  without 
seeing  its  strength)  : 

"What  v;orse  could  happen  to  these  our  efforts  than  that 
somebody  should  make  the  unexpected  discovery  that  there  is  no 
a  priori  knowledge  at  all,  and  can  be  none.  But  there  is  no  ground 
for  anxiety.  That  would  be  to  prove  by  reason  that  there  is  no 
reason.  For  we  say  that  we  know  anything  by  reason  only  when 
we  are  conscious  that  we  could  have  known  it,  even  if  it  had  not 
been  given  us  in  experience  ;  so  that  knowledge  through  reason 
and  knowledge  a  priori  are  the  same." 


78  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


THE  FORMAL. 

Science  begins  with  the  application  of  formal 
thought,  viz.,  with  counting,  measuring,  and  classify- 
ing. Only  with  the  assistance  of  the  formal  sciences 
can  we  master  the  material  given  in  the  sensory  data 
of  experience  ;  and  thus  it  happens  that  the  formal  is 
the  condition,  not  of  any  kind  of  experience,  but  of 
all  systematic  experience. 

The  formal  sciences  are  the  tools  of  cognition. 
That  to  which  they  cannot  be  applied  remains  unex- 
plained. 

The  different  formal  sciences  are  constructions  of  a 
purely  formal  nature.  Thus,  numbers  are  a  system 
of  units  (i.  e.  empty  forms)  ;  the  logical  categories  a 
system  of  ideas,  representing  the  various  relations  that 
can  obtain  among  things,  etc.  These  and  other  sys- 
tems of  pure  forms  do  not  exist  ready-made,  or  in  a 
latent  form  in  the  mind,  but  must  be  constructed  out 
of  the  purely  formal  elements  obtained  from  experience 
by  abstraction. 

Animals  are  incapable  of  making  abstractions,  and 
that  is  the  reason  why  they  cannot  develop  formal 
thought.  Abstraction  is  the  condition  of  the  evolution 
of  formal  thought,  for  all  the  formal  sciences  move  in 
a  definite  sphere  of  abstraction. 

We  have  to  distinguish  between  the  rigidly  formal, 


THE  METHODS  OE  PHILOSOPHY.  79 

the  purely  formal,  and  the  empirically  formal.  The 
last  kind  of  formality  comprises  the  real  forms  of  things 
with  which  we  become  acquainted  in  experience.  The 
purely  formal  is  to  be  found  in  the  laws  of  stereometry, 
Euclidean  geometry,  etc.,  while  logic,  arithmetic,  and 
algebra  are  rigidly  formal. 

What  is  the  difference?  The  rigidly  formal  is  the 
product  of  mental  operations  alone.  Our  mental  ac- 
tivity alone  is  given.  Otherwise  there  is  no  assump- 
tion whatever  ;  no  hypothesis,  no  axiom.  In  arith- 
metic we  count  our  mental  acts,  we  add  and  subtract 
them  ;  and  out  of  these  operations  the  magnificent 
structure  of  this  great  formal  science  is  created.  We 
construct  and  observe  the  products  of  our  construction. 
There  is  nothing  but  certain  mental  acts  and  the  con- 
sequences involved  in  these  acts.  In  all  the  rigidly 
formal  sciences  we  combine  and  separate  and  recom- 
bine.  By  investing  the  same  products  with  same  names 
and  equating  the  outcome  of  two  sets  of  operations 
with  the  same  results,  we  create  the  material  of  our 
science  ourselves,  as  the  spider  spins  the  web  that  is 
to  serve  him  as  his  field  of  operations,  out  of  his  own 
being.     Says  an  old  rhymster  : 

"  Logicus  aranea  potest  cotnparari 
Quie  subtiles  didicit  ielas  operari, 
Qute  suis  visceribus  vohtni  consuntmari 
Et  pretium  musca  si  forte  que  at  laqueari."  ♦ 

— Tom  Wright,  "  Political  Songs  of  England,"  p.  209. 

•  Trie  logician  may  be  compared  to  a  spider  who  has  learned  to  weave 
fine  webs,  which  will  be  produced  from  her  bowels,  and  the  reward  is  a  fly  if 
she  haply  can  catch  one. 


8o  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Mathematics  and  pure  mechanics  are  not  quite  so 
rigidly  a  priori  as  arithmetic  and  algebra.  Their  con- 
structions introduce  some  additional  features  which 
may  be  called  assumptions  or  axioms,  or  derivations 
from  experience,  or  common  notions. 

Whatever  we  may  call  them,  they  are  arbitrary  ; 
they  do  not  result  as  a  necessary  consequence  from 
the  operations  with  which  we  start. 

While  in  the  construction  of  rigidl}'  formal  sciences 
we  have  no  choice  left,  we  find  that  in  the  purely  formal 
sciences  there  are  several  constructions  possible.  In 
Euclidean  geometry,  for  instance,  we  execute,  at  the 
suggestion  of  the  real  space-conditions  that  surround 
us,  one  peculiar  construction,  because  this  special  kind 
of  geometry  is  most  serviceable  to  us  \  but  there  are 
other  possibilities  left,  and  we  can  imagine  analogous 
geometries  built  by  the  same  mental  operations  but 
starting  from  other  suppositions. 

Euclidean  geometry  is  a  construction  in  which, 
through  one  point  to  a  given  straight  line,  one  parallel 
only  can  be  drawn.  We  can,  however,  construct  other 
kinds  of  geometry  in  which,  through  a  point  to  a  given 
straight  line,  either  no  parallel  at  all  or  several  paral- 
lels can  be  drawn.*    Besides  our  tridimensional  space 

*  The  latter  assumption,  viz.,  that  through  a  point  to  a  straight  line  sev- 
eral parallels  can  be  drawn  will  produce  a  space  of  negative  curvature,  while 
the  former  assumption  admits  of  two  possibilities,  either  two  straight  lines 
enclose  a  space  (as,  for  instance,  on  the  sphere)  or  two  straight  lines  do  not 
enclose  a  space — which  produces  elliptic  geometry  so-called,  first  observed 
by  Klein.  It  is  doubtful  which  case  Riemann  had  in  mind.  (Translated  from 
a  private  letter  of  Professor  Lindemann  in  which  he  kindly  gave  a  brief  expo- 
sition of  the  situation.) 


THE  METHODS  OF  lUJILOSOPUV.  81 

we  can  conceive  of  four,  five,  and  ;/  dimensional 
spaces,  and  can  with  perfect  precision  define  all  the 
qualities  which  such  spaces  and  their  bodies  must 
possess. 

It  is  a  matter  of  course  that  as  soon  as  we  have 
created,  by  some  arbitrary  construction,  a  certain  fea- 
ture in  a  formal  system,  we  have  to  stick  to  it  and  take 
all  its  consequences.  W^hen  we  speak  of  triangles  of 
Euclidean  space,  we  cannot  attribute  to  them  the 
qualities  of  triangles  in  Lobatschewsky's  or  Riemann's 
space.  Each  geometry  forms  an  independent  domain 
for  itself.  None  of  them  is  truer  than  the  other ;  and 
none  of  them  should  be  confounded  with  the  other. 

The  term  ''rigidly  formal"  is  narrower  than  "purely 

formal. "  All  rigidly  formal  truths  are  at  the  same  time 

purely  formal,  but  not  all  purely  formal  statements  are 

rigidly  formal. 

*  * 

Modern  geometry  proves  that  our  notion  of  space 
is  not  rigidly  formal  \  it  is  only  purely  formal.  The 
statement  that  real  space  is  tridimensional  is  not  a 
necessary  product  of  our  mental  operations.  It  is  not 
on  one  and  the  same  level  with  the  statement  2X  2  =  4. 
The  latter  is  intrinsically  necessary.  There  is  no 
other  possibility  left.  2x2  will  always  be  the  same, 
and  whatever  we  have  called  it,  so  we  shall  have  to 
call  it  again,  or  at  any  rate  regard  it  as  equivalent  and 
equal.  Space,  however,  for  all  we  know  a  priori^ 
might  be  four  or  five  or  //-dimensional ;    and  whether 


82  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

or  not  the  world-space,  i.  e.  the  form  of  reality,  is  tri- 
dimensional is  a  matter  of  experience.  Thus  the  state- 
ment, real  space  is  tridimensional,  contains  an  em- 
pirical or  a  posteriori  element.  It  does  not  contain  any 
information  about  the  material  world,  the  information 
it  conveys  is  purely  formal  still,  but  it  is  not  rigidly 
formal.  It  cannot  be  proposed  as  the  only  possible 
condition  of  being,  for  there  are  other  constructions 
possible  and  imaginable.  Tridimensional  space  is  one 
instance  only  among  innumerable  possibilities,  and 
we  have  through  experience  from  a  posteriori  argu- 
ments sufficient  reasons  to  believe  (or  if  you  prefer,  to 
be  assured)  that  this  one  instance  is  realised  in  the 
actual  world  in  which  we  live. 

Assuming  then,  from  a  posteriori  arguments,  that 
world-space  is  tridimensional,  we  can  forthwith  a  priori 
apply  to  it  all  the  laws  of  tridimensional  space.  All 
the  various  systems  of  Euclidean  and  non-Euclidean 
geometry,  of  mathematical  or  any  other  imaginable 
space-constructions  are  purely  formal  notions.  But 
they  are  not  the  inevitable  consequence  of  our  mental 
operations  only,  they  contain,  each  system  its  own 
peculiar  conditions,  which  are  arbitrarily  established. 
Their  character  is  not  necessary,  but  might  be  other- 
wise. 

Arbitrary  constructions  of  such  a  nature  have  been 
called  "axioms"  and  are  now  commonly  called  "as- 
sumptions." The  one  term  is  as  bad  as  the  other.  The 
name   "axiom"  suggests  that  there  are  indubitable 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  83 

but  unprovable  truths,  and  the  word  "assumption" 
implies  that  we  take  some  supposition  for  granted 
which  may  not  be  correct.  We  might  assume  the  im- 
possible or  that  which  is  contradictor]^  to  the  conse- 
quences of  the  operations  with  which  we  start.  We 
might  assume  that  2x2  is  sometimes  4  and  some- 
times 5.  The  word  assumption  suggests  the  idea  that 
our  procedure  is  unfounded.  We  have  neither  to  ac- 
cept any  truth  without  proof,  nor  are  we  allowed  to 
make  assumptions.  Employing  the  mental  functions 
which  we  possess,  we  can  construct ;  and  there  is  a 
choice,  whether  to  construct  a  plane  geometry  or  other 
geometries.     But  a  choice  is  no  assumption. 


If  the  difference  between  the  rigidly  formal  and  the 
purely  formal  had  been  kept  in  mind  by  modern 
mathematicians,  much  confusion  and  many  errors  ris- 
ing out  of  confusion  would  have  been  avoided.  It  has 
been  said,  for  instance,  that  we  do  not  know  whether 
or  not  the  sum  of  the  angles  in  a  plane  triangle 
is  exactly  180^;  it  may  be  somewhat  more  or  less. 
They  grant  that  it  is  very  approximately  so  and  de- 
clare that  even  the  greatest  triangles  we  can  measure 
are  too  small  to  discover  the  deviation.  As  instances 
parallaxes  of  stars  have  been  adduced,  which  make 
measurements  on  triangles  whose  sides  sweep  through 
cosmic  space  over  the  whole  stellar  universe  ;  but  it  is 
a  pity  for  this  class  of  geometers  that  such  deviations 


84  THE  METHODS  OE  PHTLOSOPHY. 

as  are  found  in  these  calculations  keep  within  the  rea- 
sonable limits  of  errors  which  occur  in  all  analogous 
cases  of  observation.  True,  that  among  about  forty 
measurements  two  only  come  out  negative.  That  might 
be  an  argument  in  favor  of  a  slightly  curved  space  ; 
but  we  can  surmise  that  many  other  negative  measure- 
ments have  been  suppressed  as  obviously  erroneous.* 
This  view  is  based  upon  a  misconception  of  the  nature 
of  the  formal  sciences, 

A  modern  geometer  may  deny  that  world-space  is 
tridimensional,  but  he  cannot  deny  without  inconsis- 
tency that  the  sum  of  the  angles  in  a  plane  triangle  is 
1 80  degrees,  for  it  is  so  by  construction  and  cannot  be 
otherwise  unless  we  reverse  the  conditions  upon  which 
we  have  made  the  construction. 

Suppose  we  construct  a  circle  and  propose  the  the- 
orem that  in  a  circle  all  the  peripheral  angles  upon 
equal  cords  are  equal,  intending  to  prove  that  this  fol- 
lows with  necessity  from  the  qualities  of  the  circle. 
Having  done  so  a  geometrical  friend  of  ours  steps  in 
and  denies  the  validity  of  the  argument.  He  says, 
"The  peripheral  angles  on  equal  cords  in  a  circle  as 
large  as  the  orbit  of  the  earth  round  the  sun  are  ap- 
proximately but  not  exactly  equal.  Your  theorem  may 
be  right  within  certain  limits  and  will  be  sufficient  for 
all  the  small  circles  which  occur  in  our  practical  ex- 
perience. But  whether  it  holds  good  generally  is  very 
doubtful  still.      In  order  to  know  that,  we  shall  have 

*  The  Monist,  Vol.  I,  No.  2,  p.  i73-i74- 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  85 

to  make  more  exact  measurements  with  circles  as  large 
as  the  milk}'^  way.  Within  a  century  our  children  will 
probably  know  more  about  it  than  we  do  now  with  the 
insufficient  material  at  our  disposal." 

What  would  we  tell  him  ?  We  should  tell  him  that 
a  circle  remains  a  circle  as  much  as  a  plane  triangle 
remains  a  plane  triangle  ;  astronomy  may  prove  that 
the  orbit  of  the  earth  round  the  sun  is  only  approxi- 
mately a  circle  (celestial  bodies  move  in  conic  sec- 
tions, our  earth  moving  nearly  in  a  circle),  but  it  can 
as  little  prove  that  peripheral  angles  on  equal  cords 
are  only  approximately  equal,  as  the  measurement  of 
parallaxes  can  induce  us  to  believe  that  the  sum  of 
plane  triangles  is  only  approximately  not  exactly  equal 
to  180°. 

Suppose  that  the  parallaxes  of  stars  really  showed 
that  these  world-sized  triangles  of  astronomy  really 
and  regularly  measured  somewhat  more  or  less  than 
180°,  what  would  be  the  conclusion?  Would  we  in- 
deed have  to  revise  our  mathematics  and  declare  that 
mathematics  is  only  approximately  true  ?  No,  we 
should  conclude  that  the  rays  of  light  do  not  travel  in 
exactly  straight  lines,  that  their  path  is  only  approxi- 
mately straight.  However,  whether  or  not  the  rays 
of  light  travel  in  straight  lines  is  not  a  purely  formal 
question  at  all  ;  it  is  an  empirically  formal  question, 
which  has  as  little  to  do  with  pure  mathematics  as  the 
question  whether  apples  are  exact  or  only  approximate 
globes. 


86  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Important  as  is  the  difference  between  the  rigidly 
formal  and  the  purely  formal  (a  difference  entirely 
overlooked  by  Kant),  the  difference  between  the  purely 
formal  and  the  empirically  formal  is  greater  still.  It 
is  so  obvious,  however,  that  it  has  scarcely  ever  escaped 
attention  and  has  led  to  the  well  known  distinctions 
between  purely  formal  mathematics,  mechanics,  logic, 
etc.,  and  applied  mathematics,  mechanics,  logic,  etc. 
The  purely  formal  sciences  exclude  all  the  incidental 
deviations  of  real  objects,  while  the  applied  formal  sci- 
ences take  notice  of  them,  introducing  them  as  factors 
in  their  calculations. 

How  near  Kant  came  to  the  solution  of  the  problem 
which  actually  explains  all  and  is  in  our  opinion  the 
only  satisfactory  answer  possible,  viz.,  that  the  formal 
sciences  arc  purely  formal  constructions,  will  be  seen 
from  the  following  passage  in  Kant's  preface  to  the 
second  edition  of  his  "Critique  of  Pure  Reason." 

"A  new  light  must  have  flashed  on  the  mind  of  the  first  man 
( Thales,  or  whatever  may  have  been  his  name)  who  demonstrated 
the  properties  of  the  isosceles  triangle.  For  he  found  that  it  was 
not  sufi&cient  to  meditate  on  the  figure,  as  it  lay  before  his  eyes,  or 
the  conception  of  it,  as  it  existed  in  his  mind,  and  thus  endeavour 
to  get  at  the  knowledge  of  its  properties,  but  that  it  was  necessary 
to  produce  these  properties,  as  it  were,  by  a  positive  a  priori  con- 
struction; and  that,  in  order  to  arrive  with  certainty  zi  a  priori 
cognition,  he  must  not  attribute  to  the  object  any  other  properties 
than  those  which  necessarily  followed  from  that  which  he  had 
himself,  in  accordance  with  his  conception,  placed  in  the  object." 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  87 

After  this  explanation  Kant  falls  back  upon  the  theory 
that  the  a  priori  or  purely  formal  elements  are  given  by 
the  mind,  which  is  quite  another  thing  than  constructed 
by  the  mind.  If  they  were  "given  by  the  mind  "  they 
would  exist  in  the  mind  as  a  latent  knowledge,  in  the 
same  way  that  we  know  many  things  of  which  we  are 
not  conscious  and  to  recollect  which  may  require  con- 
siderable mental  effort.  But  if  they  are  constructed  by 
the  mind,  we  need  only  look  upon  certain  mental 
operations  as  given.  The  products  of  these  operations 
are  the  object  of  the  formal  sciences.  And  in  this  way 
we  can  indeed  escape  all  the  perplexing  consequences 
of  Kant's  transcendentalism. 


Kant  was  puzzled  that  we  could  know  anything 
a /rzVr/ concerning  the  constitution  of  things.  He  saw 
only  two  possibilities  ;  either,  he  said,  we  have  derived 
this  knowledge  from  the  things  by  experience,  or  we 
ourselves  have  put  it  into  the  things  to  which  it  really 
does  not  belong.  The  former  possibility  being  ex- 
cluded, since  the  purely  formal  truths  are  a  priori, 
Kant  accepted  the  other  horn  of  the  dilemma  declaring 
that  our  faculty  of  cognition  did  not  conform  to  the 
objects,  but  contrariwise,  that  the  objects  conform  to 
cognition.  The  objects  do  not  in  themselves  possess 
form,  but  our  mind  is  so  constituted  that  it  cannot 
help  attributing  form  and  everything  formal  to  the  ob- 
jects of  our  experience, 


88  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Kant  did  not  see  that  form  might  be  a  property  of 
all  existence  that,  in  that  case,  the  purely  formal  in 
things  would  be  of  the  same  nature  as  the  purely  formal 
in  man's  mind. 

Nature  is  throughout  activity,  and  so  our  existence 
is  throughout  activity.  Nature  is  constantly  combining 
and  separating  ;  and  these  same  operations  are  inalien- 
able functions  of  our  mind.  They  are  given  together 
with  our  existence. 

When  we  construct  some  purely  formal  configura- 
tion with  our  nature-given  mental  operations,  it  will  be 
the  same  as  any  other  construction  which  has  been 
made  in  the  same  way,  be  it  in  the  domain  either  of 
things  or  of  other  minds.  Nature  performs  the  same 
operations  which  appear  in  man's  mental  activity.  Be- 
ing a  part  of  existence,  what  is  more  natural  than  that 
man's  bodily  and  mental  existence  partakes  of  the  same 
form  as  all  the  other  parts  of  the  world  that  surrounds 
him. 

A  great  and  important  part  of  our  knov/ledge  con- 
sists of  rigidly  formal  theorems  \  they  are  a  priori. 
And  these  rigidly  formal  theorems  contain  actual  infor- 
mation concerning  the  real  world.  And  why  ?  Because 
they  are  systematic  reconstructions  of  a  certain  feature 
of  reality  by  operations  which  take  place  throughout 
the  universe.  When  Kant  says  :  Our  mind  ''dictates  " 
certain  laws  to  the  objects  of  experience ;  he  uses  a 
wrong  expression  or  takes  a  poetical  license  seriously. 
The  mind  "dictates"  nothing  to  reality.    Reality  is  in- 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  89 

dependent  of  what  we  think  it  to  be.  That  which  Kant 
calls  dictating  is  a  mere  determining,  a  mere  foretell- 
ing or  predicting  by  constructing  in  our  mind  an  anal- 
ogous model. 

The  agreement  between  our  model  and  reality 
proves  only  that  the  model  is  correct,  it  does  not  prove 
that  the  model  does  any  dictating.  The  model  dictates 
as  little  to  reality  as  a  barometer  dictates  what  air- 
pressure  there  is  to  be  in  the  atmosphere. 

The  purely  formal  gives  information  concerning 
things  so  general  that  they  are  the  same  throughout  the 
universe,  and  the  rigidly  formal  concerning  things 
so  universal  that  they  are  the  same  in  all  possible  uni- 
verses. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  THREE  DIMENSIONS  OF 

SPACE. 

Our  geometricians  have  always  attempted  to  con- 
struct space  from  its  simplest  elements.  They  take  a 
point  which  is  very  vaguely  defined  as  that  which  has 
neither  parts  nor  magnitude.  The  point  is  moved, 
and  its  path  is  called  a  line.  Now,  a  peculiar  difficulty 
arises,  when  out  of  moving  points  alone  they  propose 
to  define  the  idea  of  straightness.  This  is  impossible, 
and,  in  want  of  anything  better,  a  straight  line  is  gen- 
erally defined  as  the  shortest  distance  between  two 
points.  Having  a  straight  line,  the  rest  is  easy  enough. 
We  construct  a  plane  by  moving  a  straight  line  in  any 


go  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

direction  not  its  own,  and  solids,  again,  by  moving  a 
plane  in  any  direction  not  contained  in  the  plane. 

Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  circumvent  the 
difficulty  of  presenting  an  unequivocal  and  purely  ra- 
tional, i.  e.,  rigidly  formal  or  a  priori,  definition  of  a 
straight  line.  Vain  as  these  attempts  were  for  that 
purpose,  they  have  not  been  futile,  for  they  have  led 
to  the  startling  discovery  of  the  possibility  of  other 
space  constructions.  It  is  strange,  nevertheless,  that 
no  one  has  yet  called  attention  to  the  faults  of  the 
method  itself.  Should  we  succeed  in  satisfactorily  de- 
fining or  constructing  a  straight  line,  it  would  avail  us 
nothing.  We  should  be  in  the  predicament  of  the 
physician  who  has  removed  one  symptom  only  of  a 
disease,  without  curing  its  deeper-seated  cause,  which 
continues  to  work  evil  effects   in  other  parts  of  the 

organism. 

* 
*  * 

The  fault  of  the  geometrical  method  lies  (so  it 
seems  to  me)  in  its  apriorism.  It  is  the  same  vice  as 
that  of  the  ontological  school  of  philosophy,  which 
starts  the  world  from  nothing.  Nothing  is  one  minus 
one  (o^i  —  i),  which,  when  transposed,  reads  o-h  i^  i. 
This  at  once  launches  us  into  positive  statements. 
True  philosophy,  however,  must  not  only  start  from 
facts,  but  also  be  and  remain  a  statement  of  facts. 
Philosophy  is  the  science  of  the  method  of  dealing 
with  facts  according  to  their  nature.  The  method  of 
dealing  with  facts  has  to  be  derived  from  the  facts  them- 


TJIE  METJWDS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  gi 

selves.  Pure  reason  is  nothing,  unless  it  is  the  inter- 
action of  ideas.  All  processes  of  reasoning  are  mental 
operations  with  representations  of  facts.  They  start 
from  known  facts  and  proceed  to  unknown  facts  ;  and 
if  the  conclusions  at  which  we  arrive  are  not  facts,  our 
reasoning  is  a  mere  Vanity  Fair. 

All  the  formal  sciences,  not  less  than  philosophy, 
must  start  with  something  ;  they  must  be  based  upon 
facts,  and  the  facts  of  the  formal  sciences  are  the  opera- 
tions which  are  constitutional  to  our  mind,  and  with- 
out which  nothing  would  exist.  In  mathematics  the 
additional  fact  of  space  is  presupposed,  mathematics 
being  the  science  of  purely  form.al  space-relations. 


How  lame  is  the  old  method  of  constructing  space 
with  points  ! 

First,  notice  that  the  definition  of  a  point  is  nega- 
tive. A  point  is  something  without  parts  and  magni- 
tude. Are  there  not  many  things  without  parts  and 
magnitude,  which  are  not  points  ?  All  material  things 
have  parts  and  magnitude,  but  immaterial  things  have 
no  extension  and  cannot  always  be  divided  into  parts. 
Has,  for  instance,  the  color  red  any  parts?  Has  a  pain 
any  parts  ?  A  desire  may  be  great  or  strong,  but  it  can- 
not be  large.  An  idea  may  be  grand,  but  it  can  pos- 
sess no  magnitude.  Or  can  any  one  state  what  are  the 
size  and  the  parts  of  the  idea  of  unity  ? 

Second,  consider  that  space,  the  thing  to  be  con- 


92  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

structed,  is  after  all,  tacitly  or  even  openly,  presup- 
posed. To  obviate  the  first  objection  an  amendment 
ismade.  "A point,"  we  are  told,  "is  that /«j/«r^  which 
has  neither  parts  nor  magnitude."  *  If  space  is  pre- 
supposed, why  trouble  at  all  to  construct  it  ? 

Having  constructed  the  solid  as  the  third  power  of 
extension,  we  suddenly  stop  ;  for  space  has,  so  we  say, 
three  dimensions  only.  This  seems  arbitrary  and  our 
mathematicians  are  puzzled  as  to  why  we  cannot  con- 
tinue constructing  four,  five,  or  ^-dimensional  bodies. 
That  such  constructions  are,  theoretically,  quite  admis- 
sible, Grassmann's,  Lobatschewsky's,  and  Riemann's 
investigations  have  demonstrated. 

* 
*  * 

Suppose  we  begin  at  the  other  end  and  say  that  in 
mathematics  (i)  our  mental  operations,  and  (2)  space 
are  given.  Our  mathematical  operations  are  acts  that 
take  place  in  space  ;  they  are  motions,  and  space  is  the 
possibility  of  motion. 

Points  are  not  real  objects,  but  mental  artifices  to 
determine  a  position  in  space.  A  point  is  in  space, 
but  it  is  not  ^  space,  which  means,  it  indicates  a  loca- 
tion, but  has  no  extension.  We  may  use  as  a  point, 
or  indicator  of  a  special  spot,  anything  we  please,  our 
own  body,  our  finger,  the  point  of  a  pencil,  a  dot,  the 
whole  earth,  the  sun,  or  Sirius.  But  we  have  to  bear 
in  mind  that,  extension  being  excluded,  we  have,  as  a 

♦  Most  of  the  German  text-books  offer  the  following  definition  :  Ein  Putikt 
ist  ein  Ding  'im  Raum,'  das  keine  Theile  hat. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  93 

matter  of  mental  abstraction,  to  ignore  the  materiality 
of  these  indicators  of  location,  and  in  case  they  are  as 
large  as,  for  instance,  Sirius,  we  have  to  know  where 
to  locate  the  point,  either  in  its  centre,  or  at  some  spe- 
cially marked  corner. 

Points  are  conceived  as  movable;  and  "space" 
being  the  condition  of  motion,  we  have  further  to  in- 
quire into  the  nature  of  space.  We  can  construct  vari- 
ous kinds  of  mathematical  space,  such  as  planes,  hom- 
aloidal  (or  even)  as  well  as  curved,  the  three-dimen- 
sional space  for  stereometrical  constructions,  and  also 
imaginary  spaces  of  n  dimensions.  Yet  we  find,  as  a 
matter  of  experience,  that  our  world-space  is  three- 
dimensional,  and  here  we  ask.  Could  not  space  just  as 
well  have  either  more  or  less  than  three  dimensions  ? 
Is  the  tridimensionality  of  space  purely  arbitrary,  or 
can  we  detect  for  it  any  assignable  reason  ? 

Certainly,  considering  a  priori  arguments  alone, 
space — i.  e.,  the  real  world-space — could  have  any 
number  of  dimensions,  or  no  existence  at  all,  just  as 
we  do  not  know  why  the  world  exists,  and  why  there 
is  not  in  its  place  mere  nothingness. 


The  dimensions  of  space  would  appear  less  arbi- 
trary, and  we  should  sooner  acquiesce  in  their  nature, 
if  they  were  infinite  in  number.  Infinitude  is  the 
absence  of  limits.  Infinitude,  accordingly,  is  a  matter 
of  course,  while  the  linitude  of  a  certain  limit  or  num- 


94  THE  METHODS  OF  FHJLOSOPHY. 

ber  is  a  special  restriction,  which  calls  for  a  special 
explanation. 

In  the  same  way,  eternity,  or  infinitude  of  time,  is 
a  matter  of  course,  if  but  existence  be  given,  while  be- 
ginning and  end  must  have  their  special  causes.  Eter- 
nity is  implied  in  existence. 

We  ought  to  expect  space  to  be  in  possession  of 
infinite  dimensions,  for  such  a  state  of  things  would 
be  as  plausible  and  as  little  startling  as  the  eternity  ol 
time. 

This  consideration  suggests  the  idea  of  how  to  con- 
struct a  space,  not  as  Riemann  did,  of  n  (viz.,  any 
number  of)  dimensions,  but  of  truly  infinite  (viz.,  in- 
exhaustibly many)  dimensions. 

While  attempting  to  think  a  space  of  an  infinite 
number  of  dimensions,  we  are  struck  by  the  fact  that 
space  actually  possesses  infinite — not  dimensions,  but 
— directions. 

A  space  of  infinite  directions  is  that  condition  of 
motion  in  which  there  is  no  restriction  whatever.  It 
means  the  absence  of  any  impediment. 


What  is  the  difference  between  a  dimension  and  a 
direction? 

Directions  are  the  possibilities  of  motion  in  actual 
space  ;  dimensions,  however,  are  contrivances  for  de- 
termining directions  as  well  as  locations  in  space  from 
a  given  reference  point.   Directions,  accordingly,  must 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  95 

be  considered  as  given  by  nature  ;  they  are  data  of 
experience,  and,  being  infinite  in  number,  they  are 
exactly  what  we  must  expect  them  to  be.  Dimensions 
are  artificial;  dimensions,  as  such,  are  not  given  by 
nature.  They  are  as  little  natural  as  right  angles,  or 
logarithms,  or  a  sine,  or  an  integral,  or  an  infinites- 
imal. 

Straight  lines  are  directions  of  a  peculiar  kind. 
They  possess  a  simplicity  and  consistency  which  dis- 
tinguishes them  from  irregular  lines  and  from  curves. 

* 

Sir  Robert  Stawell  Ball,  of  Cambridge,  England, 
speaking  of  the  theories  of  some  modern  mathema- 
ticians, who  deny  the  Euclidean  axiom  of  parallel 
lines,  and  proposing  the  theory  that  a  straight  line, 
after  a  journey  which  is  not  infinite  in  its  length,  may 
return  to  its  starting-point,  says,  in  an  article  pub- 
lished  in  the  Fortnightly  Review,  May,  1893,  p.  632  : 

"If  any  one  should  think  this  a  difficulty,  I  would  recom- 
mend him  to  try  to  affix  a  legitimate  definition  to  the  word 
'straight.'  He  will  find  that  the  strictly  definable  attributes  of 
straightness  are  quite  compatible  with  the  fact  that  a  particle 
moving  along  a  straight  line  will  ultimately  be  restored  to  the 
point  from  which  it  departed." 

Sir  Robert  Ball  does  not  believe  in  homaloidal 
space,  such  as  is  presupposed  by  Euclid,  but  thinks 
that  if  he  could  but  make  space  a  little  bit  curved,  all 
such  difficulties,  as  infinitude,  would  vanish. 


96  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Now,  we  believe  that  the  straightness  which  con- 
stitutes the  homaloidality  of  space  is  not  so  much  a 
quality  of  space,  as  of  our  methods  of  calculating  and 
computing  space-relations. 

We  can  imagine  a  condition  of  things  in  which, 
through  some  unknown  cause,  a  point  moving  with 
strictest  consistency  in  one  and  the  same  direction 
should  suffer  a  slight,  but  constant,  switching  off. 
This  would  make  Euclidean  straight  lines  no  longer 
available  for  certain  practical  purposes,  but  would  not 
render  them  theoretically  impossible;  nor  would  it  in- 
volve homaloidal  geometry  in  contradictions.  The 
infinitude  of  homaloidal  space  would  remain  what  it  is 
now,  a  difificulty,  but  not  an  antinomy.  However,  the 
finitude  of  a  curved  space  presents  innumerable  new 
problems,  a  satisfactory  solution  of  which  appears 
very  improbable. 

Professor  Ball  says  that  all  the  strictly  definable 
attributes  of  straightness  are  compatible  with  curved 
space.  While  granting  the  difficulty  of  defining  straight- 
ness by  purely  a  priori  methods  from  moving  points 
only,  we  claim  that  straight  lines  are  describable  by 
methods  of  abstraction  on  the  ground  of  our  space- 
experiences. 

Take  two  points  of  any  line,  and  turn  the  line  be- 
tween the  points  round  itself.  Every  line  which  by 
this  operation  will  change  its  place  is  called  curved, 
while  that  line  which  remains  in  its  place  is  called 
straight  ;  in   other  words,  every  curved  line  has  an 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  97 

axis  of  rotation  outside  itself,  while  the  straight  line  is 
its  own  axis  of  rotation.  In  one  case,  rotation  makes 
a  difference,  in  the  other  case,  rotation  does  not  in- 
volve change  of  position  ;  and  this  latter  condition  is 
what  Euclid  calls  ''even,"  in  describing  a  straight 
line.  *  We  do  not  intend  to  attach  too  much  importance 
to  this  description  of  straightness,  but  it  seems  to  fulfil 
all  the  demands — except  that  it  leaves  space  as  infinite 
as  before,  which,  however,  ought  to  be  expected. 

We  must  not  forget  that  infinitude,  being  the  ab- 
sence of  limits,  is  a  simpler  conception  than  finitude. 
While  the  infinitude  of  space  involves  difficulties,  the 
finitude  of  space,  so  it  seems  to  us,  involves  not  only 
an  innumerable  host  of  undreamed  of  problems,  but 
also  an  actual  antinomy.  On  close  inspection  it  will 
be  found  to  be  a  paralogism  of  reason. 


Straight  lines,  as  peculiar  paths  of  motion,  remind 
us  of  rays  of  light.  Light  is  the  quickest  motion  we 
know  of ;  and  the  problem  has  often  been  proposed. 
Why  do  rays  of  light  travel  in  straight  lines,  i.  e.,  in 
paths  of  shortest  time? 

Physicists  of  former  ages  found  in  this  condition 
of  things  an  argument  for  the  Creator's  wisdom  ;  and 
at  present  there  is  a  tendency  to  regard  the  path  of  a 
ray  of  light  as  the  prototype  of  straight  lines  in  geom- 


*  Euclid  says  :  "A  straight  line  is  that  which  lies  evenly  between  its  ez- 
treme  points." 


98  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

etry.  The  fact,  however,  is  that  light  does  not  travel 
in  straight  lines  or  on  paths  of  shortest  time,  but  in  all 
directions  and  on  an  infinite  number  of  paths.  But  on 
the  paths  of  shortest  time  the  action  of  light  is  so  in- 
tensified as  to  produce  that  peculiar  result  which  we  call 
rays. 

Similarly,  if  we  consider  a  point  as  a  permanent 
source  of  a  homogeneous  motion,  which  simultaneously 
takes  place  in  all  its  infinite  directions,  the  continuous 
summation  of  the  results  in  the  paths  of  shortest  time 
would  mark  the  geometrical  straight  line.  This  should 
assist  us  in  looking  upon  the  nature  of  a  straight  line 
as  the  accumulated  sum  of  motion  in  one  and  the  same 
direction.  Suppose  that  motion  pours  forth  in  all  direc- 
tions, and  that  every  point  to  which  the  motion  is  trans- 
ferred is  again  a  source  of  motion  in  all  directions  : 
Among  the  infinite  number  of  directions  there  is  always 
one  which  continues  the  direction  from  which  the  mo- 
tion is  received,  so  as  to  connect  it  directly,  i.  e.,  on  the 
shortest  path,  with  the  original  source.  Thus  the 
straight  line  represents  the  maximum  of  action  in  a 
minimum  of  absolutely  unimpeded  motion,  and  must  as 
such  be  taken  as  a  Grenzbegriff,  i.  e.,  a  conception 
which  denotes  the  utmost  limit  to  be  reached  by  a  cer- 
tain operation. 

The  homaloidality  (or  evenness)  of  space  is  not  a 
positive  but  a  negative  quality,  being  due  to  the  non- 
existence of  any  impediment  of  motion,  it  means  the 
absence  of  positive  qualities. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  99 

Suppose  a  ray  of  light  did  not  travel  in  a  straight 
line,  we  should  not  have  to  infer  that  space  is  curved 
but  that  there  is  an  impediment  to  the  action  of  light, 
preventing  it  from  reaching  the  limit  of  a  maximum  of 
action  in  a  minimum  of  time.  Part  of  the  action  being 
absorbed  by  the  resistance  of  the  medium  through 
which  it  travels  the  ray  is  no  longer  straight,  but 
curved. 

Suppose  that  a  rotating  line  could  not  be  made 
identical  with  its  axis  of  rotation  we  should  then  have 
to  assign  a  cause  for  our  inability  to  reach  the  limit  of 
its  shortest  size. 

If  the  straight  line  is  viewed  as  a  Grenzbegriff,  the 
mystery  which  surrounds  it  disappears.  We  need  no 
longer  marvel  either  at  the  wisdom  of  the  Creator  that 
rays  of  light  travel  in  paths  of  shortest  time,  or  at  the 
arbitrariness  of  nature  that  space  is  homaloidal. 

* 
*  * 

The  problem  accordingly  is  not,  why  is  a  straight 
line  not  curved,  but  what  is  a  straight  line?  And  con- 
cerning the  extension  of  space,  we  must  not  ask  why  is 
space  three-dimensional,  but  why  can  the  infinite  direc- 
tions of  space  be  reduced  for  purposes  of  space-deter- 
mination or  for  the  location  of  points  to  three  orthog- 
onal directions. 

This  problem  is  not  a  problem  of  philosophy  proper, 
but  of  the  algebra  of  formal  thought,  and  we  are  not 
as  yet  prepared  to  solve  it.     We  must  be  satisfied  at 


ioo  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

present  to  have  formulated  it.  Suffice  it  here  to  indi- 
cate that  we  are  inclined  to  believe  that  any  infinitude 
may  for  practical  measurements  always  be  reduced  to 
three  fundamental  elements,  the  first  one  of  which  may 
be  selected  arbitrarily,  while  the  second  is  to  be  con- 
structed with  reference  to  the  first,  and  the  third  with 
reference  to  the  first  and  second.* 

Suppose  we  have  a  system  of  infinitely  various  inter- 
relations. We  represent  them  graphically  as  an  in- 
finite number  of  points  in  all  possible  positions,  all  of 
which  are  combined  among  themselves  bylines.  It  is 
inevitable  that  the  elements  of  these  interconnections 
will  be  triplet  relations.  Suppose  that  all  points  are 
interconnected,  the  diagram  will  consist  of  triangles 
only.  Every  elementary  interrelation  will  be  of  a  three- 
fold nature  and  is  determinable  by  three  magnitudes. 

We  can  always,  with  triads,  or,  so  to  speak,  with 
logical  triangles,  compute  any  relation  in  any  universe 
of  infinite  possibilities.  Those  interrelations  which 
are  more  complex  (we  might  call  them  polyads  or  po- 
lygonal relations)  can  always  be  resolved  into  or  re 
duced  to  triads  or  triplet-relations, 

* 
*  * 

Those  who  have  studied  Hegel  are  familiar  with  the 
importance  of  the  trinity- relation.  The  logical  necessity 
of  the  triad  is  inevitable,  for  every  simple  relation  is 

*  In  this  connection  we  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  innumerable 
varieties  of  color-tints  can  be  reduced  to,  and  determined  by,  three  funda- 
mental colors. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY  loi 

inevitably  triune  in  its  nature.  The  relation  A  and  B 
is  not  a  duality,  but  a  trinity,  for  besides  A  and  B  we 
have  that  which  combines  them  or  constitutes  their  pe- 
culiar connection.  Thus  it  is  a  logical  necessity  that 
all  dualism  leads  to  triism  or  rather  triunism,  and  tri- 
unism  is  again  monism. 

We  cannot  even  conceive  of  God  without  attribut- 
ing trinity  to  him.  An  absolute  unity  would  be  non- 
existence. God,  if  thought  of  as  real  and  active,  in- 
volves an  antithesis,  which  may  be  formulated  as  God 
and  World,  or  natura  nattirans  and  natura  naturata,  or 
in  some  other  way.  This  antithesis  implies  already 
the  trinity-conception.  When  we  think  of  God  not 
only  as  that  which  is  eternal  and  immutable  in  existence, 
but  also  as  that  which  changes,  grows,  and  evolves,  we 
cannot  escape  the  result  and  we  must  progress  to  a 
triune  God-idea.  The  conception  of  a  God-Man,  of 
a  Saviour,  of  God  revealed  in  evolution,  brings  out  the 
antithesis  of  God  Father  and  God  Son,  and  the  very 
conception  of  this  relation  implies  God  the  Spirit  that 
proceeds  from  both. 

Mathematics  is  a  constructive  science  and  we  ex- 
pect to  find  only  a  priori  constructions  in  it.  But  this 
is  a  mistake.  Although  mathematics  is  a  constructive 
science,  it  starts  from  certain  data,  and  the  data  of 
mathematics  are  not  the  products  of  a  priori  construc- 
tions, but  the  results  of  abstraction. 

Mathematical  space,  too,  is  rather  an  abstraction 
than  a  construction.  We  first  drop  in  our  thoughts  the 


I02  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

materiality  as  well  as  the  dynamical  reality  of  relations 
and  retain  the  mere  form  of  interrelations — viz.,  posi- 
tions and  directions.  These  positions  and  directions 
are  then  taken  to  be  infinite  and  continuous ;  and  for 
purposes  of  determination  they  are  reduced  to  the  three 
coordinates,  called  dimensions. 

Our  explanations  must  not  attempt  to  bridge  the  gap 
from  non-existence  to  existence.  We  must  not  attempt 
to  elucidate  the  qualities  of  that  which  exists  from  that 
which  does  not  exist.  Our  explanations  must  aspire  to 
be  systematic  descriptions  of  that  which  is,  and  compre- 
hension consists  in  recognising  the  consistency  of  being. 
That  existence  exists,  and  that  it  is  not  non-existence 
will  always  impress  us  as  arbitrary,  but  the  qualities 
of  existence  will  cease  to  appear  arbitrary  when  we 
find  that  any  one  fact  agrees  with  all  other  facts.  The 
quality  a  which  we  find  in  the  configuration  A  appears 
different  from  ft  which  we  find  in  the  configuration  B. 
But  when  we  find  that  R  or  Reality  under  the  peculiar 
conditions  given  in  A  appears  as  a  and  under  the  pe- 
culiar conditions  given  in  B  appears  as  ft,  so  that 
a  =  RA  and  ft  =  RB,  we  cease  to  consider  a  and  ft 
as  arbitrary. 

The  tridimensionality  of  space  strikes  us  as  ar- 
bitrary, but  its  main  arbitrariness  is  the  arbitrariness  of 
reality  itself.  Yet,  above  all  this  there  is  hope  that  we 
can  conceive  it  as  a  consistent  corollary  of  the  infinitude 
of  space-relations.  We  can  regard  it  as  due  to  the 
same  reason  that  a  syllogism,  consisting  of  two  premises 


rilE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  103 

and  one  conclusion,  presents  a  triad  relation.  In  that 
case  the  tridimensionality  of  space  is  in  the  same  pre- 
dicament as  other  facts  which  can  be  explained  by  the 
usual  methods.  It  is  neither  more  nor  less  arbitrary 
than,  for  instance,  the  value  of  n  as  3.14589  .  .  .  and 
of  logarithm  3  as  0.4771213. 

REASON. 

The  difference  between  the  two  great  philosophical 
parties  of  the  middle  ages  may,  in  a  modernised  form, 
be  characterised  as  follows  : 

The  Realist  recognises  forms  as  realities  of  a  uni- 
versal nature.  The  samenesses  in  the  world,  the  simi- 
larities and  dissimilarities,  the  relations  and  the  changes 
taking  place  in  these  relations,  are  actual  and  objective. 
Thus  the  universal  is  real. 

The  Nominalist  regards  universals  as  idealities. 
He  professes  to  know  only  single  experiences  and  be- 
lieves that  he  is  not  warranted  in  assuming  a  coherence 
among  them.  To  him  the  samenesses  which  a  mind 
discovers  are  not  real ;  they  are  mental  impositions. 
The  regularities  of  laws  have  no  objective  existence, 
but  are  purely  subjective  conceptions,  and  universals 
are  mere  names. 

To  the  Realist  the  universe  is  one  whole,  the  bond 
of  union  being  the  universal  in  the  single  experiences. 

To  the  Nominalist  the  universe  is  a  sum  of  innume- 
rable items,  and  we  are  not  entitled  to  make  any  con- 


104  THE  METHODS  OE  PHILOSOPHY. 

elusion  from  the  nature  of  one  of  them  as  to  the  nature 
of  others. 

The  nominalistic  position  appears  to  be  the  more 
guarded  one.  But  when  adhered  to  and  applied  with 
consistency  it  makes  knowledge  impossible.  It  is  in 
its  root  scepticism  and  leads  to  agnosticism. 

Now  the  question  is,  can  the  realistic  assumption 
be  proved  or  not?  Is  the  denial  of  the  legitimacy  of 
realistic  conclusions  justifiable  or  not  ? 

If  the  universe  were  actually  an  indifferent  medley 
of  single  facts,  without  any  coherence  of  their  own,  so 
that  all  the  order  we  see  in  the  world  were  given  to  it 
by  ourselves,  reality  would  be  more  correctly  pictured 
in  the  animal  brain  than  in  the  human  mind. 

The  question,  as  to  whether  or  not  there  is  any 
universality,  is  the  problem  of  reason.  If  there  were  no 
universality  there  would  be  no  dependence  on  reason. 
Reason  would  be  of  a  purely  ideal,  or  merely  sub- 
jective and  illusory,  nature.  Its  application  to  reality 
would  be  an  assumption,  at  best  a  mere  working  hy- 
pothesis. Thus  there  would  be  no  knowledge,  but 
opinions  only,  and  we  could,  with  strict  consistency, 
not  even  say  that  if  all  men  are  mortal,  Caius,  being  a 
man,  must  be  mortal,  too. 

When  we  deny  universality,  we  kill  reason,  for  uni- 
versality is  the  life-blood  of  reason. 

How  can  we  justify  the  assumption  of  universality? 

There  may  be  some  coherence  among  the  many 
single  facts  of  our  experience,  but  perhaps  we  are  un- 


THE  METHODS  OF  FHILOSOPHY.  105 

able  to  verify  it,  and,  for  all  we  know,  the  coherence 
may  be  partial. 

Before  we  enter  into  a  discussion  of  the  problem, 
let  us  ask  :  Is  it  at  all  true  that  experience  consists  of 
many  single  items,  and  do  we  not,  when  treating  ex- 
perience as  such,  inadvertently  imply  a  whole  theory, 
the  consequence  of  which  will  crop  out  unawares  after- 
wards? It  maybe  true  that  realism  begins  with  an  as- 
sumption, but  we  should  not  be  blind  to  the  fact  that 
nominalism  also  is  not  free  of  assumptions. 

The  truth  is  that  experience  is  a  coherent  entirety, 
and  the  existence  of  single  facts  is  due  only  to  an 
analysis  of  experience.  There  is  no  fact  unconnected 
with  other  facts,  and  the  connections  of  facts  are  not 
merely  incidental  features.  Reahty  can  be  understood 
only  when  it  is  conceived  as  a  system  of  changes. 
Events  are  intelligible  only  when  viewed  as  transforma- 
tions, so  that  the  laws  of  form  which  obtain  in  these 
transformations  are  universal. 

Thus  it  appears  that  universality  is  as  much  a  fact 
of  experience  as  are  sensations.  Sensation  is  the 
subjective  symbol  for  what  objectively  appears  as 
matter,  and  the  connections  and  forms  of  our  sensa- 
tions are  the  subjective  aspect  of  the  interrelations  of 
material  reality.  The  truth  is,  that  not  only  matter  is 
real,  but  its  forms,  also. 

The  problem  of  universality  is  the  same  as  the 
problem  of  necessity,  and  the  problem  of  necessity  is 
the  problem  of  determinableness.     How  is  it  that  we 


io6  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

can  determine  certain  things  ?*  This  again  is  the  prob- 
lem of  reason. 

The  most  perplexing  feature  of  reason  is  its  faculty 
of  «/r/(?r/ determination.  We  can  make  certain  state- 
ments with  perfect  assurance  concerning  things  which 
sometimes  we  cannot  even  know  by  direct  experience. 

For  instance,  we  accurately  measure  first  the  dis- 
tance betv>'een  two  observatories,  which  happen  to 
lie  in  the  same  longitude,  and  then  the  two  angles 
at  which  the  moon  passes  through  the  meridian.  We 
thus  have  a  triangle  of  which  one  side  and  the  two 
adjacent  angles  are  known,  and  it  is  easy  enough  tc 
calculate  from  these  data  the  distance  of  the  moon 
from  the  earth.  We  can  never  directly  measure  the 
moon's  distance  by  yard-sticks  or  tape-lines,  but  we 
can,  without  further  experience  or  experiment,  be  sure 
that  calculation  as  such  is  reliable.  The  moon's  dis- 
tance being  known,  we  can  proceed  to  measure  the 
sun's  distance  by  measuring  the  angle  at  which  sun 
and  moon  appear  on  earth  when  the  moon  is  exactly  at 
the  half.  We  again  have  a  triangle  in  v/hich  three  parts 
are  known,  viz.,  (i)  the  distance  between  earth  and 
moon ;  (2)  the  angle  at  the  moon  as  a  right  angle  ; 
and  (3)  the  angle  at  the  earth  by  measurement.  And 
from  these  data  we  can  calculate  the  hypothenuse  of 

*  Necessity  is  often  regarded  as  a  compulsion,  and  determinism  is  accord- 
ingly confounded  with  fatalism.  "An  event  is  necessary,"  means  simply  that 
it  can  be  determined,  and  "  to  determine  "  means  to  describe  with  precision. 
All  determinations  are  made  on  the  supposition  of  the  presence  of  certain 
conditions  and  the  absence  of  any  other  factors  which  might  interfere, 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  107 

the  right-angled  triangle,  which  is  the  distance  between 
sun  and  earth.  In  this  way  human  reason  bridges  over 
the  gap  between  the  known  and  the  unknown. 

Reality  possesses  certain  features  which  can  be  de- 
termined, not  by  experience,  but  a  priori,  by  purely 
formal  thought,  i.  e.,  by  pure  reason. 

There  is  this  peculiarity  about  our  reasoning,  that 
the  first  act  determines  the  following  acts.  When  we 
construct  an  equilateral  triangle,  we  cannot  help  also 
making  the  angles  equal ;  and  when  we  construct  an 
equiangular  triangle,  we  cannot  help  making  the  sides 
equal.  This  is  a  puzzling  fact  to  those  who  look  upon 
the  world  as  a  sum  of  many  incoherent  items.  It  is  all 
but  inexplicable  from  the  nominalistic  standpoint.  But 
it  is  only  a  more  complex  case  of  the  fact,  that  when 
we  have  determined  A  to  be  A,  we  cannot  at  the  same 
time  determine  it  to  be  not  A.  By  positing  A,  A  is  A 
and  remains  A  in  all  its  cojisequences.  Only  by  inverting 
reason  itself,  can  I  say  that  A  is  A  and  not  A  at  the 
same  time. 

What  is  reason  ? 

We  present  as  a  preliminary  definition  the  state- 
ment that  reason  is  man's  method  of  thinking.  Noire 
says:  "Man  thinks  because  he  speaks";  and  Max 
Miiller,  standing  upon  the  same  ground,  adds:  "No 
language  without  reason,  no  reason  without  language." 
We  are  quite  willing  to  adopt  the  results  of  modern 
philology,  but  they  are  not  sufficient  for  our  pres- 
ent purpose.    Our  problem  is  deeper  still.    We  accept 


io8  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  Noir^-Miiller  theory  and  may  restate  it  as  follows  : 
Language  is  the  organ  of  rational  thought,  and  rational 
thought  develops  through  the  mechanism  of  language. 
Our  present  problem,  however,  is  not  How  did  human 
reason  develop  ?  but  How  is  it  possible  that  our  reason 
can  give  us  information  about  reality  ? 

Not  all  processes  of  reasoning  give  us  information 
about  reality,  but  only  such  as  are  carried  on  with  con- 
sistency. Thus  we  have  to  modify  our  preliminary 
definition  of  reason.  Reason  is  not  any  process  of  rea- 
soning, but  a  certain  and  quite  definite  kind  of  reason- 
ing, and  reasoning  is  rational  only  when  it  agrees  with 
this  one  kind  of  reasoning.  Accordingly  we  define  rea- 
son as  "the  norm  of  reasoning." 

We  ask.  Is  there  any  norm  of  reasoning?  In  this 
form  the  question  again  reminds  us  of  the  old  problem 
of  realism  versus  nominalism.  Is  there  any  universality, 
generality,  or  necessity  ?  Our  answer  is  affirmative. 

One  thing  is  pre-eminently  characteristic  of  reason, 
viz.  that  there  is  but  one  reason.  There  are  not  vari- 
ous reasons.  Reason  (if  it  is  reason  at  all)  is  the  same 
in  one  man  as  in  another  man.  As  there  is  but  one 
kind  of  arithmetic,  so  there  is  but  one  kind  of  reason. 

Reason  in  the  sense  of  "  norm  of  reasoning  "  is  to 
be  used  without  the  article.  If  a  man  gives  a  reason 
for  his  action,  or  if  he  speaks  of  the  reason  he  has,  he 
means  the  rational  motives  or  principles  by  which  he 
allows  himself  to  be  influenced.  Such  reasons  are  va- 
rious and  of  different  natures  ;  but  reason  as  the  norni 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  109 

of  reasoning,  is  no  individual  or  particular  thing  or 
idea  ;  its  very  nature  is  generality  or  rather  universal- 
ity.    And  it  is  a  real  feature  of  existence. 

Mathematicians  with  great  ingenuity  have  invented 
various  kinds  of  mathematics.  They  have  shown  that 
Euclidean  geometry  is  but  one  actual  case  among  many 
possible  instances.  Space  might  be  curved,  it  might 
be  more  than  three-dimensional.  But  no  one  has  yet 
been  bold  enough  to  propound  a  theory  of  curved  reason. 

And  why  should  there  not  as  well  exist  a  curved 
logic  as  a  mathematics  of  curved  space?  A  curved 
logic  would  be  a  very  original  innovation  for  which 
no  patent  has  yet  been  applied  for.  What  a  splendid 
opportunity  to  acquire  Riemann's  fame  in  the  domain 
of  logic  ! 

We  must  let  this  fine  opportunity  of  propounding 
a  new  and  extremely  original  conception  of  reason  slip 
away,  for  we  are  not  in  a  disposition  to  make  good  use 
of  it.  A  curved  reason  would  be  simply  crooked  rea- 
son, for  the  rigid  sameness  of  reason  prevents  us  ad- 
mitting any  different  kinds  of  reason. 

The  inmost  nature  of  reason  is  consistency,  and 
thus  the  simplest  statement  of  rational  thought  is  the 
maxim  of  sameness  formulated  in  logic  in  the  sentence 
A  =  A.  The  formula  A  =  A  \s,  as  it  were,  the  straight 
line  of  logic;  but  with  this  difference  that  we  can 
imagine  as  possible  (although  not  as  actual)  the  straight 
lines  of  curved  spaces,  but  not  a  logic  that  abandons 
what  might  be  called  "the  axiom  of  consistency." 


no  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

The  axiom  of  parallels  in  geometry  corresponds  to 
the  syllogism  in  logic.  Inconsistent  reason,  a  reason 
which  does  not  acknowledge  the  truth  expressed  in  the 
formula  A  =  A,  which  can  accept  the  existence  and  non- 
existence of  a  thing  at  the  same  time  is  pseudo-reason; 
and  if  pseudo-reason  as  a  possible  case  by  the  side  of 
actual  reason  were  a  legitimate  assumption,  all  think- 
ing would  cease  and  all  being  would  be  thrown  into 
confusion,  reason  would  be  nonsense  and  the  world  a 
chaos,  everything  would  be  a  medley  without  coherence, 
without  rhyme  or  reason,  a  vast  bedlam,  and  reason 
itself  would  present  an  exceptional  case,  unaccount- 
able, odd,  strange,  exceptional,  brought  about  perhaps 
incidentally  as  a  happy  chance.  But  how  this  reason 
could  be  of  any  objective  use  would  present  new  dififi- 
calties.  For  reason  being  only  an  incidental  chance 
occurrence  in  our  brain  would  have  no  applicability  to 
the  objects  around  us.  Of  a  triangle  which  we  con- 
structed in  our  mind,  we  could,  perhaps,  from  three 
known  parts,  determine  the  other  unknown  parts.  But 
it  would  be  impossible  for  this  mental  model  of  a  tri- 
angle to  give  us  information  about  a  real  triangle 
formed  by  the  sun,  the  moon,  and  the  earth.  And 
when  information  thus  acquired  was  found  to  be  cor- 
rect, we  should  be  confronted  with  an  all  but  miracu- 
lous coincidence. 

There  are  two  classes  of  formal  sciences,  the  one  is 
characterised  by  geometry,  the  other  by  logic,  algebra, 
and  arithmetic.   The  former  we  have  on  another  occa- 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOFIIY.  m 

sion  called  purely  formal,  the  other  rigidly  formal,  the 
rigidly  formal  being  a  special  kind  of  the  purely  formal. 
The  rigidly  formal  sciences  are  products  of  our  mental 
operations.  There  is  no  assumption,  no  hypothesis, 
no  knowledge  of  the  actual  forms  of  the  world  in  it. 
The  other  formal  sciences,  such  as  Euclidean  geom- 
etry, assumes  that  space  is  of  a  certain  nature.  Space 
is  a  pure  form  of  the  world  ;  but  that  space  is  such  as 
it  is,  we  know  through  experience.  We  cannot  by 
pure  reason  alone  prove  that  space  is  tri-dimensional 
or  that  it  is  homaloidal. 

Reason  is  not  merely  purely  formal,  it  is  rigidly 
formal.  Reason  is  unequivocally  determined ;  and 
when  we  say  "  all  men  are  mortal  and  Caius  is  a  man," 
we  can  by  no  means  escape  the  conclusion  that  Caius 
is  mortal. 

The  rigidly  formal  being  in  its  applications  strictly 
reliable  in  experience,  there  is  no  other  explanation 
than  to  think  of  experience  as  possessed  of  the  same 
nature  as  our  thought.  There  is  an  analogy  between 
mental  operations  and  natural  processes  which  proves 
that  they  are  ultimately  of  the  same  kind. 

When  we  consider  the  events  of  the  world  in  their 
simplest  possible  conditions,  we  resolve  it  into  in- 
numerable processes  of  motion,  as  a  constant  shifting 
about.  There  are  separations  and  combinations,  and 
wherever  the  same  separations  and  combinations  take 
place  there  are  also  the  same  results.  This  sameness, 
which  can  be  formulated  as  a  law,  viz.,  that  the  same 


112  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

produces  the  same,  is  a  reality,  and  indeed  the  most 
real  reality,  for  it  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  cosmic  na- 
ture of  the  world  ;  it  implies  that  existence  is  not  a 
chaotic  chance  medley,  but  a  cosmos  permeated  by 
uniformities  and  regulated  by  laws.  All  laws  will  in 
the  end  have  to  be  recognised  as  mere  corollaries  of 
this  simplest  of  all  laws,  which  is  nothing  but  the  self- 
consistency  of  being.  This  fundamental  law  is  by  its 
very  nature  eternal  and  universal ;  it  thus  constitutes 
an  intrinsic  and  inalienable  quality  of  existence ;  and 
no  existence  can  be  without  it.  To  be  sure,  it  is  a 
purely  formal  law,  for  it  tells  us  nothing  as  to  the  sub- 
stance, the  material,  the  sensations,  or  other  qualities 
of  being  ;  but  for  that  reason  it  is  not  less  real.  The 
formal,  indeed,  is  the  most  important  part  of  reality, 
for  the  forms  of  things  make  the  things  in  their  indi- 
viduality what  they  are. 

The  same  operations  which  are  active  everywhere, 
separations  and  combinations,  build  up  the  human 
frame,  and  in  the  human  frame  also  man's  mind. 
Human  reason  is  a  structure  built  up  by  mind  opera- 
tions ;  and  pure  reason  is  a  mental  construction  of 
them  in  abstract  purity.  The  human  mind  being  a 
part  of  the  world,  we  find  that  the  law  of  sameness 
holds  good  also  for  the  products  of  purely  mental  ope- 
rations :  the  same  operations  yield  the  same  results. 
Moreover,  there  will  be  an  agreement  of  the  con- 
structions of  pure  reason  and  the  laws  that  obtain  in 
them  with  the  configurations  of  reality  and  the  purely 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  113 

formal  laws  of  the  universe.  This  agreement  was  the 
puzzle  of  Kant,  which  led  him  astray  into  the  by- 
paths of  his  transcendental  idealism  ;  and  yet  this 
agreement  is  nothing  but  the  law  of  sameness,  which 
he  neither  doubted  as  a  logical  law,  nor  as  a  feature  of 
reality.  He  might,  with  the  same  reason,  be  puzzled 
because  one  egg  looks  like  another. 

Experience,  viz.,  the  effect  of  events  upon  sen- 
tient beings,  is  caused  by  sense-impressions  and  con- 
sists of  sensations.  Every  sensation  is  a  feeling  of  a 
certain  kind  and  form,  and  the  various  sensations  are 
interrelated.  Thus  we  have  (i)  the  properly  feeling 
element,  or  the  sentient  or  sensory  part  of  a  sensation, 
and  (2)  its  formal  or  relational  aspect. 

When  we  consider  in  ahstracto  these  two  qualities, 
the  purely  formal  on  the  one  hand  and  the  purely  sen- 
sory on  the  other,  we  are  struck  by  a  peculiar  contrast. 
We  attribute  necessity  and  universality  to  the  formal, 
while  the  phenomena  of  the  sensory  exhibit  such  an 
irregularity  that  we  can  never  attain  to  the  certainty 
that  they  are  the  same  in  one  case  as  in  another. 

No  amount  of  sense-experience,  be  it  ever  so  large, 
can  justify  the  proposition,  that  "because  something 
has  been  so  in  nine  hundred  and  ninety-nine  cases  it 
will  also  be  the  same  in  the  thousandth  case."  While, 
contrariwise,  one  case  of  experience  of  a  formal  con- 
sideration, for  instance,  that  the  equalit}'  of  sides  in  a 
triangle  constitutes  an  equality  of  the  angles  at  its 
base  is  sufficient  to  establish  a  universal  rule. 


114  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

This  contrast  has  given  many  a  headache  to  Mr. 
Mill  and  his  followers,  but  they  have  never  solved  the 
problem  ;  nor  can  they  solve  it  so  long  as  they  cling 
to  the  principle  from  which  the  sensational  school 
starts,  that  all  knowledge  is  and  remains  a  mere  asso- 
ciation of  single  sensations;  a  principle  which  over- 
looks the  important  contrast  between  the  formal  and 
the  material.  Says  Mr.  Mill  in  his  System  of  Logic, 
III,  chap,  iii,  §  3  : 

"There  are  cases  in  which  we  reckon  with  the  most  unfailing 
confidence  upon  uniformity,  and  other  cases  in  which  we  do  not 
count  upon  it  at  all.  In  some  we  feel  complete  assurance  that  the 
future  will  resemble  the  past,  the  unknown  be  precisely  similar  to 
the  known.  In  others,  however  invariable  may  be  the  result  ob- 
tained from  the  instances  which  have  been  observed,  we  draw 
from  them  no  more  than  a  very  feeble  presumption  that  the  like 
result  will  hold  in  all  other  cases.  That  a  straight  line  is  the 
shortest  distance  between  two  points,  we  do  not  doubt  to  be  true 
even  in  the  region  of  the  fixed  stars. 

"Why  is  a  single  instance,  in  some  cases,  sufficient  for  a  com- 
plete induction,  while  in  others,  myriads  of  concurring  instances, 
without  a  single  exception  known  or  presumed,  go  such  a  very 
little  way  toward  establishing  a  universal  proposition  ?  Whoever 
can  answer  this  question  knows  more  of  the  philosophy  of  logic 
than  the  wisest  of  the  ancients,  and  has  solved  the  problem  of  in- 
duction." 

He  who  does  not  see  the  contrast  between  the 
formal  and  the  material,  between  that  which  imparts 
necessity  to  conclusions  and  the  incidental  features  of 
experience,  between  the  universal  and  the  particular, 
can   never  arrive  at  scientific  certainty,  and  he  will 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  115 

naturally  be  puzzled  at  his  own  boldness  when  he  un- 
hesitatingly accepts  some  conclusion,  based  perhaps 
upon  one  single  observation,  as  of  universal  applica- 
tion. 

The  formal  sciences  are  systematic  ;  they  are  pro- 
duced by  construction  and  can  thus  exhaust  all  possi- 
bilities of  a  case,  while  our  sensory  experience  bears 
the  character  of  the  incidental ;  all  information  through 
the  senses  is  only  in  parts.     And  why  is  that  so? 

We  perform  certain  operations,  for  instance,  in 
arithmetic  we  add  and  subtract,  and  we  invest  the 
products  of  our  operations  with  certain  symbols.  We 
call  I  -f  I  "two"  (denoted  by  the  sign  "2")  and 
i  +  i  +  i  "three"  (denoted  by  the  sign  "3");  and  we 
find  that  the  product  of  the  operation  i  + 1  is  the  same 
as  the  product  of  the  operation  3 — i,  viz.,  =2.  This 
is  so  and  will  be  so  whenever  we  repeat  the  operation; 
and  this  quality  that  it  will  always  be  so  is  called  "  ne- 
cessity" or  "rigidity." 

The  whole  mystery  of  logical  necessity  consists  in 
this,  that  exactly  the  same  operation  will  always  bring 
about  exactly  the  same  product.  The  same  is  true  of 
all  purely  formal  operations.  Unforeseen  interferences 
of  unknown  powers  being  excluded  from  this  domain 
of  abstraction,  we  can  pronounce  with  absolute  cer- 
tainty the  verdict  that  in  this  sense  twice  two  will  un- 
der all  circumstances  be  four. 

The  objection  has  been  made  that  twice  two  may 
be  five  in  other  worlds,  but  we  reject  this  view  as  ab- 


ii6  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

surd.  We  willingly  grant  that  two  bacilli  plus  two 
bacilli  might  be  five  or  even  five  hundred  and  more 
bacilli,  because  they  might  rapidly  multiply  during  the 
operation.  This  is  quite  possible  in  the  tube  of  the 
microscopist,  but  it  is  impossible  in  mathematics,  for 
in  the  realm  of  abstract  thought  all  such  possibilities 
are  excluded.  There  we  measure  or  count  only  our 
mental  operations.  When  counting  our  mental  steps 
only,  we  cannot  have  made  five  hundred  steps  when 
we  have  made  only  four. 

Having  constructed  in  our  mind  systems  of  formal 
thought,  such  as  numbers,  geometrical  figures,  the 
logical  categories,  etc.,  we  are  in  possession  of  sched- 
ules which  serve  us  for  reference  when  dealing  with 
the  real  world,  and  their  infallible  rigidity  is  extremely 
useful  in  extending  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge. 

Having  constructed  by  certain  mental  operations 
(which  in  their  elementary  forms  are  very  simple  in- 
deed, being  upon  the  whole  nothing  but  a  combining, 
separating,  and  recombining)  we  possess  in  the  pro- 
ducts of  our  formal  thought  an  instrument  that  enables 
us  to  deal  with  single  experiences  and  to  systematise 
them  into  exact,  scientific,  and  philosophical  knowl- 
edge ;  in  other  words,  we  possess  reason. 

Reason  originates  by  a  differentiation  of  the  formal 
and  the  sensory  in  experience.  As  soon  as  the  formal 
has  been  separated  in  thought  from  the  sensory,  as 
soon  as  an  animal  learns  to  speak,  to  count,  and  to 
think  in  abstracts,  it  has  developed  reason.      Reason 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  117 

does  not  rise  out  of  the  sensory  element  of  our  sensa- 
tions and  memory-images,  but  out  of  their  interrela- 
tions. Reason  is  the  product  of  abstract  thought-ope- 
rations, and  pure  reason  is  a  system  of  empty  forms 
whose  office  it  is  to  arrange  in  good  order  and  to  sys- 
tematise further  experience. 

Reason  is  not  an  arbitrary  invention,  it  is  not  the 
product  of  a  hap-hazard  association  :  reason  is  the 
method  of  our  experience  and  the  norm  of  all  thinking. 

Experience  is  the  natural  revelation  of  existence  to 
sentient  beings  ;  reality  impresses  itself  upon  their  sen- 
tiency  and  thus  forms  their  notions.  But  we  find  that  all 
the  impressions  of  experience  possess  in  spite  of  their 
infinite  variety  certain  features  in  common,  and  these 
universal  features  develop  in  the  course  of  the  mental 
evolution  of  sentient  beings  into  those  notions  which 
in  their  systematic  unity  are  called  "reason." 

Reason  is  not  purely  subjective.  Reason  is  objec- 
tive in  its  nature.  Our  subjective  reason,  human  rea- 
son, or  the  rationality  of  our  mind  grows  out  of  that 
world-order  which  we  may  call  the  rationality  of  ex- 
istence. Human  reason  is  only  the  reflection  of  the 
world-reason,  the  former  is  rational  only  in  so  far  as 
it  agrees  with  the  latter. 

Reason  (i.  e.  human  reason)  in  its  elementary  be- 
ginnings consists  first  of  the  operations  that  take  place 
among  mental  images.  Mental  operations  are  the  germ 
of  reason,  and  mental  operations  are  as  such  the  same 
as  any  other  operations,  the  same  as  any  process  that 


n8  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

takes  place  in  nature.  Reason  is,  secondly,  a  mental 
picture  of  certain  qualities  of  reality ;  and  being  the 
picture  of  a  universal  feature  of  reality,  it  conveys  in- 
formation applicable  to  all  reality.  Thus  reason  is, 
thirdly,  an  instrument  which  enables  us  methodically 
and  critically  to  deal  with  any  kind  of  experience. 


ABSTRACTION. 

The  importance  of  understanding  the  process  and 
scope  of  abstraction  is  very  great,  for  abstraction  is 
the  very  essence  and  nature  of  man's  method  of 
thought.  The  ability  of  thinking  in  abstracts  distin- 
guishes him  from  the  rest  of  the  animal  world,  for  ab- 
straction is  the  main  function  of  reason,  and  abstract 
thought  is  almost  a  synonym  of  rational  thought. 

Abstraction  is  a  very  simple  process,  and  yet  some 
of  the  greatest  philosophers  have  misunderstood  it. 
He,  however,  who  is  not  clear  on  this  subject,  or  neg- 
lects the  rules  of  abstraction,  will  never  be  able  to  at- 
tain accuracy  or  lucidity  of  thought. 

The  greatest  difificulty  for  a  child  when  he  learns  to 
walk  is,  not  to  stumble  over  his  own  feet.  Similarly, 
the  greatest  difficulty  with  philosophers  is,  not  to 
stumble  over  their  own  ideas.  All  our  ideas  are  ab- 
stractions, and  different  abstractions  represent  differ- 
ent qualities  of  the  objects  which  we  meet  in  experience. 
In  order  to  preserve  clearness  of  thought,  we  must  not 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  119 

confound  the  different  ideas,  and  must  not  transfer  a 
certain  abstract  that  belongs  to  one  set  of  abstractions 
into  another  quite  different  domain  of  abstractions. 
At  the  same  time,  we  must  never  leave  out  of  sight 
that  the  reality  from  which  our  abstractions  are  made 
is  one  inseparable  unity. 

The  very  existence  of  many  problems  proves  how 
little  the  nature  of  abstract  ideas  is  understood.  There 
is,  for  instance,  the  question  which  has  again  and  again 
been  raised,  whether  the  soul  can  be  explained  from 
matter  or  energy.  The  question  itself  is  wrong,  and 
proves  that  the  questioner  stumbles  over  his  own  ideas. 
We  might  just  as  well  ask  whether  matter  can  be  ex- 
plained from  energy,  or  energy  from  matter.  Matter 
and  energy  are  two  different  kinds  of  abstraction,  and 
feelings,  or  states  of  consciousness,  are  again  another 
kind.  We  cannot  explain  an  idea  by  confounding  it 
with  other  heterogeneous  ideas.  What  should  we  say, 
for  instance,  of  a  man  who  spoke  of  blue  or  green 
ideas,  or  who  attempted  an  explanation  of  mathemati- 
cal problems  from  the  law  of  gravitation  ?  What  should 
we  say  of  a  philosopher  who  sought  to  determine 
whether  ideas  could  be  explained  from  the  ink  in 
which  they  are  written  ? 

Our  abstracts  are  stored  away,  as  it  were,  in  differ- 
ent drawers  and  boxes.  Any  one  who  expects  to  solve 
problems  that  confound  two  sets  of  abstractions,  has 
either  stored  his  ideas  improperly  or  searches  for  them 
in  the  wrong  box. 


I20  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

If  a  problem  is  hopelessly  entangled,  we  cannot 
solve  it,  and  being  led  to  regard  the  confusion  of  our 
mind  as  a  true  image  of  the  world  :  we  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  world  is  incomprehensible ;  that  is, 
we  fall  into  agnosticism.  But  such  is  the  confusion 
generally  prevailing,  that  the  man  who  reaches  the 
conclusion  that  all  things  are  at  bottom  utterly  un- 
knowable, becomes  the  leading  philosopher  of  the  time. 
Mr.  Spencer  actually  declares  in  his  famous  work, 
"The  Data  of  Psychology,"  that  "the  substance  of 
mind"  (sic  !)  is  unknowable. 

Mr.  Spencer  searches  for  his  explanation  of  mind 
in  the  wrong  box. 

Misunderstand  the  nature  of  abstraction  and  an 
impenetrable  mist  will  cover  all  your  thinking  and 
philosophising. 

Says  Professor  Huxley  in  an  address  on  Descartes's 
"  Discourse  ": 

"If  I  say  that  impenetrability  is  a  property  of  matter,  all  that 
I  can  really  mean  is  that  the  consciousness  I  call  extension  and  the 
consciousness  I  call  resistance,  constantly  accompany  one  another. 
Why  and  how  they  are  thus  related  is  a  mystery." 

He  first  abstracts  two  qualities,  viz.,  extension  and 
resistance,  from  one  and  the  same  thing,  and  then 
wonders  why  they  are  constantly  found  together.  Be- 
sides, unless  we  identify  the  two  ideas,  extension  and 
resistance  are  not  always  joined  together.  The  sur- 
rounding air  is  extended,  but  does  not  perceptibly  re- 
sist, unless  confined  so  that  it  cannot  escape.      Exten- 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  121 

sion  and  resistance,  of  course,  always  accompany  one 
another  if,  as  in  physics,  extension  is  used  as  a  synonym 
of  resistance,  if  extending  means  exercising  a  pressure 
or  resisting.  Where  is  the  mystery  that  fluidity  is  al- 
ways accompanied  by  liquidity,  that  inflammability  is 
always  found  together  with  ignitability,  etc.? 

Professor  Huxley  has  stored  ideas  which  belong  in 
the  same  box  in  different  boxes. 


Some  philosophers  forget  very  easily  that  our  ideas 
are  not  reality  itself,  but  representations  of  reality. 
They  are  symbols,  representing  certain  features  of 
reality.  While  our  ideas  of  different  spheres  partly 
overlap,  partly  exclude  each  other,  reality  itself,  from 
which  they  have  been  abstracted,  is  not  a  "combina- 
tion "  of  heterogeneous  existences.  On  the  contrary, 
we  must  always  bear  in  mind  that  the  totality  of  the 
world  is  an  inseparable  unity.  All  reality  is  one  great 
whole,  and  our  ideas  draw  limits  between  the  different 
provinces  that  are  of  a  purely  ideal  nature. 

Ideas,  and  especially  abstract  ideas,  are  symbols 
that  serve  for  orientation  in  the  world.  They  help 
us  to  find  our  bearings.  Energy  is  not  matter,  and 
matter  is  not  energy,  but  for  that  very  reason  there  is 
no  matter  without  energy,  or  energy  without  matter. 
In  the  same  way  consciousness  is  neither  matter  nor 
energy,  but  consciousness  for  that  reason  is  not  a  thing 
in  itself.    It  is  not  an  independent  existence  that  exists 


122  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

apart  from  matter  or  energy.  Things  in  themselves, 
in  the  sense  of  separate  and  independent  entities,  do 
not  exist.  But  philosophers  are  too  apt  to  regard 
their  abstract  ideas  (their  noumena)  as  representing 
things  in  themselves.  Thus  time  is  not  space,  and 
space  is  not  time,  and  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  is 
material ;  but  we  are  not  therefore  justified  in  con- 
ceiving of  time  or  space  as  things  in  themselves.  In 
brief,  all  abstracts  represent  features  of  that  great  in- 
separable whole  which  is  called  reality,  the  world,  the 
universe,  or  nature.  Matter  is  not  an  inscrutable  en- 
tity, but  a  name  for  that  quality  which  all  material 
things  have  in  common.  Space  and  time  are  thought- 
constructions  built  of  abstract  notions  representing 
certain  relations  of  things.  And  the  inside  world  of 
man,  the  states  of  his  consciousness,  his  sensations, 
perceptions,  and  ideas,  no  less  than  all  other  abstracts, 
form  one  special  sphere  of  abstraction — the  domain  of 

psychology. 

* 

The  words  abstract  and  abstraction  are  derived  from 
the  Late  Latin  abstractum  and  abstractio,  the  latter 
being  the  act  of  abstracting,  the  former  the  product 
of  abstraction.  The  old  Romans  did  not  use  the 
words  abstractio  and  abstractum  in  a  philosophical 
sense.  These  ideas  are  a  product  of  the  great  nomi- 
nalistic  controversy  and  first  appear  in  the  twelfth 
century.  Abstraction  was  originally  used  in  contrast 
to  "subtraction."     Abstraction  was  the  consideration 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  123 

of  form  apart  from  matter,  and  subtraction  the  con- 
sideration of  the  essence  without  heeding  its  form.* 

Modern  usage  has  dropped  the  scholastic  distinc- 
tion between  ''abstract"  and  "subtract"  entirely,  and 
places  the  abstract  in  opposition  either  to  the  "con- 
crete" or  to  the  "intuitional,"  i.  e.  the  direct  percep- 
tion of  objects. 

Abstraction  means  "to  single  out,  to  separate  and 
hold  in  thought." 

For  instance :  when  observing  the  whiteness  of 
snow,  we  concentrate  our  attention  upon  the  quality 
of  whiteness,  to  the  neglect  of  all  the  rest.  Attention, 
accordingly,  is  the  condition  of  abstraction.  Special 
wants  produce  special  interests  ;  special  interests  pro- 
duce special  attention,  and  a  special  attention  singles 
out  and  keeps  in  mind  that  which  is  wanted. 

Abstraction  is  first  a  concentration  of  attention, 
involving  the  neglect  of  everything  else,  then  a  mental 
separation  of  the  part  or  quality  upon  which  the  atten- 
tion is  concentrated,  and  finally  the  establishment  of  a 
relative  independence  of  the  product  of  abstraction. 
This  completes  the  function  of  abstraction,  and  as  this 
can  be  done  only  by  naming,  abstract  thought  is  iden- 
tical with  rational  thought,  which  is  the  characteristic 
feature  of  the  thought  of  speaking  beings. 

This  is  the  reason  why  abstract  thought  is  upon 
earth  the  exclusive  prerogative  of  man  ;  and  why 
brutes  are  incapable  of  abstract  thought.     The  process 

♦  See  Century  Dictionary,  s.  v.  abstract. 


124  7'^^^'  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

of  naming  is  the  mechanism  of  abstraction,  for  names 
establish  the  mental  independence  of  the  objects 
named. 

As  soon  as  the  color  of  the  snow  has  been  denoted, 
the  word  designating  snowish  color  or  whiteness  be- 
comes applicable  as  a  thought-symbol  to  the  same 
quality  wherever  it  is  found. 

* 
*  * 

The  verb,    "to  abstract,"   is  used,   according  to 

Drobisch,  either  in  a  logical  or  psychological  sense  ; 

in  the  former  we  abstract  certain  qualities  of  a  given 

complex,  in  the  latter  we  abstract  our  attention  from 

certain  objects.   (See  Mansel,  "Prolegomena  Logica," 

3d  ed.,  p.  30.)     Hamilton  regards  the  former  usage 

as  improper.     Says  Hamilton  : 

"I  noticed  the  improper  use  of  the  term  'abstraction'  by 
many  philosophers,  in  applying  it  to  that  on  which  the  attention  is 
converged.  This  we  may  indeed  be  said  to  prescind,  but  not  to 
abstract.  Thus,  let  A,  B,  C  be  three  qualities  of  an  object.  We 
prescind  A,  in  abstracting  from  B  and  C,  but  we  cannot  without 
impropriety  say  that  we  abstract  A." 

In  agreement  with  Hamilton,  Sully  remarks  : 

"Abstraction  means  etymologically  the  active  withdrawal  of 
attention  from  one  thing  in  order  to  fix  it  on  another  thing." 

The  Century  Dictionary  adds  to  this  quotation  : 

"This  is  all  founded  on  a  false  notion  of  the  origin  of  the 
term." 

The  old  quarrels  between  Nominalists  and  Real- 
ists, important  though  they  were,  are  forgotten.    The 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  125 

distinction  between  "abstract"  and  "subtract"  has 
lost  its  meaning.  Hamilton  and  Sully's  usages  have 
not  been  accepted  outside  some  narrow  circles  of  Eng- 
lish scholars  ;  and  the  most  natural  and  common  usage 
of  the  verb  "to  abstract,"  it  seems  to  us,  is  in  the 
sense  "to  form  abstracts,"  or  "to  make  an  abstrac- 
tion." We  abstract  a  certain  quality  of  a  certain  thing, 
(say  whiteness)  and  treat  it  in  our  thought  as  if  it 
were  a  thing  itself. 

*  * 

Intuition,  in  the  proper  sense  of  the  term,  i.  e.  An- 
schaming  or  atsight,  furnishes  the  immediate  data  of 
our  sense-impressions.  (See  p.  g  et  seqq.  of  this  book.) 
Man's  thought,  i.  e.,  the  properly  human  of  his  mind- 
operations,  consists  in  an  analysis  and  reconstruction 
of  his  Anschauungen,  intuitions,  or  atsights,  i.  e.,  of 
the  data  given  him  in  his  sense-impressions.  With 
the  assistance  of  language,  man  separates  and  recom- 
bines  certain  features  of  his  atsights  ;  he  constructs 
ideas,  which  enable  him  to  find  out  in  the  events  of 
nature  the  determining  factors  and  to  make  them,  on 
a  large  scale,  subservient  to  his  wants. 

Man's  ideas,  and  most  so  his  general  ideas  or  gene- 
ralisations, in  so  far  as  they  are  represented  by  names, 
are  products  of  abstract  thought.  The  idea  "horse  " 
is  not  the  actual  and  concrete  reality  of  the  sight  of  an 
individual  horse,  but  a  generalisation  ;  it  is  a  name 
representing  to  every  English-speaking  man  the  com- 
posite image  of  all  horses,  or  pictures  of  horses  seen, 


126  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

and  including,  in  addition,  all  the  knowledge  he  has 
of  horses.  The  general  idea  of  a  horse  thus  stands  in 
contrast  to  real  horses ;  it  is  not  the  horse  itself,  but  a 
thought-symbol  signifying  horse  in  general. 

Abstract  thought  is  decried  as  pale,  colorless,  shad- 
owy, and  unreal.  True  enough,  in  a  certain  sense, 
for  abstract  thought  is  not  intuition,  it  is  not  Anschau- 
ung,  and  therefore  it  cannot  possess  the  vivid  glow  of 
sensuous  activity,  the  reality,  individuality,  directness, 
and  immediateness  of  the  objects  presented  to  our 
senses.  Yet,  in  another  sense,  abstract  ideas  are  not  at 
all  unreal. 

The  atsights  of  our  sense-experience  are  the  basis 
of  all  abstract  ideas.  The  atsights  are  the  real  facts, 
our  abstract  ideas,  however,  are  artifices  invented  for 
the  purpose  of  better  dealing  with  facts ;  they  are  real- 
ity-describing symbols  and  well-designed  mental  tools. 


The  term  "abstract"  is  confined  to  such  products 
of  thought-operations  as  "whiteness,  goodness,  virtue, 
courage,"  etc.;  but  it  is  sometimes  also  employed  to 
denote  generalisations  such  as  "star,"  meaning  any 
kind  of  a  star,  or  "triangle,"  meaning  any  kind  of  a 
triangle.  The  fact  is  that  generalisations  can  be  made 
only  by  the  method  of  abstraction.  The  term  "ab- 
stract "  is  not  used,  however,  to  denote  sensations. 
Sensations  are  the  materials  which  by  abstraction  are 
analysed  into  their  elements,  for  sensations  are  that 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  127 

which  is  given  in  our  intuition,  i.  e.  our  Anschauung, 
and  abstracts  are  contrasted  to  the  intuitional. 

This  is  very  well,  and  we  do  not  blame  this  usage 
of  the  word  ;  but  we  wish  to  point  out  that  even  sen- 
sations are  in  their  way  a  kind  of  abstraction.  Our 
sense-organs  perform  the  function  of  abstracting  cer- 
tain features  of  the  objects  impressing  us.  Thus  the 
eye  abstracts  only  certain  ether-vibrations  called  light, 
and  transforms  them  into  vision,  the  ear  abstracts  only 
air-vibrations  and  transforms  them  into  sounds,  the 
muscular  sense  abstracts  resistance  and  transforms  it 
into  the  notion  of  corporeality,  the  skin  abstracts  tem- 
perature and  transforms  it  into  sensations  of  heat  and 
cold.  The  tongue  and  the  nose  actually  abstract  and 
bodily  absorb  certain  particles,  and  transform  the 
awareness  of  this  process  into  taste  and  smell. 

Thus  it  is  evident  that  abstraction  is  a  function  of 
fundamental  application  in  the  domain  of  psychic  life, 
and  the  method  of  abstraction  is,  properly  considered, 
not  limited  to  that  sphere  which,  according  to  the  gen- 
erally accepted  terminology,  is  called  the  domain  of 
abstraction. 

THE  ABSOLUTE. 

Of  all  abstract  ideas,  none,  perhaps,  has  played 
a  more  important  part  in  philosophical  thought  than 
the  term  "absolute." 

The  mischief  which  the  term  "absolute"  has 
caused  in  almost  all  antiquated  philosophies  is  hardly 


128  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

conceivable.  It  actually  plays  the  part  of  a  fetish 
among  a  certain  class  of  sages,  who,  as  soon  as  their 
thinking  capacity,  either  from  innate  inability  or  from 
natural  laziness,  ceases  to  accomplish  its  purpose,  re- 
quest their  readers  and  adherents  to  bow  down  into 
the  dust  and  worship  the  Absolute. 

The  absolute  is  an  idol  which  is  still  worshipped 
and  which  must  be  broken  to  make  room  for  a  purer, 
clearer,  and  truer  conception  of  philosophy. 

We  present  the  following  definitions  of  the  term  ab- 
solute*: (i)  That  which  is  not  related.  (2)  That 
which  is  not  conditioned.  (3)  That  which  is  entire, 
complete,  or  perfect.  (4)  That  which  is  viewed  with- 
out regard  to  its  relations  or  conditions  as  a  complete 
whole. 

The  term  "absolute"  is  used  in  contradistinction 
to  "relative."  That  which  is  not  relative  is  absolute. 
The  most  important  relations  being  those  which  con- 
dition the  existence  of  a  thing,  the  term  came  to  be 
identical  with  the  unconditioned  or  that  which  has  the 
conditions  of  being  in  itself.  This  raised  the  dignity 
of  the  word  above  all  its  comrades  and  it  became  a 
substitute  for  God,  for  God  alone  can  be  described  as 
"unconditioned."  Those  philosophers,  accordingly, 
who  have  ceased  to  believe  in  God,  but  have  not  out- 
grown the  paganism  of  antediluvian  religions,  find  it 
very  convenient  to  enthrone  a  divinity   of  their  own 


*  The  word  is  derived  from  the  Latin  absolututn,  meaning  that  which  has 
been  loosened  from. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  129 

make,  and  to  treat  it  with  the  same  awe  and  reverence 
that  marks  the  behavior  of  fetish  worshippers. 

Let  us  review  the  philosophical  meanings  of  the 
term.  Absolute  is  used  in  the  sense  of  "that  which 
is  not  related."  Very  well  !  Such  a  thing  as  "that 
which  is  not  related  "  does  not  exist.  The  world  is  a 
system  of  relations  and  there  is  nothing  that  is  or  can 
be  unrelated.  Even  the  God  of  Genesis  (i.  e.  accord- 
ing to  the  traditional  notion)  is  not  an  absolute  being. 
He  stands  in  a  definite  relation  to  the  world  as  its 
creator,  ruler,  and  master.  The  God  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament being  He  in  whom  we  live  and  move  and  have 
our  being  can  still  less  be  called  absolute;  and  the 
Universe  as  such,  the  All,  the  totality  of  being  (whether 
we  include  God  as  a  part  of  it  or  regard  the  Universe 
with  materialists  or  atheists  simply  as  a  big  lump  of 
material  atoms)  is  as  little  absolute  as  either  a  super- 
natural or  an  immanent  God,  for  the  All  has  certain 
relations  to  its  parts.  In  a  word,  the  absolute  in  the 
first  sense  is  simply  a  humbug. 

The  "absolute"  in  the  second  sense,  as  that  which 
is  not  conditioned,  is,  perhaps,  admissible,  although  it 
would  be  an  improper  expression  for  that  which  ought 
to  be  called  the  unconditioned.  For  the  "uncondi- 
tioned "  or  "that  which  has  the  conditions  of  its  being 
in  itself"  is  not  a  concrete  thing,  a  special  being,  or  a 
big  person  inside  or  outside  of  the  world,  but  a  certain 
feature  existing  in  all  the  realities  to  be  met  with  in 
experience.    All  things,  all  creatures,  all  concrete  real- 


130  THE  METHODS  OE  PHILOSOPHY. 

ities  or  beings,  as  such,  are  forms ;  they  originate  by 
being  shaped,  they  disappear  by  being  dissolved,  but 
there  is  a  certain  something  in  them  which  abides  in 
all  the  changes,  and  this  certain  something  is  part  and 
parcel  of  their  existence. 

Here  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  what  this  feature 
of  an  abiding  something  in  all  the  various  forms  of 
being  is.  It  most  certainly  is  not  only  matter  and 
energy  as  the  materialists  say,  it  is  also  that  within  of 
nature  which  in  its  highest  evolution  appears  as  con- 
sciousness j  mainly  that  peculiarity  of  the  formal  laws 
which  establishes  harmony  and  makes  them  so  axiom- 
like, "self-evident,"  as  they  have  been  called,  that 
through  them  the  whole  universe  becomes  transparent 
like  glass  to  the  eyes  of  the  initiated.  In  all  these  abid- 
ing features  of  fleeting  existences  there  obtains  an  in- 
alienable consistency  of  being  with  itself  which  gives 
to  the  world  the  character  of  Gesctzmdssigkeit,  so  that 
uniformities  prevail  which  can  be  formulated  in  so- 
called  "natural  laws,"  so  that  the  totality  of  the  world 
is  not  a  chaos  but  a  cosmos,  a  whole  in  which  order 
prevails. 

Something  "unconditioned"  in  this  sense  exists  in 
the  abiding  features  of  the  various  existences.  But  it 
is  obvious  that  this  something  that  abides  is  not  abso- 
lute ;  it  is  not  without  relations  to  the  other  more  or 
less  fleeting  forms  of  realities.  Moreover,  we  cannot 
so  much  say  that  it  is  unconditioned  as  that  it  condi- 
tions the  very  existence  of  every  thing  that  is. 


THE  METHODS  OE  PHILOSOPHY.  131 

The  absolute  in  the  third  sense  is  identical  with  the 
All,  including  everything  and  anything,  past,  present, 
and  future,  also  all  the  chances  of  its  possible  forma- 
tions. The  All  alone  is  a  perfect  entirety,  a  complete 
whole  in  itself,  which  has  no  relations  to  things  out- 
side, because  there  are  none,  the  All  including  every- 
thing. 

This  conception  of  "absolute"  is  quite  legitimate, 
but  the  expression  "AH"  being  free  from  the  mystical 
tinge  that  still  adheres  to  the  term  "absolute"  is  pre- 
ferable. We  can  only  use  the  term  absolute  in  this  sense 
as  an  epitheton  ornafis  for  the  All  in  All,  not  as  its  name ; 
yet  as  an  epitheton  ornans  it  has  little  significance. 

The  "  absolute  "  in  the  fourth  sense  expresses,  not 
a  quality  of  or  in  things,  but  a  certain  attitude  of  the 
thinking  subject.  In  this  sense,  it  has  a  loose  and 
rather  popular  application.  Thus  we  speak  of  the  "ab- 
solute certainty "  of  mathematics,  meaning  thereby 
simply  its  universal  reliability*;  there  may  be  special 
cases,  but  there  are  no  exceptions  to  mathematical 
theorems.  We  speak  of  "absolute  monarchy,"  looking 
at  monarchy  abstractly  and  meaning  thereby  that  ac- 
cording to  the  law  of  the  country  the  monarch  is  not 
bound  to  give  account  to  any  one  for  the  acts  of  his 
rule  or  misrule.  We  speak  of  "absolute  (i.  e.,  the 
highest  imaginable)  perfection,"  of  "absolute  (i.  e., 
perfect)  beauty,"  "absolute  (i.  e.,  pure)  alcohol, "  "ab- 

*  Mathematical  axioms  possess  absolute  certainty  in  the  sense  mentioned 
above;  thc-y  are  reliable  statements.  But  they  are  not  absolute  truths,  i.  e., 
truths  which  need  not  be  proved. 


132  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

solute  zero"  of  temperature,  which  is — 459.4°.  All 
these  terms  and  many  more  similar  phrases  are  sanc- 
tioned by  usage,  but  nowhere  is  there  any  real  abso- 
luteness as  a  quality  of  things  ;  there  is  only  a  relative 
absoluteness,  a  lack  of  relations  in  some  special  direc- 
tions or  a  perfection  or  finish  of  some  kind. 

Thus  the  usage  of  the  term  ''absolute"  in  these 
and  similar  connections  is  not  to  be  understood  in  any 
strict  or  philosophical  sense  of  the  word,  but  is  a  license 
quite  allowable  for  special  purposes. 

It  would  lead  us  too  far  here  to  refer  to  all  the  non- 
sense that  has  been  written  by  philosophers  who  de- 
clare that  "philosophy  is  ultimately,  by  its  very  nature, 
a  search  for  the  Absolute  "  (with  a  capital  A^, 

No  greater  absurdity  has  been  excogitated  by  a 
great  man  than  the  idea  of  things  in  themselves,  which 
really  means  "things  absolute."  (See  The  Afofiist, 
Vol.  II,  No.  2,  "Are  There  Things  in  Themselves?") 
Hegel's  system  has  been  characterised  as  the  philoso- 
phy of  the  absolute.  He  maintains,  as  Flemming  sums 
up  his  doctrine,  that  "all  existence  is  strictly  a  mani- 
festation of  the  Absolute  in  the  evolution  of  Being, 
according  to  dialectic."  The  truth  is  that  all  existence 
is  existence,  and  the  idea  of  absolute  existence  is  noth- 
ing but  a  pale  thought,  an  abstract  symbol  created  by 
dialectic  to  represent  those  qualities  which  all  exist- 
ences possess  in  common.  To  represent  the  absolute, 
this  shadow  of  being,  as  real,  and  existence  as  a  mere 
manifestation  of  it,  is  turning  the  universe  topsyturvy. 


THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  133 


NOUMENA  AND  REALITY. 

The  main  mistake  of  the  early  philosophers  was 
their  habit  of  regarding  abstracts  as  independent  real 
entities,  or  essences.  The  pagans  represented  beauty 
as  a  goddess  and  worshipped  it,  and  Plato  thought 
that  ideas  were  beings  that  possess  an  independent 
existence  outside  and  above  the  sphere  of  reality,  of 
that  reality  which  is  faced  by  us  and  depicted  in  our 
sensations. 

Abstracts  are  thoughts  and  Kant  called  them  Ge- 
danke7iwesen  (things  of  thought)  or  nouniena^  which  he 
contrasted  with  Sinneswesen  (things  of  sense)  ox  phe- 
nomena. The  latter,  a  synonym  of  Anschauungen  or 
atsights,  are  the  data  of  experience,  the  former  are  the 
theories  derived  therefrom. 

Their  abstract  nature  being  recognised,  we  have 
ceased  to  regard  noumena  as  metaphysical  essences  or 
mysterious  beings.  They  are  no  longer  substantiated. 
In  fact,  just  the  contrary  has  happened.  The  pendu- 
lum has  swung  from  the  one  extreme  to  the  other,  and 
it  is  now  customary,  to  regard  abstract  ideas  in  contra- 
diction to  the  old  view  as  mere  fictions  and  nonenti- 
ties. One  error  is  naturally  followed  by  the  opposite 
error.     But  abstracts  are  not  mere  fictions,  they  are 

*  Noumenon,  literally  translated,  means  "  thought  "  and  not  as  the  diction- 
aries almost  unisono  have  it  (the  Century  Dictionary  among  them)  "  anytliing 
perceived."  It  is  derived  from  vtmv  "to  think,"  not  "to  perceive."  Noi)f 
means  "understanding"  and  not  "perception  "  or  "sense."  The  correct  pro- 
nunciation is  "no-oo'menon  "  and  not  "noomenon." 


134  ^^^^'  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

symbols  representing  features  of  real  existence,  and  as 
stick  they  cannot  be  overestimated,  for  they  form  the 
properly  human  in  manj  they  create  his  dignity  and 
give  him  the  power  he  possesses. 

Even  our  systems  of  mathematics,  arithmetic,  and 
other  sciences  of  pure  thought  are  not  mere  fictions 
or  arbitrary  inventions,  but  constructions  made  of  ele- 
ments representing  actual  features  of  reality,  of  pure 
forms  and  of  the  relations  of  pure  forms.  To  be  sure, 
they  are  fictions  in  a  certain  sense  ;  they  are  inven- 
tions, but  they  are  not  mere  fictions  and  not  arbitrary 
inventions.  To  operate  with  pure  forms,  as  if  pure 
forms  as  such  existed,  is  a  fiction.  But  exactly  in  the 
same  way  it  is  a  fiction  to  speak  of  whiteness  as  if 
whiteness  in  itself  existed.  The  processes  of  addition, 
subtraction,  multiplication,  division,  involution,  evo- 
lution, the  usage  of  logarithms  are  inventions,  but  they 
are  as  little  arbitrary  inventions  as,  for  instance,  the 
method  of  naming  things.  All  these  inventions  (like 
other  useful  inventions)  have  been  called  forth  by  spe- 
cial wants  ;  most  of  them  have  been  eagerly  searched 
for,  and  they  serve  certain  practical  purposes. 


Noumena  represent  certain  features  of,  or  relations 
among,  phenomena.  Ideas  are  symbols  of  reality. 
Abstract  thoughts  are  comparable  to  bills  or  checks 
in  the  money  market.  Bills  and  checks  are  not  real 
values  themselves,  but,  being  orders  to  pay  out  a  cer- 


THE  ME  THODS  OF  PHIL  OSOPH  Y.  1 35 

tain  amount,  they  represent  real  values,  thus  serving 
to  facilitate  and  economise  the  exchange  of  goods.  In 
the  same  way  the  realities  of  life  are  the  data  of  ex- 
perience as  they  appear  in  onx  Anschauung ;  abstract 
ideas,  however,  are  derived  from  and  have  reference 
to  these  basic  facts  of  our  existence.  Although  the 
values  of  our  abstract  ideas  are  ultimately  founded 
upon  the  reality  of  the  given  facts  of  experience,  bear- 
ing to  them  the  relation  that  bills  or  drafts  bear  to 
gold  bullion  or  cash  money;^  no  one  who  is  a  capitalist 
in  the  domain  of  knowledge,  can  do  without  them,  for 
he  needs  them  for  the  utilisation  and  practical  control 
of  his  wealth.  But  it  is  comparatively  easy  to  palm 
off  counterfeit  abstracts  at  their  nominal  value  upon 
ignorant  or  uncritical  people  who  know  not  the  differ- 
ence ;  for  the  poor  fellows  who  have  thus  been  cheated 
are  likely  to  die  before  they  discover  the  fraud. 
Goethe  says  in  one  of  his  distichs  :  ^ 

"Fiirsten  priigen  so  oft  auf  kaum  versilbertes  Kupfer 
Ihr  bedeutendes  Bild  ;     lange  betriigt  sich  das  Volk. 

Schwarmer  pragen  den  Stempel  des  Geists  auf  LUgen  und  Unsinn. 
Wem  der  Probierstein  fehlt,     halt  sie  fur  redliches  Gold." 

Princes  are  coining  mean  coppers  that  poorly  are  plated  with  silver, 
Stamping  their  portraits  thereon.     Long  the  deceit  remains  hid. 

Thus  the  enthusiast  stampeth,  as  genuine,  nonsense  and  errors. 
Many  accept  them  as  good,     lacking  the  touchstone  of  truth. 

ICf.  page  I,  last  paragraph. 

2  Goethe  and  Schiller's  Xenions.     Selected   and  translated  by  Paul  Carus. 
Chicago  :  The  Open  Court  Publishing  Co.     iBgfi. 


136  THE  METHODS  OF  PHILOSOPHY. 

Most  people  being  uncritical,  we  need  not  wonder 
that  the  philosophical  world  is  flooded  with  abstracts 
that  possess  no  merit  beyond  being  high-sounding 
words.  There  are  plenty  of  philosophical  wild-cat 
banks  flourishing  and  booming,  and  this  is  quite  nat- 
ural, for  our  average  public  is  no  better  than  the  sav- 
ages of  darkest  Africa  with  whom  glass  pearls  pass 
for  money,  the  same  as  if  they  were  genuine. 


THE    PROBLEMS    OF    EXPERIENCE 

SOLVABLE  BY  THE  METHODS 

OF  PHILOSOPHY. 


CAUSATION. 


CAUSE  AND  EFFECT. 

'T^HE  problem  of  causation  is  a  test-question,  the 
^  solution  of  which  is  highly  characteristic  and  of 
fundamental  importance.  If  you  wish  to  know  a 
thinker  and  the  nature  of  his  philosophy,  ask  him 
what  he  understands  by  "cause."  Both  the  statement 
and  the  solution  of  many  other  philosophical  and  ethical 
problems  depend  on  the  answer  given  to  this  question. 

What  is  a  cause? 

A  cause  is  that  which  produces  an  effect. 

The  terms  cause  and  efec^  belong  together ;  they 
are  correlates.  There  are  no  causes  without  effects, 
there  are  no  effects  without  causes. 

What  is  an  effect  ? 

An  effect  is  a  state  of  things  produced  by  some 
event,  action,  or  process. 

Everything  we  see  has  a  special  form  or  is  in  a 
special  place;  it  is  somehow  and  somewhat;  it  is  in 


138  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

a  special  condition  or  state.  Yet  whatever  its  nature 
or  substance  be,  its  form,  or  mode  of  being,  its  such- 
ness,  is  the  result  of  events.  These  events  which 
form  and  mould  things  are  called  their  "  causes." 

We  distinguish  causes  and  circumstances;  causes 
being  events  which  by  their  motion  produce  effects, 
and  circumstances  being  conditions  which,  though  al- 
ways at  rest  or  at  least  relatively  at  rest  when  the  cause 
happens,  yet  exercise,  directly  or  indirectly,  a  deter- 
minative influence  upon  the  result. 

If  there  be  several  factors  that  produce  by  coope- 
ration an  effect,  we  can  either  speak  of  several  causes, 
or  may,  according  to  the  special  purpose  of  our  inves- 
tigation, denote  only  the  most  important  one  as  the 
cause,  counting  the  others  as  circumstances. 

This  conception  of  cause  is  plain  enough.  We  say, 
for  instance,  the  touch  of  a  key  on  the  piano  is  the 
cause  of  any  of  the  succeeding  events  contingent 
thereon,  viz.,  of  the  motion  of  the  hammer  in  the  piano, 
of  the  vibration  of  the  chord,  or  of  the  sound  perceived 
by  the  ear. 

CAUSE  AND  REASON. 

There  is  another  sense,  however,  in  which  the  term 
cause  is  frequently  used.  By  cause  is  often  under- 
stood that  quality  of  things  by  which  their  peculiar 
action  is  explained.  Thus  gravity  is  said  to  be  the 
"cause"  of  the  falling  of  a  stone.     The  elasticity  of 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  139 

the  vibrating  chord  is  said  to  be  the  "  cause  "  of  the 
notes  which  it  emits. 

This  kind  of  cause  is  identical  with  what  from  an- 
other point  of  view  is  called  the  forces  of  nature. 

Now,  we  are  at  perfect  liberty  to  give  the  name 
cause  either  to  the  events  which  produce  effects  or  to 
the  so -cd\\Q.dL.  forces  of  nature  by  which  we  explain  phe- 
nomena ;  but  we  should  not  give  the  same  name  to 
both]  they  are  things  of  too  different  a  nature  to  be 
classed  in  one  and  the  same  category.  The  latter, 
being  the  explanations  by  which  we  account  for  the 
efficiency  of  causes,  are  better  called  "reasons  "  ;  and 
so  we  propose  to  distinguish  between  "causes"  and 
" leasons. "  Unless  we  distinguish  causes  and  reasons 
we  are  apt  to  fall  into  confusion. 

Let  us  consider  the  two  ideas  "cause"  and  "rea- 
son," that  the  distinction  may  be  clear. 

Causes  are  always  special  and  concrete  events  ; 
single  facts  ;  certain  definite  happenings,  which  occur 
or  have  occurred  in  a  certain  place  and  at  a  certain 
time.  Reasons  are  general  ideas  expressing  qualities 
of  things  ;  they  are  universal  rules  concerning  the  na- 
ture of  such  qualities ;  they  are  natural  laws  applica- 
ble wherever  and  whenever  things  are  possessed  of 
these  qualities. 

Thus,  the  cause  of  the  stone's  fall  is  the  particular 
event  that  pushed  the  stone  over  the  edge  of  the  preci- 
pice. The  cause  may  have  been  the  movement  of  a 
man,  who  shoved  the  stone  till  it  started  to  roll ;  other 


I40  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

determining  circumstances  being  the  precipice,  the 
mass  of  our  planet,  its  atmospheric  resistance,  etc. 
But  the  reason  why  the  stone  fell  is  the  reason  why 
stones  generally  fall,  and  why  all  masses  gravitate. 

When  we  ask  the  reason  why  a  certain  thing  acts 
in  a  special  way,  or  why  a  certain  event  takes  place 
under  certain  circumstances,  we  expect  as  an  answer 
a  description  of  the  qualities  of  the  things  under  con- 
sideration. Now,  the  reasons  of  natural  phenomena 
are  formulated  in  natural  laws.  Qualities  are  the 
causative  in  the  cause  ;  they  are  that  which  makes 
things  move  or  act  in  a  special  way,  and  natural  laws 
are  general  formulas  that  describe  the  qualities  of 
things. 

The  reason  of  the  stone's  fall  is,  that  the  stone  pos- 
sesses a  certain  quality  called  gravity  which  makes  the 
stone  gravitate  toward  the  centre  of  the  earth.  The 
action  of  gravity  is  constant;  it  is  a  force  present  in 
the  stone ;  it  is  an  inseparable  property  of  its  mass, 
and  its  action  has  been  formulated  in  a  natural  law 
called  the  law  of  gravity  or  gravitation. 


REASON  AND  CONSEQUENCE. 

The  correlative  term  of  cause  is  effect,  that  of  rea- 
son is  consequence.  The  Germans  interrelate  Ursache 
and  Wirkung  on  the  one  hand  and  Grund  and  Folge  on 
the  other.  A  man  who  speaks  of  the  effects  of  a  rea- 
son or  of  the  consequences  of  a  cause  forms  word- 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  141 

combinations  that  have  no  sense.  We  say  "conse- 
quence," not  "sequence."  Consequence  conveys  quite 
a  different  idea  from  sequence.  Consequence  is  log- 
ical, sequence  is  temporal. 

The  (logical)  consequence  of  a  reason  is  that  which 
it  implies,  or  involves.  The  statement  All  men  are 
mortal,  implies  that  Socrates  is  mortal.  Mortality  is 
a  mark  of  all  men  \  this  is  the  reason  why  such  single 
men  as  Socrates  are  also  to  be  declared  mortal.  Thus 
the  consequence  is  not  a  sequence,  riot  a  temporal  suc- 
cession, for  it  is  necessarily  coexisient'Svith  its  reason. 
The  effect  is  a  temporal  sequence ;  the  consequence, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  a  logical  conclusion  ;  it  points 
out  to  us  what  is  involved  in  the  reason.  The  equal- 
sidedness  of  a  triangle  involves  by  implication  that  it 
is  also  equal-angled.  If  a  dog  is  a  mammal,  he  is  also 
an  animal.  Neither  the  one  nor  the  other  quality  is 
temporally  prior,  both  are  temporally  simultaneous : 
the  term  consequence  signifies  a  mental  succession,  a 
vffTspov  Trpos  rjixaS. 

A  DISTINCTION  NEEDED. 

If  we  were  to  call  "  causes  "  and  "  reasons  "  by  one 
and  the  same  name,  what  a  bewildering  confusion 
would  arise  !  If  we  called  both  "causes,"  some  causes 
would  be  the  antecedents  of  their  effects.  This  all  real 
causes  are.  Other  causes,  however,  would  be  simul- 
taneous with  their  effects.     This  all  reasons  are.    The 


142 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 


gravity  of  a  stone,  for  instance,  persists.  The  stone 
still  gravitates  toward  the  centre  of  the  eartVi  after  it 
has  fallen.  Thus,  the  cause  would  exist  even  after  its 
effect. 

Says  the  Latin  proverb  :  Ccssante  causa  cessat  ef- 
fectus.  This  is  nonsensical,  for  every  cause  is  ended 
when  its  effect  has  appeared.  The  touch  of  a  key  on 
the  piano  represents  a  certain  expenditure  of  energy 
which  is  transferred,  first  to  the  hammer,  and  then  to 
the  chord,  which  at  once  begins  to  vibrate.  These 
vibrations  are  then  transferred  to  the  air,  and  through 
the  air  to  the  acoustic  nerve  and  to  the  brain,  where 
the  vibrations  are  felt  as  a  peculiar  sensation.  There 
is  a  constant  transfer  of  energy  taking  place,  and  the 
cause  is  always  past  as  soon  as  the  effect  appears,  for, 
though  the  cause  continues  to  exist  in  the  effect,  it 
ceases  to  exist  in  its  original  form  ;  every  effect  is  its 
cause  transformed  under  special  circumstances. 

The  Latin  proverb  should  read  :  Cessante  ratione 
cessat  consequetis.  If  a  certain  reason  ceases,  its  con- 
sequence also  will  cease.  For  reasons  are  simultane- 
ous with  their  consequences. 

Take  the  following  facts  as  an  example  : 

The  mercury  in  the  barometer  does  not  flow  out  at 
the  open  end,  because  the  atmosphere  exercises  a  cer- 
tain pressure  on  it.  The  atmospheric  pressure  is  a 
certain  quality  of  things,  which,  so  long  as  it  lasts, 
obtains  with  all  its  consequences.  The  fluctuations  of 
the  pressure  are  accompanied  with  a  rise  or  a  fall  of 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIEXCE.  143 

the  barometer,  and  if  they  ceased  altogether,  or  almost 
altogether,  as,  for  instance,  under  the  air-pump,  the 
mercury  would  flow  out.  Thus  the  barometer  can  be 
used  as  an  indicator  of  air-pressure.  The  consequence 
of  a  certain  reason  is  employed  as  a  means  of  informa- 
tion. 

The  difference  between  "cause"  and  "reason"  is 
marked  in  all  languages.  The  logical  spirit  of  the 
speech  of  the  various  nations  is  wiser  than  our  phi- 
losophers. 

The  Greeks  distinguish  between  airiot  (cause)  and 
apxV  (principle,  beginning,  reason),  the  Romans  be- 
tween causa  and  ratio,  the  French  and  all  other  Ro- 
mance nations  between  cause  and  raison  d'etre,  the 
Germans  between  Ursache  and  Grund.  Popular  usage 
is,  as  a  rule,  very  accurate ;  but  those  who  should  be 
the  leaders  of  the  thought  of  the  people  have  become 
blind  guides  of  the  blind,  who  lead  them  astray.  The 
people  use  these  words  correctly  ;  those  who  are  chiefly 
to  be  blamed  for  their  misuse  are  our  professional 
thinkers. 

ARISTOTLE  ON  CAUSATION. 

What  confusion  reigns  in  the  four  meanings  in 
which  Aristotle  (as  handed  down  to  us  in  his  books) 
proposes  to  use  the  term  "cause"!  He  distinguishes 
(i)  the  formal  cause,  or  ro  ri  rjv  dvai,  that  which 
makes  the  thing  such  as  it  is ;  (2)  the  material  cause, 
or  rj  vkr)  xai  to  V7roH€iju€vov,  saying  that  the  brass  of 


144  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

a  Statue  is  its  cause  ;  (3)  the  start  of  the  motion,  or 
oSfr  1)  ctpxV  "^7^  nivfjffecj?:  [this  alone  is  a  real  cause]  ; 
and  (4)  the  end  in  view,  or  to  ov  avsua,  the  "where- 
fore." 

We  are  tempted  to  believe  that  we  have  before  us 
in  Aristotle's  works,  not  the  master's  own  exposition, 
but  the  bungling  notes  of  a  superficial  disciple  ;  for 
there  is  no  system  in  the  doctrine  of  the  four  causes. 
Aristotle's  distinctions,  as  they  stand,  have  no  sense. 
But  sense  might  easily  be  introduced  into  them  by 
slightly  altering  the  report. 

Aristotle  might  have  said  that  we  must  note  in 
causation  :  (i)  the  material ;  (2)  the  formal;  (3)  the 
cause  ;  and  (4)  the  effect.  These  four  things  are  not 
four  kinds  of  causes,  but  are  four  points  to  be  minded 
in  all  causation.  The  first  and  second  points  are  two 
aspects  demanding  consideration ;  but  neither  sub- 
stance nor  form  are  causes,  causation  being  the  trans- 
formation of  substance.  The  third  point  is  the  cause, 
viz.,  the  motion  through  which  the  transformation 
takes  place,  while  the  fourth  one  is  the  end  attained, 
the  effect,  or  purpose,  i.  e.  the  effect  desired. 

If  the  agent  is  a  living  and  thinking  being,  so  that 
the  whence  of  the  motion  (to  o^ev  rrjs  mrijaEGoz)  is  a 
motor-idea,  the  effect,  or  the  whither  of  causation,  is 
pursued  with  consciousness,  and  the  effect  aimed  at  is 
called  purpose,  or  the  end  of  the  cause. 

There  would  be  rhyme  and  reason  in  Aristotle's 
four  points,   if  he  had  treated   them   in  the  manner 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  145 

briefly  sketched  here;  but  as  the  various  passages  i;; 
which  the  subject  is  treated  actually  stand,  they  appear 
as  the  loose  talk  of  a  rambling  mind.  The  author  of 
the  Aristotelian  books  as  they  now  read  (most  likely 
not  Aristotle  himself,  but  one  of  his  auditors)  appar- 
rently  repeats  his  recollections  of  an  ill-digested  lec- 
ture and  fills  out  the  gaps  of  his  incomplete  notes  with 
his  own  misconceptions. 

CONFUSED  NOTIONS  OF  CAUSATION. 

It  would  repay  one's  trouble  to  go  over  the  entire 
field  of  philosophical  literature  and  collate  the  mistakes 
made  by  prominent  philosophers  in  the  conception  of 
causation,  for  the  harvest  would  be  very  great.  Thus 
Lucretius  says : 

"Felix  qui  potuit  rerum  cognoscere  causas." 

[Happy  the  man  who  could  comprehend  the  causes  of  objects.  ] 

Yet  Lucretius  means  :    "  Happy  the  man  who  could 

understand  the  reasons  of  all  things." 

* 
*  * 

Spinoza  speaks  of  causa  sui  and  means  ratio  sui. 
A  causa  sui,  a  cause  which  is  the  cause  of  itself,  is  sheer 
nonsense,  while  ratio  sui  is  at  least  not  nonsensical.  A 
ratio  sui  is  a  reason  which  requires  no  further  explana- 
tion ;  it  denotes  some  quality  of  existence  which  is 
universal,  so  that  we  need  not  look  for  a  more  general 
one  under  which  it  can  be  subsumed.  In  this  sense 
ratio  sui  is  equivalent  to  ultimate  reason. 


146  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

It  has  been  said  that  "science  is  a  search  for 
causes  and  philosophy  for  the  causes  of  causes."  The 
meaning  of  this  saying  is  that  science  is  a  search  for 
reasons  and  philosophy  for  ultimate  reasons.  We 
want  to  know  why  things  act  in  a  special  way,  or,  in 
other  words,  we  want  to  become  acquainted  with  the 
qualities  of  which  things  are  possessed. 


The  pious  expression  "First  Cause"  is  also  only  a 
misnomer  for  "ultimate  reason."  If,  supposing  we 
knew  all  reasons,  we  continually  ascended  from  one 
reason  to  another,  we  should  at  last  arrive  at  an  ulti- 
mate reason,  which  is  that  reason  from  which  all  other 
reasons  can  be  deduced,  and  all  the  reasons  together 
would  form  one  great  system.  This  "ultimate  reason  " 
is  sometimes  wrongly  supposed  to  be  capable  of  afford- 
ing us  a  key  to  all  the  problems  of  the  universe.  It 
is  thought  to  be  a  kind  of  centre  from  which  all  the 
parts  are  quickened  with  the  reason  of  their  being,  and 
is  then  identified  with  God. 

This  is  the  metaphysical  conception  of  God.  The 
philosopher  fills  an  empty,  abstract  idea  with  myste- 
ries and  worships  the  errors  of  his  own  brain. 

We  must  not  forget  that  the  ultimate  reason  (even 
if  we  had  it  quite  clear  in  our  mind)  does  not  and  can- 
not, of  itself  alone,  explain  the  rest  of  the  world.  The 
more  general  our  ideas  become,  the  emptier  they  are. 
It  is  true   that   general  ideas   serve   as  explanations 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  147 

for  less  general  ideas,  but  they  provide  us  only  with 
one  part  of  the  explanation  ;  the  other  part  has  to  be 
added  by  the  particular  conditions  to  which  they  are 
applied.  The  universe  does  not  possess  somewhere  a 
secret  nook  from  which  we  can  understand  the  whole 
in  the  sense  "Faust"  imagines  when  he  says: 

"  Dass  ich  erkenne,  was  die  IVelt 
Iin  Inncrsten  z:isa»imenhSU," 

And  similarly  the  God  of  the  universe  is  neither  in 
a  particular  place,  as  a  great  world-ego,  nor  does  he 
reside  in  any  special  ideal  centre,  such  as  a  general 
notion.  God  is  concrete  and  real,  being  everywhere 
that  element  which  makes  things  be.  To  mankind 
the  idea  of  God  has  never  been  either  the  mythologi- 
cal conception  of  theologians  or  the  abstract  cloud  of 
philosophers ;  the  idea  of  God  in  practical  life  may 
not  have  been  thought  out  clearly  in  the  minds  of  the 
people,  but  it  has  always  been  that  something  in  exist- 
ence which  demands  obedience ;  it  was  always  the 
authority  of  conduct,  which  we  have  to  mind  and  to 
which  we  have  to  adapt  ourselves  ;  it  was  always  a 
moral  idea. 

God  should  never  be  identified  with  so  grotesque 
an  idea  as  a  "first  cause";  and  to  pray  to  the  "First 
Cause"  is  about  on  the  same  level  as  to  pray  to  the 
"Ultimate  Effect." 

Schopenhauer  has  written  a  whole  monograph  on 
Causation  ;  yet  so  little  does  he  distinguish  between 


148  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

cause  and  reason  that  he  calls  every  cause  "  a  suffi- 
cient reason  "  and  entitles  his  book,  "  Ueber  die  vier- 
fache  Wurzel  des  Satzes  vom  zureichenden  Grande" 
(On  the  four-fold  root  of  the  principle  of  sufficient  rea- 
son). He  speaks  of  Erkenntnissgrund,  Seinsgrund,  Reiz, 
Motiv,  and  Ursache,  as  if  all  were  causes  and  reasons 
at  the  same  time.*  The  various  kinds  of  causes,  such 
as  stimuli  and  motives,  are,  of  course,  not  comparable 
to  roots,  but  are  rather  branches  of  causation. 


Reid  claims  that  "causation  is  not  an  object  of 
sense."  So  far  he  is  right,  for  our  notion  of  causation 
is  not  a  product  of  sensation,  but  of  reflection.  Our 
ideas  of  cause  and  effect  are  noumena  ;  they  are  re- 
sults of  thought,  not  phenomena,  not  sense-percep- 
tions. But  Reid  is  wrong  when  he  claims  that  causa- 
tion "is  to  be  admitted  as  a  first  or  self-evident  prin- 
ciple." ("Intellectual  Powers,  "Essay  VI,  Chap.  Vl.) 
There  are  no  such  things  as  self-evident  principles. 
If  we  limit  (with  Kant)  the  term  "experience"  to 
sense-experience,  we  must  agree  with  Reid  that  "ex- 
perience is  surely  too  narrow  a  foundation  "  for  it. 
But  if  we  include  in  experience  our  rational  reflection 
upon  the  events  which  form  the  objects  of  our  observa- 
tion, we  should  say  that  our  notion  of  causation  is 
safely  and  firmly  based  upon  experience. 


*  One  of  Schopenhauer's  four  roots,  so-called,  is  not  a  cause,  but  a  reason, 
viz.,  the  third  one,  which  he  calls  Erkcjintnissgrund. 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 


149 


George  Henry  Lewes  says  in  one  place  ("Probl.," 
First  Series,  Vol.  II,  p.  323): 

"  Cause  is  the  group  of  conditions  which  pass  into  the  effect, 
ideally  distinguishable  from  the  product,  but  not  really  separ- 
able." 

And  again  (First  Series,  Vol.  I,  p.  330): 

"Causation  is  immanent  change." 

This  is  cause  in  the  commonly  accepted  sense;  it 
is  cause  as  we  understand  the  term.  Yet  his  investi- 
gations lead  him  to  identify  not  only  Cause  and  Law, 
but  even  Cause,  Law,  and  Fact.  He  says  (First  Se- 
ries, Vol.  I,  p.  336): 

"Had  the  essential  identity  of  Law,  Cause,  and  Fact  been 
duly  apprehended,  much  misty  speculation  would  have  been  dissi- 
pated." 

Facts  are  single  and  concrete  events,  while  laws 
are  abstract  descriptions  of  qualities  of  facts  that  are 
of  a  general  nature.  This  is  a  radical  difference  !  How 
can  causes  be  identified  with  both  facts  and  laws? 
Causes  (viz.,  causes  in  the  sense  in  which  we  use  the 
term)  are  facts,  but  laws  are  "reasons." 

Locke  defines  cause  as 

"A  substance  exerting  its  power  into  act  to  make  one  thing  to 
begin  to  be." 

And  in  a  similar  way  Lewes  says  (First  Series,  Vol. 
n,  p.  350): 

' '  A  glass  of  punch  is  made  by  adding  together  whiskey,  water, 
sugar,  and  lemon  ;  each  of  these  elements  we  know  separately, 
and  know  them  as  the  cause  of  the  punch," 


15° 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 


This  kind  of  cause,  in  the  language  of  traditional 
Aristotelianism,  is  called  "the  material  cause";  but 
the  term  is  very  misleading.  A  cause  is  never  a  sub- 
stance, or  a  thing,  or  an  object,  or  a  material  body. 
A  cause  is  always  a  motion,  an  event,  or  a  happening 
of  some  kind.  The  cause  of  the  punch  is  the  act  of 
mixing  its  ingredients ;  but  the  materials  of  which  it 
consists  are  no  causes.  Otherwise,  we  ought  to  call 
oxygen,  hydrogen,  nitrogen,  etc.,  the  causes  of  man, 
because  human  tissues  consist  of  these  materials ; 
paper  and  printer's  ink  would  be  the  causes  of  books ; 
iron  and  wood  the  causes  of  machinery. 

If  causes  were  material  things,  what  cause  could  be 
offered  for  events,  which,  as  such,  are  not  material. 
What  is,  for  instance,  the  cause  of  a  death? 

The  famous  instance  invented  to  show  that  cause 
and  effect  are  quite  disparate  and  cannot  be  brought 
into  an  equation  by  which  to  demonstrate  their  iden- 
tity, according  to  the  scholastic  theorem  causa  cequai 
effectum,  proposes  "mercury"  as  "the  cause  of  death." 

Says  Mr.    Lewes  (First   Series,  Vol.   II,  pp.  337, 

338): 

"The  mercury  or  antecedent  is  said  to  be  the  cause,  the  par- 
alysis, or  consequent,  the  effect.  Could  any  two  things  or  events 
be  more  unlike  ?  Can  we  say  that  the  cause,  mercury,  has  among 
its  properties  the  peculiar  property  of  paralysis  ?  We  cannot,  for 
we  know  that  paralysis  is  a  condition  of  the  organism,  not  of  the 
metal;  and  it  is  only  in  this  special  conjunction  of  these  two 
agents — metal  and  organism — that  the  result  appears." 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  151 

Mr.  Lewes  is  quite  right,  that  "the  result  appears 
in  this  special  conjunction  ";  he  adds  : 

"The  effect  will  be  the  completed  process,  and  the  efficient 
causes  are  the  factors  in  that  process." 

Yet  he  should  have  added  that  the  main  mistake 
is  to  call  "  mercury  "  a  cause.  Not  the  thing  mercury 
is  the  cause  of  death,  but  "the  administration  of  mer- 
cury," which  under  given  circumstances  produces  such 
transformations  in  the  organism  that  its  vital  actions 
cease  altogether — a  state  which  we  call  death. 

Says  Mr.  Lewes  (First  Series,  Vol.  II,  p.  346): 

"Every  event  that  happens  has  a  cause,  everything  that 
exists  is  a  cause.     This  is  evident." 

The  truth  is  exactly  the  reverse.  We  must  say, 
"Everything  that  exists  has  a  cause, "  which  means 
that  everything  as  it  is  at  present  possesses  its  form 
and  nature  so  as  to  be  what  it  is  by  antecedent  condi- 
tions which  formed  it.  Everything  is  the  result  of 
causes  and  circumstances.  And  we  must  further  say  : 
"Everything  that  happens  is  a  cause  ";  that  is  to  say, 
every  event  which  produces  a  change  is  a  factor  in  the 
transformation  of  a  special  field  of  existence  ;  every 
event  is  an  agent  in  the  causation  of  certain  effects 
resulting  therefrom. 

The  misconception  of  causes  as  "objects  which 
follow  one  another  "  led  Hume  to  regard  succession 
as  the  main  characteristic  feature  of  causation.  He 
could  discover  no  necessary  connection  between  ante- 


152  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

cedents  and  their  sequences,  and  thus  he  became  a 
sceptic.  Truly,  there  is  no  necessary  connection  be- 
tween arsenic  or  mercury  and  death.  There  is  no 
similarity  between  cannon-balls  or  shells  and  a  deso- 
late citadel.  And  even  if  there  were  a  necessary  con- 
nection or  similarity  or  identity  among  objects  that 
are  wrongly  called  causes  and  effects,  it  would  avail 
nothing,  for  ''objects"  assuredly  are  not  interrelated 
as  causes  and  effects. 

*  * 

The  theorem  causa  (equat  effectum  is  wrong.  The 
cause  is  never  equal  to  its  effect.  What  remains  equal 
in  the  act  of  causation  is  simply  the  total  amount  of 
matter  and  energy;  that  which  does  not  remain  the 
same  is  the  form  ;  and  the  difference  of  form  is  all- 
important.  The  difference  of  form  constitutes  the  new 
state  of  things  called  the  effect,  and  if  the  effect  were 
not  different  from  its  cause,  there  would  be  no  change, 
and  we  should  not  be  entitled  to  speak  of  causation 
at  all. 

CAUSATION  NOT  MERE  SUCCESSION. 

The  idea  of  regarding  causation  as  a  mere  suces- 
sion  of  antecedents  and  sequences  misses  the  essential 
nature  of  causation,  for  it  leaves  out  of  view  the  fact 
that  causation  is  a  transformation  of  a  definite  amount 
of  matter  and  energy,  without  any  increase  or  decrease 
of  substance.  When  omitting  this,  the  most  essential 
feature  of  causation,  we  can,  of  course,  find  no  con- 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  153 

nection  between  two  such  things  as  mercury  and  death, 
and  the  whole  process  becomes  mystical,  with  the  re- 
sult that  we  have  no  choice  left  but  to  surrender  all 
hope  of  ever  unravelling  the  problem.  Yet  we  have, 
in  that  case,  artificially  raised  the  dust  which  prevents 
us  from  seeing.  We  have  ourselves  produced  the 
confusion  by  confounding  the  issues,  and  have  there- 
fore no  right  to  say  that  causation  is  an  inscrutable 
mystery,  because  we  have  made  a  muddle  of  it. 

The  statement  that  we  can  observe  only  antece- 
dents and  sequences,  but  can  discover  no  necessary 
connection  among  them,  appears  very  guarded,  yet  it 
is,  after  all,  a  mere  misstatement  of  the  case.  For 
indeed  we  can  observe  transformations,  and  all  trans- 
formations are  successions  of  events  which  possess  a 
very  obvious  connection. 

To  discuss  causes  and  effects  without  even  men- 
tioning that  they  are  phases  in  processes  of  transforma- 
tion, is  something  like  writing  a  book  on  mechanics 
without  speaking  of  motions,  or  acting  Hamlet  with 
the  role  of  Hamlet  omitted. 


EXPLANATION  AND   COMPREHENSION. 

The  business  of  science  consists,  first,  in  observa- 
tion \  second,  in  explanation  ;  and  third,  in  applica- 
tion. 

First  we  have  to  observe  a  process,  that  is,  we  have 
to  describe  the  whole  event,  to  search  for  the  motion 


154  "^HE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

which  starts  it,  and  also  to  take  note  of  the  action  of 
the  circumstances.  The  process  as  a  whole  constitutes 
what  we  call  a  system  of  transformation. 

Having  made  many  observations  of  similar  and  of 
diverse  kinds,  we  proceed  to  explain  them  :  that  is, 
we  make  them  plain  ;  we  describe  them  in  such  a  way 
that  the  determining  factors  of  the  transformation  are 
placed  in  relief  and  the  indifferent  circumstances 
dropped. 

Explanation  is  systematic  description.  An  explana- 
tion is  complete  when  we  can  so  trace  all  changes  that 
all  the  details  of  a  process  are  recognised  as  transfor- 
mations. 

Being  in  possession  of  an  explanation  we  can  prac- 
tically apply  it  to  future  experience  by  adjusting  the 
course  of  events  so  that  favorable  conditions  may  be 
obtained  and  dangers  avoided. 

Our  desire  for  explanation  is  not  satisfied  with  a 
formulation  of  the  qualities  of  things  as  they  are  in 
single  cases.  We  want  reasons  which  will  apply  to  all 
cases  of  the  kind.  Again,  every  law  of  nature  which 
describes  the  action  of  things  in  a  general  formula, 
applicable  to  all  actions  of  the  same  kind,  calls  for  fur- 
ther explanation.  We  want  reasons  for  our  reasons. 
We  want  to  know  how  two  laws,  which  apparently  are 
very  different  because  describing  the  actions  of  reality 
in  different  conditions,  are,  after  all,  two  applications 
only  of  one  and  the  same  fundamental  law.  Our  need 
of  explanation  impels  us  to  rise  from  special  laws  to 


r//A  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  155 

more  general  laws,  until  all  are  comprehended  in  uni- 
versal laws.  Now,  this  method  of  subsuming  a  num- 
ber of  instances  under  one  common  point  of  view  is 
called  "comprehension."  Comprehension  is  a  higher 
kind  of  explanation.  Thus,  all  knowledge  describing 
the  qualities  of  things  would  form  one  great  system  of 
laws ;  and  if  we  were  omniscient  we  should  see  at  a 
glance  how  one  and  the  same  law  operates  in  all  other 
laws. 

Laws  being  descriptions  of  reality,  an  omniscient 
being  would  intuitively  see  that  reality  is  the  same 
everywhere,  and  that  its  fundamental  quality  remains 
what  it  is  throughout;  it  is  only  differentiated  accord- 
ing to  conditions  and  in  the  innumerable  variations 
which  we  meet  with  in  experience. 

CAUSATION  AS  TRANSFORMATION. 

The  law  of  causation  is  a  law  of  motion ;  it  de- 
scribes a  transformation  that  takes  place,  and  as  in  a 
transformation  the  form  only  is  changed,  causation 
means  substantially  the  same  thing  as  the  conservation 
of  matter  and  energy.  When  we  observe  a  process  in 
which  the  effect  can  be  shown  to  be  the  product  of  a 
transformation,  our  desire  for  explanation  is  satisfied. 
But  we  are  always  sore  perplexed  when  we  are  con- 
fronted with  something  that  is  not  the  product  of  a 
transformation.  We  should  be  nonplussed  if  we  were 
ever  to  observe  the  creation  of  matter  or  energy  out  of 


156  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

nothing,  or,  vice  versa,  witness  an  instance  of  the  an- 
nihilation of  either  the  one  or  the  other.   We  see,  thus 
that  the  world  is  explainable  wherever  its  events  are 
exhibited  as  transformations. 

So  far  as  science  has  gone,  it  has  met  with  many 
problems  that  defy  explanation,  but  nowhere  has  it 
discovered  an  instance  in  which  a  thing  could  be 
proved  not  to  be  a  case  of  transformation.  The  faith 
of  science  in  the  reliability  of  the  law  of  causation  has 
never  been  shattered. 

TELEOLOGY. 

The  problem  of  causation  involves  another  problem 
which  may  be  called  the  problem  of  teleology. 

Aristotle,  we  have  seen,  mentions  besides  "  efficient 
causes  "  also  "  final  causes,"  and  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy is  replete  with  quarrels  as  to  the  admissibility 
of  final  causes.  There  are  some  philosophers  who 
admit  the  existence  only  of  efficient  causes,  while  there 
are  others  who  claim  that  there  exist  both  efficient 
causes  and  final  causes.  The  latter  understand  by 
"final  causes"  what  is  commonly  called  "purposes," 
"ends  in  view,"  "aims,"  or  "plans  of  action." 

A  little  reflection  will  teach  us  that  there  is  but  one 
kind  of  causes,  and  that  this  one  kind  of  causes  is,  at 
the  same  time,  always  efficient  and  final.  If  a  cause 
is  not  "  efficient  "  it  is  no  cause,  and  if  it  is  not  "final " 
or,  in  other  words,  if  it  leads  to  no  result,  to  no  end, 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  157 

it  can  have  no  effect,  and  a  cause  without  an  effect  is 
no  cause.  What  would  causation  be  if  either  its  cause 
or  its  effects  were  cut  off  ? 

Thus,  all  causes  being  efficient,  to  speak  of  "effi- 
cient "  causes  is  gratuitous;  and  to  speak  of  "final" 
causes  is  misleading.  The  term  "final  cause"  is  a 
word-combination  which  has  just  as  little  and  just  as 
much  sense  as  the  term  "causal  effect. "  As  every 
cause  is  final,  so  every  effect  is  causal. 

Every  transformation  is  a  motion  and  every  motion 
pursues  a  definite  direction  ;  it  has  a  whence  and  a 
whither.  The  whence  is  called  the  cause,  the  whither 
the  effect  ]  the  whence  is  the  beginning  of  the  pro- 
cess, the  whither  its  end. 

This  is  true  both  of  the  stone  that  falls  to  the  ground 
and  of  the  stone  that  is  thrown  with  purposive  inten- 
tion. Every  motion  has  a  direction,  an  aim,  which 
is  conditioned  by  the  tendencies  inherent  in  the  mov- 
ing bodies.  The  aim  may  not  be  reached.  Thus,  the 
aim  of  the  falling  stone  is  the  centre  of  the  earth  ;  the 
aim  of  a  thrown  stone  may  be  a  window.  The  falling 
stone  never  reaches  the  centre  of  the  earth,  and  the 
bad  boy  who  tries  to  break  a  window-pane  may  miss 
his  aim.  But  the  tendencies  to  reach  the  aims  are, 
nevertheless,  factors  in  the  process  of  causation  ;  they 
are  not  always  realised,  perhaps,  because  of  other  fac- 
tors which  curtail  their  efficiency. 

The  aim  or  goal  (the  tendency)  of  a  motion  is 
called  purpose  when  it  is  pursued  with  consciousness. 


158  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

The  falling  stone  has  a  definite  tendency,  in  accord 
with  the  nature  of  its  gravity,  but  it  has  no  purpose. 
Thinking  beings  alone  can  have  purposes. 

That  the  aims  of  the  actions  of  inanimate  things 
must  show  a  certain  regularity,  an  orderliness,  or  har- 
mony, if  but  the  qualities  of  the  things  upon  which  their 
tendencies  are  contingent  remain  the  same,  is  obvious. 
Thus  we  can  readily  understand  that  the  stellar  uni- 
verse, in  agreement  with  mechanical  laws,  arranges 
its  masses  in  a  harmonious  order  so  as  to  produce 
milky  ways  and  solar  systems.  We  can  see  how  cer- 
tain chemical  substances  will  assume  certain  regular 
shapes,  the  form  of  which  depends  upon  their  angle 
of  crystallisation.  We  can  further  understand  how  the 
functions  of  organised  substances  will  differentiate  so 
as  to  form  the  organs  of  organisms.  In  one  word,  the 
harmony  of  nature  appears  as  an  immanent,  intrinsic, 
and  necessary  teleology. 

The  term  teleology,  Zweckmdssigkeit,  or  finality, 
i.  e.,  a  harmony  of  the  effects  of  causation,  has  been 
wrongly  used  to  denote  conscious  design,  and  the  prob- 
lem has  been  viewed  as  if  there  were  a  dilemma  be- 
tween purposive  design  or  plan  on  the  one  side,  and 
pure  chance  or  haphazard  accident  on  the  other.  The 
truth  is,  that  we  find  in  the  realm  of  inanimate  nature 
neither  consciously  devised  calculations  of  certain  ef- 
fects, nor  purely  accidental  results  of  blind  chance, 
but  an  irrefragable  order  presenting  a  regularity  of  ac- 
tion  according  to  the  constancy  of  the  qualities  of 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  159 

things.  The  nature  of  the  universe  continuing  to  be 
the  same,  the  laws  of  its  being  remaining  immutable, 
and  its  substance  enduring  in  matter  as  well  as  in  en- 
ergy, it  follows  of  necessity  that  the  course  of  events  ex- 
hibits throughout  regularities  and  uniformities.  How- 
ever, those  who  deny  teleology,  are  not  less  mistaken 
than  their  opponents.  A  world  of  which  all  events 
are  factors  of  causation  is  necessarily  a  teleological 
world — a  world  of  law,  an  orderly  arranged  universe,  a 
cosmos  with  definite  tendencies  which  determine  the 
direction  of  the  evolution  of  its  life-phenomena. 

FREE-WILL. 

There  are  so  many  superstitions  connected  with 
the  word  cause  that  one  sometimes  feels  tempted  to 
discard  it  altogether.  And  we  should  indeed  advocate 
the  abandonment  of  the  term  if  it  were  not  difficult  to 
replace  it.  If  we  discarded  it,  a  new  term  must  be  in- 
vented to  denote  the  truth  contained  in  the  word. 

After  all,  it  seems  to  be  easier  to  purify  old  terms 
than  to  replace  them  by  new  ones.  New  terms  are 
more  liable  to  be  misunderstood  than  the  criticism  of 
old  terms.  Criticism,  if  sound  and  generally  accept- 
able, will  serve  as  a  sufficient  corrective. 

The  idea  cause  is  often  looked  upon  with  awe  and 
reverence,  as  if  it  were  an  independent  and  sovereign 
being,  and  thus  the  necessity  of  causation  is  regarded 
as  a  power  which  rules  the  world  with  an  iron  rod. 


l6o  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

We  have  learned  that  all  effects  in  the  process  of 
causation  are  strictly  determined  by  their  causes  and 
circumstances.  Causation  implies  necessity  ;  and  ne- 
cessity means  that  every  event  is  determined  by  its 
conditions  in  its  minutest  details. 

Does  not  this  doctrine  abolish  free-will  ?  It  almost 
seems  so,  but  a  close  investigation  of  the  problem  will 
show  that  it  does  not.  Necessity  is  by  no  means  con- 
tradictory to  free-will.     Both  ideas  are  compatible. 

What  do  we  understand  by  freedom  ? 

When  a  man  can  act  as  he  pleases,  we  call  him 
free  ;  but  when  he  is  under  restraint,  when  he  cannot 
follow  the  motives  which  stir  him,  when  he  is  com- 
pelled by  others  to  act  against  his  will,  he  is  not  free. 

The  actions  of  a  free  man  are  the  immediate  ex- 
pressions of  his  character.  If  we  wish  to  know  the 
character  of  a  man,  we  must  observe  how  he  acts  when 
at  perfect  liberty.  The  actions  of  a  man  that  is  not 
free,  are  not  the  expressions  of  his  character;  they 
manifest  some  other  power  which  curtails  his  liberty. 
But  every  man,  whether  free  or  unfree,  will  act  under 
given  circumstances  in  such  a  way  that,  if  his  charac- 
ter and  all  the  circumstances  are  known,  his  action  can 
be  determined  ;  it  can  be  described  as  it  will  happen. 

The  confusion  from  which  so  many  errors  arise  is 
due  to  the  similarity  of  the  ideas  "compulsion"  and 
"necessity."  Compulsion  and  necessity  are  not  always 
synonyms.      Compulsion  annihilates  free-will.     Neces- 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  i6i 

sity  is  the  inevitable  consequence  by  which  a  certain 
result  follows  according  to  a  certain  reason. 

Freedom,  in  the  sense  we  conceive  it,  is  not  lim- 
ited to  the  domain  of  man's  activity.  Nature  is  not  a 
dead  machine  which  is  set  in  motion  by  push  and 
pressure.  Nature  is  throughout  possessed  of  a  living 
spontaneity,  and  the  spontaneity  of  nature  appears  in 
the  action  of  things  according  to  their  qualities.  The 
actions  of  things  exhibit  the  nature  of  things. 

We  can  classify  all  phenomena  as  primary  and  sec- 
ondary motions.  Primary  motions  arise  from  the  na- 
ture of  things  ;  while  secondary  motions  are  transfers 
of  primary  motion  through  push  and  pressure.  Pri- 
mary motions  are  spontaneous,  and  the  freedom  of 
nature  appears  in  their  display.  Secondary  motions, 
sometimes  called  purely  mechanical  phenomena,  orig- 
inating through  the  impacts  of  spontaneous  motions, 
are  comparable  to  compulsion  in  the  domain  of  psy- 
chology. They  are  actions  in  which  the  nature  of  the 
agent,  i.  e.,  of  the  body  in  motion,  is  not  revealed; 
they  show  the  influence  of  some  power  foreign  to  the 
moving  thing.  The  motion  of  the  horse  is  spontaneous, 
but  the  motion  of  the  cart  drawn  by  the  horse  is  purely 
mechanical.* 

The  attempt  has  been  made  again  and  again  to 
explain  natural  phenomena  mechanically,  as  due  to 
some  kind  of  pressure.     This  method  is  founded  on  a 

♦The  word  "spontaneous"  is  derived  from  the  Latin  J/owr  (will).  We 
call  those  actions  "spontaneous"  which  rise  from  the  will,  the  character,  the 
nature  of  things.     See  The  Monist,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  i,  p.  91. 


i62  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

confusion  of  thought.  To  say  that  "all  motions  take 
place  according  to  mechanical  laws,  viz.,  the  laws  of 
motion,"  is  quite  a  different  proposition  from  main- 
taining that  "everything  can  be  explained  by  mechan- 
ical laws."  We  can  explain  all  motions  by  mechani- 
cal laws,  provided  the  masses  and  the  moving  forces 
are  given,  but  we  cannot  explain  the  existence  of  the 
moving  forces  themselves  by  mechanical  laws. 

The  futility  of  a  mechanical  explanation  of  the 
world  is  apparent  as  soon  as  we  understand  that  purely 
mechanical  phenomena  cannot  have  risen  from  them- 
selves. They  are  due  to  the  spontaneous  motions  of 
nature.  And  a  mechanical  explanation  of  the  spon- 
taneity of  nature  hitches  the  cart  before  the  horse. 
How  can  the  secondary  motions  produce  primary  mo- 
tions? We  might  as  well  explain  the  motion  of  the 
horse  as  due  to  the  pressure  of  the  cart  behind  him. 

We  regard  the  existence  of  primary  motions  in  na- 
ture as  an  undeniable  fact.  The  ultimate  springs  of 
reality  are  spontaneous  forces,  and  their  manifestations 
are  a  true  exhibit  of  the  nature  of  being.  The  spon- 
taneity of  nature  is  analogous  to  the  action  of  a  free 
will. 

Give  the  magnet  freedom  on  a  pivot  and  it  will 
turn  toward  the  north,  in  accordance  with  the  quali- 
ties of  its  magnetism.  If  you  direct  the  magnet  by  a 
pressure  of  the  finger  to  some  other  point,  you  will 
exercise  a  compulsion  that  will  prevent  it  from  exhib- 
iting its  real  nature.     Were  the  magnet  endowed  with 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  163 

sentiment  and  gifted  with  the  power  of  speech,  it 
would  say  in  the  first  case,  "  I  am  free,  and  of  my  free 
will  I  point  toward  the  north."  In  the  second  case, 
however,  it  would  feel  that  it  is  acted  upon  and  forced 
into  some  other  direction  against  its  nature;  it  is  pos- 
sessed of  a  tendency  to  resist  the  pressure;  it  rebels 
against  it,  but  is  not  strong  enough  to  overcome  it, 
and  would  declare  its  freedom  curtailed. 

The  moral  worth  of  a  man  depends  entirely  upon 
what  motives  direct  his  will.  An  estimate  of  moral 
actions  is  possible  only  on  the  condition  that  they  are 
an  expression  of  his  free  will.  The  best  action  would 
amount  to  nothing  if  it  were  a  mere  chance  result 
which  might  have  been  otherwise.  The  chief  value 
of  moral  deeds  rests  on  the  fact  that  the  man  who  per- 
formed them,  could  not,  under  the  conditions,  act 
otherwise ;  that  it  was  an  act  of  free-will,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  according  to  his  character,  of  inevitable 
necessity. 

FATALISM  AND  NECESSITARIANISM. 

We  distinguish  between  necessitarianism  and  fa- 
talism. Necessitarianism  is  the  doctrine  that  every- 
thing is  determined  by  its  conditions ;  while  fatalism 
means  that  no  matter  what  a  man  may  do,  his  fate  is 
predetermined. 

While  necessitarianism  is  a  sound  doctrine  and  a 
theory  without  which  science  would  be  impossible, 
fatalism  is  a  superstition. 


i64  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

Those  who  look  upon  necessity  as  a  power  residing 
outside  of  or  above  nature  will  naturally  make  no  dis- 
tinction between  necessitarianism  and  fatalism  ;  nor 
will  they  understand  that  necessity  does  not  exclude 
free  will. 

The  ancients  believed  in  a  deity  called  Moira,  which 
was  supposed  to  have  power  even  over  the  immortal 
gods.  Necessity,  however,  is  not  the  Moira  of  Greek 
paganism,  nor  the  Fate  of  the  Romans,  nor  the  Kis- 
met of  the  Mohammedans.  Necessity  is  not  the  com- 
pulsion of  natural  events.  Necessity  is  the  inevitable 
determinedness  of  events  by  the  nature  of  the  things 
in  action. 

When  we  say  that  the  falling  stone  obeys  the  laws 
of  gravitation,  we  introduce  a  dualistic  world-concep- 
tion into  our  statement.  The  law  of  gravitation  is  not 
the  power  which  compels  the  stone  to  fall ;  it  is  a 
formula  which  describes  in  a  comprehensive  way  the 
action  of  gravitating  bodies.  The  gravity  which  makes 
a  stone  fall  is  an  intrinsic  quality  of  the  stone.  The 
stone,  while  falling,  is  not  obedient  to  any  law  out- 
side of  it,  but  acts  according  to  its  nature.  The  action 
of  the  stone  is  spontaneous,  and  he  who  is  acquainted 
with  the  nature  of  the  stone  can,  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances, determine  its  action. 

All  events  in  this  world  are  determined  ;  some  of 
them  are  determined  by  the  nature  of  the  moving 
things,  while  others  are  due  to  compulsion.     Nature 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  165 

possesses  a  certain  character,  and  this  character  is  re- 
vealed in  its  spontaneous  actions. 

The  fatalistic  view  of  the  world  conceives  nature 
and  man  alike  as  dead  mechanisms,  acted  upon  and 
subject  to  a  power  which  is  not  in  themselves.  Neces- 
sitarianism, as  we  have  defined  it,  is  monistic.  It 
shows  that  nature  is  no  mere  display  of  mechanical 
forces,  but  full  of  independence,  life,  and  spontaneity, 
the  highest  efflorescence  of  which  appears  in  the  free- 
dom of  man. 

THE  CHARACTER  OF  NATURE. 

All  the  actions  of  a  man,  diverse  as  they  may  be, 
will  be  of  a  certain  type,  because  his  character  is  the 
ground  from  which  they  start ;  and  his  character  re- 
maining to  a  certain  extent  the  same  throughout  his 
life,  all  he  does,  says,  and  intends,  will,  within  reason- 
able limits  contingent  upon  the  changes  of  his  charac-  , 
ter,  be  in  unfailing  harmony.  His  virtues  and  his  ' 
vices  will  bear  some  resemblance.  They  will  corre- 
spond with  one  another  and  show  their  common  ori- 
gin. 

In  the  same  way  chemical  materials  will  show  un- 
der certain  circumstances  certain  qualities.  Phos- 
phorus shines  in  the  dark  ;  it  is  inflammable  ;  it  melts 
at  a  temperature  of  so  many  degrees ;  such  and  such 
is  its  specific  gravity,  etc.  And  all  these  properties 
form  single  characteristics  of  this  element  which  we 
call  phosphorus.     In   order  to  find  out  the  nature  of 


1 66  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

things,  we  must  put  them  to  different  tests,  called  ex- 
periments, so  as  to  find  out  how  they  operate  under 
different  circumstances.  The  nature  of  things  appears 
in  their  tendencies  to  act,  and  their  actions  are  a  reve- 
lation of  their  qualities. 

The  character  of  man  and  the  properties  of  things 
are  inquired  into  in  the  same  way,  according  to  the 
law  of  causation.  And  whosoever  would  get  at  the 
truth  of  what  the  nature  of  the  universe  may  be,  must 
observe  its  actions  and  search  for  the  ends  and  aims 
to  which  its  development  tends.  In  this  way  alone 
can  we  understand  the  character  of  existence,  for  the 
development  of  natural  events  in  their  entirety  is  the 
revelation  of  the  cosmos. 

When  we  have  to  deal  with  a  man,  we  must  know 
his  character.  When  the  chemist  operates  with  drugs 
he  must  know  their  properties ;  and  he  who  wants  to 
adapt  himself  to  the  world  in  which  he  lives  must 
know  the  character  of  nature. 


The  light  which  the  theory  of  evolution  throws 
upon  our  knowledge  of  nature  shows  that  the  devel- 
opment of  the  world  is  constantly  tending  toward  a 
higher  plane  and  a  better  arrangement.  The  amount 
of  matter,  as  we  learn  from  the  law  of  the  conservation 
of  matter,  remains  unchanged  ;  but  the  form  and  com- 
position of  matter  is  changeable.  The  arrangement 
in  which  the  elements  are  combined  may  be  more  or 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  167 

less  favorable,  and  this  arrangement  undergoes  a  con- 
stant alteration  according  to  the  law  of  cause  and  ef- 
fect. 

In  the  realm  of  organised  life  there  is  a  tendency 
to  advancement  observable,  the  aim  of  which  is  the 
improvement  of  the  present  state.  But  the  improve- 
ment is  only  possible  by  unceasing  struggle  and  heroic 
work ;  not  in  the  service  of  egotism,  but  in  that  of  a 
higher  unity,  conceived  as  higher  than  the  existence 
of  the  individual;  not  by  indulging  in  the  happiness  of 
the  present,  but  by  severe  labor  done  in  the  hope  of 
and  with  a  faith  in  a  better  future  ;  in  a  word,  it  is 
only  possible  by  sacrifice. 

The  world-constitution  is  such  that  it  impHes  du- 
ties, and  the  attendance  to  the  duties  of  life  consists 
in  a  constant  struggle  for  advancement,  progress,  and 
amelioration  ;  and  the  world-conception  which  recog- 
nises this  state  of  things  is  called  "  Meliorism." 

The  struggle  for  advancement  and  the  aspirations 
of  moral  endeavor  in  general  are  not  a  matter  of  indi- 
vidual choice,  so  that  we  may  or  may  not  acknowledge 
the  authority  of  its  ideals.  They  are  an  inevitable 
presence  in  the  world  and  no  living  creature  can  with- 
draw itself  from  their  influence.  They  constitute  an 
authority  for  conduct  which  is  not  dependent  upon 
our  likes  or  dislikes  and  cannot  be  disregarded  with 
impunity. 

Every  individual  has  to  sacrifice  his  youth's  best 
years  for  the  comfort  of  his  age,  and  in  like  manner 


1 68       THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

humanity  sacrifices  the  labor  and  the  lives  of  its  indi- 
viduals for  a  better  future.  On  the  road  of  perpetual 
sacrifice  the  human  race  throngs  onward  to  a  higher 
and  better  existence  ;  and  should  races  similar  to  hu- 
manity on  earth  live  on  other  planets,  we  may  be 
fully  convinced  that  on  those  planets  also  there  is  an 
evolution  taking  place  to  higher  states  of  existence. 

The  way  by  which  life  advances  and  the  means 
through  which  it  attains  this  end  is  called  morality. 

All  living  existences  possess  tendencies  to  form 
higher  unities.  Like  organs  which  operate  as  parts  of 
an  organism,  they  work,  they  suffer,  they  sacrifice 
themselves  for  the  good  of  the  whole  of  which  they 
are  members. 

Let  us  look  at  the  lowest  forms  of  life.  Cells  pos- 
sess in  general  all  the  properties  of  organic  beings  ; 
alimentation,  growth,  and  propagation.  A  mother  cell 
having  divided  itself,  is  still  connected  with  its  filial 
cells ;  and  several  cells  are  in  their  union  more  fit  to 
encounter  the  struggle  for  life.  Henceforth,  the  work 
to  be  done  for  their  preservation  is  divided  in  such  a 
way  that  some  cells  perform  one,  other  cells  another, 
function  for  the  unity  thus  created.  It  is  a  division  of 
labor  according  to  a  general  plan,  and  that  is  what 
constitutes  an  organism.  The  single  organ  or  limb  of 
a  body  does  not  exist  of  itself,  but  is  subservient  to  the 
larger  unity  of  which  it  feels  itself  a  part.  The  pur- 
pose, aim,  and  end  of  its  existence  is  no  longer  in  itself 
but  in  something  higher  than  itself.     This  principle 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  169 

pervades  all  organised  nature.   Organisms  cannot  exist 
but  under  this  condition,  and  this  principle  is  ethical. 

The  same  principle  that  produced  organisms  and 
animals,  guides  them  in  their  future  development. 
And  only  so  far  as  a  creature  is  animated  by  this  eth- 
ical guidance  is  it  able  to  develop  into  something 
higher.  This  principle  is  the  star  of  Bethlehem  that 
leads  the  leaders  of  the  human  races  to  the  cradle 
where  a  new  truth  is  born,  or  where  the  germ  of  a 
higher  development  is  thriving.  Thus  the  existence 
of  man,  of  his  bodily  organism,  and  the  society  of  the 
man  as  a  social  organism,  rest  on  the  same  principle. 
We  find  everywhere  an  aspiration  to  develop  to  a 
higher  unity  and  a  better  existence. 

The  next  higher  stage  to  which  development  ever 
tends  is  the  ideal,  and  there  will  be  no  rest  in  the  minds 
of  men  until  the  ideal  is  reahsed.  After  that,  new 
ideals  arise  and  lead  on  in  the  interminable,  infinite 
path  of  progress  not  merely  ruled,  as  Darwin  says,  by 
the  famous  law  of  the  struggle  for  hfe,  but  enhanced 
by  the  strife  for  the  ideal. 

The  ideal  is  no  mere  fiction.  It  is  a  power  of  real- 
ity pervading  the  universe  as  the  law  of  nature,  and  in 
humanity's  case  it  points  out  to  man  the  path  of  pro- 
gress. Progress,  if  it  is  guided  by  the  ideal,  will  pro- 
duce new  and  better  eras  for  human  kind,  and  if  a 
moral  tendency  were  not  the  fundamental  law  of  na- 
ture, there  could  not  be  any  advancement,  develop- 
ment, or  evolution. 


I70  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

Nature  and  the  laws  of  nature  are  sometimes  com- 
plained of  as  immoral,  but  such  a  conception  of  nature 
has  no  sense.  It  is  based  upon  an  anthropomorphic 
view  of  nature.  Nature  is  neither  moral  nor  immoral, 
but  unmoral.  Nature's  creatures  only  are  moral  or  im- 
moral, according  as  they  do,  or  do  not,  conform  to 
the  laws  of  nature. 

That  power  in  nature  which  under  penalty  of  de- 
struction enforces  a  certain  conduct  is  called  by  the 
religious  name  "God."  God  is  the  authority  of  con- 
duct, and  the  name  "  God  "  signifies  a  reality  as  much 
as  any  natural  law.  Obedience  to  God  is  morality, 
disobedience,  immorality. 

Those  who  claim  that  God,  or  nature,  or  both,  are 
immoral,  have  either  a  wrong  conception  of  morality 
or  an  insufficient  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  things 
and  the  laws  of  evolution. 

The  nature  of  morality  cannot  be  established  by  a 
priori  reasoning,  but  by  experience  and  a  scientific  in- 
vestigation of  the  data  of  experience.  Scientific  in- 
vestigation tends  more  and  more  plainly  to  show  that 
the  morality  of  our  traditional  religions  is,  upon  the 
whole,  correct.  The  moral  rules  propounded  by  the 
great  religious  teachers  of  mankind  prove  an  instinc- 
tive but  deep  insight  into  the  order  of  nature.  That 
which  according  to  their  precedent  we  are  in  the  habit 
of  calling  morality  can  be  demonstrated  to  agree  with 
the  constitution  of  the  universe. 

In  this  sense,  to  live   naturally  becomes  identical 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  171 

with  aspiring  morally.  We  are  all  parts  of  a  whole 
greater  than  ourselves,  and  our  very  being  is  intimately 
connected  with  our  surroundings,  viz.,  with  the  fates 
of  our  fellow-men,  with  the  remotest  past,  and  also 
with  the  most  distant  future. 

The  innate  qualities  and  talents  which  appear  as 
gifts  of  nature,  are,  according  to  the  theory  of  evolu- 
tion, faculties  or  combinations  of  faculties,  inherited 
from  ancestors.  The  labor  of  former  generations  is 
not  lost.  Its  fruit  has  been  preserved  and  handed 
down  to  the  generation  now  living.  This  fact  has  a 
profoundly  ethical  import.  There  is  nothing  without 
work  in  this  world.  The  easy  and  apparently  effortless 
production  which  we  admire  in  genius  is  only  possible 
by  inherited  abilities,  acquired  by  the  labor  of  ances- 
tors. Every  man  ought  to  be  conscious  of  the  fact  that 
he  is  the  product  of  the  labor  of  ages,  and  whatever 
he  does,  be  it  evil  or  good,  will  live  after  him  so  far  as 
his  individuality  impresses  itself  and  influences  his  con- 
temporaries. In  consideration  of  this  fact,  man  will 
think  of  the  past  with  reverence  and  work  out  his  fu- 
ture with  earnestness. 

The  aspirations  to  ever  higher  aims  on  the  high- 
road of  eternity  seems  to  be  the  inmost,  the  sublimest, 
and  the  grandest  of  nature's  tendencies.  And  although 
the  solar  system  in  which  we  live  should,  after  its  due 
time,  fall  to  pieces,  there  are  other  suns  with  their 
planets  developing,  in  which,  no  doubt,  the  same  prin- 
ciple is  as  active  as  it  is  in  this  world  of  ours, 


172  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

Sursum  is  the  watchword  of  all  evolution,  and  the 
aim  everywhere  perceptible.  The  means  by  which  it 
is  attained  is  morality.  The  source  from  which  this 
tendency  starts  is  the  wonderful  spring  that  marvel- 
lously and  mysteriously  quickens  all  the  parts  of  the 
universe. 


PSYCHOLOGY. 

THE  ASSOCIATION  PHILOSOPHY, 

"Association  "  (from  the  Latin  ad,  "  to,"  and  socius, 
"  an  ally  ")  originally  denotes  the  act  of  becoming,  or 
the  state  of  being,  a  confederate,  and  is  generally 
used  in  the  sense  of  a  connection  of  persons,  things, 
or  ideas. 

The  association  of  ideas  plays  an  important  part 
in  psychology.  Ideas  which  are  related  possess  the 
quality  of  involuntarily  calling  one  another  into  con- 
sciousness. Our  mind  is  full  of  associations,  and  our 
brain  is  filled  with  commissural  fibres  which  may  fairly 
be  regarded  as  the  paths  of  association. 

Psychologists  have  taken  much  pains  to  formulate 
the  laws  of  association,  and  have  come  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  there  are  different  kinds  of  associations,among 
which  must  be  mentioned  those  by  contiguity,  simi- 
larity, and  contrast. 

If  two  impressions  have  been  made  simultaneously, 
the  one  will  recall  the  other.  This  is  called  the  asso- 
ciation of  contiguity,  and  this  contiguity  may  be  one 
of  time  or  one  of  space:  it  may  be  simultaneity,  or  it 
may  be  a  coincidence  of  events  in  one  and  the  same 
place,  or  both.  ' 


174  ^^^  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

Again,  suppose  a  child  has  seen  an  elephant  for 
the  first  time  in  a  menagerie,  and  now  sees  another  in 
a  street-parade  ;  he  will  think  of  the  first  elephant  and 
also  of  the  surroundings  in  which  he  saw  him.  The 
present  image  of  the  street-parade  elephant  becomes 
associated  with  and  awakens  the  memory- image  of  the 
menagerie  elephant.  This  is  association  by  similarity. 
At  the  same  time  it  calls  to  mind  other  impressions 
incidentally  associated  by  contiguity. 

Now  imagine  a  philosopher,  who  has  devoted  his 
life  to  a  study  of  the  schoolmen  and  their  quarrels.  As 
soon  as  he  hears  the  word  "nominalist,"  he  thinks  of 
their  opponents,  the  "realists."  These  names  are 
closely  connected  in  his  brain,  and  this  connection  is 
called  association  by  contrast. 

The  explanation  of  these  facts  appears  simple 
enough.  Two  impressions  are  made  at  the  same  time, 
and  it  is  natural  that  their  traces  should  be  as  closely 
connected  as  were  their  original  ideas.  Moreover,  that 
ideas  will  revive  the  memory-images  to  which  they  bear 
a  strong  resemblance  is  easily  explained  by  the  theory 
that  nervous  actions  of  a  peculiar  form  will  naturally 
travel  in  the  paths  of  their  own  form  ;  they  follow  the 
lines  prepared  for  them  by  former  actions  of  the  same 
kind. 

The  fact  that  ideas  are  actually  associated  with 
each  other,  together  with  the  obvious  simplicity  with 
which  this  fact  can  be  explained,  has  induced  a  great 
number  of  psychologists  to  believe  that  the  theory  of 


l^HE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  175 

association  affords  a  key  to  all  the  problems  of  the 
soul.  The  psychology  of  association  is  represented  by 
Hobbes,  Hume,  Hartley,  the  two  Mills,  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, Hoffding,  and  others,  and  it  may  be  said  to  be  in 
full  bloom  to-day. 

The  association  of  ideas  is  a  very  important  factor 
in  soul-life,  but  it  does  not  explain  the  problems 
that  have  caused  the  greatest  difficulties  to  our  phi- 
losophers. The  association  of  ideas  does  not  explain 
the  origin  of  concepts,  of  generalisations,  of  abstracts ; 
it  does  not  explain  the  origin  of  reason  ;  it  does  not 
explain  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  necessary  connection 
which  we  attribute  to  certain  relations. 

The  association  philosophy  is  an  error,  because  it 
applies  one  special  thing  (the  association  of  ideas)  to 
the  whole  realm  of  psychical  life,  and  thus  makes  of  it 
a  fundamental  principle  in  philosophy.  The  associa- 
tion philosopher  resolves  all  the  more  complex  psychi- 
cal facts  into  associations  of  single  sense-impressions; 
he  regards  the  idea  of  causation  as  a  mere  association 
of  a  frequently  repeated  sequence  ;  thus  making  reason 
a  mere  incidental  and  purely  subjective  habit  of  asso- 
ciation, and  depriving  it  of  stringent  authority,  objec- 
tivity, and  necessity. 

Let  us  first  consider  the  psychological  mistakes  of 
the  association  philosophy.  Generic  images  do  not 
originate  by  association,  but  by  fusion.  Many  images 
are  superimposed  like  composite  photographs  and 
form   a  composite  image,   in  which   all  the  common 


176  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

features  are  strongly  marked,  while  the  incongruent 
features  appear  blurred.  The  association  of  ideas  is 
quite  another  and,  indeed,  a  very  different  process  from 
the  blending  of  images.  The  former  preserves  the 
single  pictures  distinct,  the  latter  welds  all  particular 
impressions  into  a  higher  and  more  general  unity. 

He  who  fails  to  distinguish  these  two  processes, 
association  and  fusion,  and  tries  to  conceive  of  a 
generic  image  as  the  product  of  association,  will  be 
perplexed  in  many  ways  ;  and,  indeed,  almost  all  the 
attempts  that  have  been  made  to  explain  association 
by  similarity  from  that  by  contiguity,  or  vice  versa, 
bear  evidence  of  the  sad  confusion  that  prevails  among 
the  association  philosophers.  Some  of  them  despair 
of  reducing  the  various  associations  to  unity,  and 
either  ask  us  to  look  upon  it  as  an  evidence  of  dualism 
or  declare  that  the  mystery  is  too  deep  for  our  com- 
prehension. 

The  process  of  causation  has,  in  the  conception  of 
the  association  philosophy,  ceased  to  be  a  necessary 
event  and  has  become  a  mere  sequence,  which  is  at 
best  an  invariable  sequence.  Thus  the  bond  of  union 
that  holds  the  world  together  as  one  inseparable  whole 
is  lost,  and  all  events  become  isolated  particulars, 
single  happenings  without  any  intrinsic  or  necessary 
interconnection.  The  universe,  which  to  us  is  a  syste- 
matic and  consistent  cosmos,  is,  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  association  philosophy,  comparable  to  a  bag  of 
innumerable  peas;  many  events  happen  to  follow  the 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  177 

one  upon  the  other,  but  there  is  no  true  necessity,  no 
real  causation,  no  intrinsic  order  or  harmony. 

The  association  philosophy  rests  upon  the  principle 
that  all  knowledge  is  derived  from  experience.  So 
far,  good  !  But  the  association  philosophers,  having 
inherited  all  the  errors  of  sensationalism,  take  the  idea 
"experience  "  in  the  limited  sense  of  the  word.  In  the 
spirit  of  nominalism,  of  which  they  are  an  offshoot,  they 
see  isolated  phenomena  only  and  are  not  aware  of  the 
bond  of  union  which  permeates  the  whole  realm  of  ex- 
istence, giving  rise  to  the  uniformities  that  science 
formulates  into  natural  laws.  The  possibility  of  formu- 
lating a  law  of  nature,  appears,  from  their  standpoint, 
an  insoluble  mystery. 

The  association  philosophy  fails  to  satisfy  the  de- 
mands that  must  be  made  of  a  philosophy.  It  leaves 
the  most  important  problems  unexplained,  and  by 
its  assumptions  and  hypotheses  involves  us  in  such 
hopeless  intricacies  that  we  must  ultimately  take  ref- 
uge either  in  scepticism,  agnosticism,  or  mysticism  ; 
and  something  must  be  wrong  in  a  system  of  explana- 
tions, a  philosophy,  or  a  science,  which  comes  to  the 
conclusion  that  we  cannot  explain  things,  that  they 
are  unknowable  or  utterly  mysterious. 

The   association   philosophy   forms   a   contrast    to 
Kant's  apriorism.     The  philosophy  which  we  propose 
avoids  on  the  one  hand,  the  fallacies  of  Kantian  apri 
orism,  and  on  the  other  those  of  the  association  phi- 
losophy.  Our  view  does  not  end  in  agnosticism  or  mys- 


178  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

ticism,  but  affords  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  why 
we  attribute  to  the  formal  sciences  necessity  and  uni- 
versality. It  explains  how  mind  originates,  how  gen- 
eral ideas  are  formed,  how  knowledge  (and  not  only 
mere  opinion)  is  possible,  and  teaches  us  the  usage  of 
the  proper  methods  of  scientific  inquiry. 

COMPOSITES  OF  BLENDED  MEMORIES. 

To  procure  truly  representative  faces,  Mr.  Francis 
Galton  invented  the  method  of  composite  portraiture  ; 
he  photographed  whole  classes  of  persons,  one  after 
another,  upon  the  same  photographer's  plate,  so  ad- 
justing and  superimposing  the  different  faces  that  all 
eyes  fell  in  the  same  horizontal,  and  all  noses  in  the 
same  vertical  line.  The  results  which  he  obtained  are 
remarkable.  They  "bring  into  evidence  all  the  traits 
in  which  there  is  agreement,  and  leave  but  a  ghost  of 
a  trace  of  individual  peculiarities.  There  are  so  many 
traits  in  common  of  all  faces  that  the  composite  pic- 
ture v/hen  made  from  many  compounds  is  far  from 
being  a  blur ;  it  has  altogether  the  look  of  an  ideal 
composition." 

Now,  suppose  that  the  photographer's  sensitive 
plate  were  endowed  with  actual  sentiency.  We  should 
have  in  that  case  a  state  of  things  similar  to  what  ac- 
tually exists  in  the  brains  of  living  beings.  Similar 
impressions  are  made  through  the  different  sense-or- 
gans and  registered  in  their  respective  sensory  centres. 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  179 

Registrations  of  the  same  kind  are  not  made  side  by 
side  ;  they  are  not  independent  single  pictures  ;  they 
are  placed  one  upon  another  and  blend,  all  forming  a 
peculiar  new  formation,  viz.,  a  composite  memory- 
structure  or  an  ideal  image  of  all  the  objects  of  the 
same  kind  that  have  come  under  observation.  To  ex- 
press it  in  two  words,  they  are  not  associations,  but 
fusions. 

When  a  special  sense-impression  is  made,  the  nerv- 
ous disturbance  travels  on  the  path  prepared  by  former 
sense-impressions  of  the  same  kind  to  the  interior  struc- 
tures of  the  hemispheres  containing  their  traces  as 
a  composite  memory-picture.  The  present  sense-im- 
pression, being  felt  to  be  the  same  in  kind  as  the  old 
ones  registered  in  its  analogous  composite,  naturally 
serves  as  an  indicator  of  the  presence  of  an  object  of 
the  same  kind  as  those  that  caused  the  former  sense- 
impressions.  Thus  sense-impressions  become  signs 
of  things,  and  the  composite  memory-images  acquire 
meaning.  These  meaning-endowed  sentient  compo- 
sites constitute  the  elements  of  the  soul. 

THE  NATURE  OF  PERCEPTIONS. 

Perhaps  everybody  has  sometime  in  his  experience 
been  puzzled  at  the  sight  of  an  object  the  character 
of  which  he  was  unable  to  recognise.  We  see  a  cer- 
tain something  and  do  not  know  what  it  is.  The  out- 
lines perhaps  are  clear,  the  colors  distinct ;  but,  never- 
theless, we  cannot  make  out  what  kind  of  a  thing  it  is. 


i8o  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

What  can  this  psychical  phenomenon  teach  us? 

It  teaches  that  a  sense-impression  is  quite  a  differ- 
ent thing  from  a  perception.  A  sense-impression  that 
is  felt  is  called  a  "sensation."  But  a  perception  is 
more.  A  sensation  may  be  perfect  yet  a  perception 
need  not  be  effected.  A  perception  is  effected  only 
when  the  sense-impression  is  transmitted  to  the  mem- 
ory-structures of  its  class  so  that  it  is  interpreted  as  a 
certain  object,  is  identified  with  former  impressions 
of  the  same  kind,  and  clearly  recognised  as  such  and 
such  a  thing. 

That  which  has  been  called  the  cerebral  centre  of 
vision,  is  nothing  but  the  place  in  which  the  composite 
memories  of  sight- impressions  are  stored.  A  crea- 
ture whose  centre  of  vision  has  been  destroyed  has 
lost  the  repository  of  those  impressions  which  it  has  re- 
ceived through  the  eye.  It  is  soul-blind,  ox  seelen-blifid, 
as  it  has  been  called  by  German  savants.  Again,  that 
which  has  been  called  the  centre  of  hearing  is  nothing 
but  the  place  in  which  composite  memories  of  auditory 
impressions  are  contained  ;  and  a  creature  whose  cen- 
tre of  hearing  has  been  destroyed  can  no  longer  recog- 
nise sounds.  It  is  soul-deaf,  or  seelen-taub.  And  the 
same  is  true  of  all  the  so-called  centres  of  soul-life. 

Professor  Goltz  has  succeeded  in  keeping  alive  a 
dog  whose  entire  hemispheres  had  been  removed. 
While  all  other  organs,  especially  his  senses,  are  in 
perfect  order,  he  has  lost  all  his  memory-structures, 
and  with  them   the   composite  images  shaped  by  his 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE  i8i 

former  experiences.  Thus  he  is  a  perfect  idiot,  a  soul- 
less creature,  capable  of  receiving  sense-impressions 
through  all  his  sensory-organs,  but  unable  to  interpret 
their  meaning. 

A  perception  is  the  simplest  act  of  cognition,  for  a 
perception  is  a  sensation  that  has  reached  and  revived 
its  analogous  memory-structure.  There,  so  to  say,  it  is 
subsumed.  Having  the  same  or  a  similar  form,  the 
sense-impression  fits  into  the  form  of  the  memory- 
structures  and  is  felt  to  be  of  the  same  kind.  This 
classification  of  things  of  the  same  kind  is  the  essential 
nature  of  cognition  :  perceptions  are  primitive  judg- 
ments. 

GENERALISATION  PRIOR  TO  COGNITION. 

There  has  been  much  controversy  concerning  the 
priority  of  general  or  of  particular  ideas.  It  was  de- 
clared, on  the  one  hand,  that  general  ideas  had  sprung 
from  particular  ideas  :  the  primum  appellatum  and  pri- 
mum  cognitum,  it  was  maintained,  were  concrete  ob- 
jects. While  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  objected  that 
the  very  first  act  of  naming,  and  indeed  every  act  of 
cognition,  presupposes  the  existence  of  a  general  idea. 
The  latter  view  is  quite  correct;  yet,  when  this  view  is 
adduced  to  prove  the  mysteriousness  of  cognition, 
implying  that  there  is  a  break  in  nature  between  man 
and  the  rest  of  nature  (as  proposed  by  Prof.  F.  Max 
Miiller  in  Tlic  Monist,  I.,  4),  we  must  seriously  protest. 

If  we  keep  before  our  minds  the  physiological  pro- 


i82  THE   PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

cess  of  perception,  the  reason  is  obvious  why  every 
idea  must  at  bottom  be  a  general  idea,  and  why  every 
act  of  cognition  presupposes  some  general  notion  under 
which  a  particular  notion  is  subsumed.  Every  sense- 
impression  is  a  particular  fact,  while  the  analogous 
memory-structure,  which  is  ready  to  receive  any  sense- 
impression  of  the  same  kind,  is,  or  at  least  stands  for, 
a  general  notion.  And  this  notion  is  the  more  vague, 
the  more  primitive  it  is. 

Generalisation,  accordingly,  is  not  one  of  the  high- 
est faculties  of  the  mind,  but  the  very  lowest.  Mind 
begins  with  generalisation. 

The  first  sensation  is  a  particular  act ;  it  is  no  no- 
tion. But  the  first  memory-trace  of  a  composite  par- 
takes of  the  nature  of  a  generalisation  ;  when  revived 
by  a  later  sensation,  it  represents  a  whole  class,  and 
therefore  the  first  perception,  i.  e.,  the  first  and  most 
rudimentary  act  of  cognition  is  a  subsumption  ;  it  pre- 
supposes already  the  existence  of  a  general  notion. 

APPERCEPTION  AND   CONSCIOUSNESS. 

A  perception  is,  in  turn,  the  most  elementary  act 
of  apperception  ;  and  apperception  is  the  function  of 
consciousness. 

In  analysing  the  nature  of  consciousness,  we  find 
that  it  consists  of  coordinating,  centralising,  and  in- 
tensifying feelings  in  a  focus.  A  single  and  isolated 
feeling  cannot  exist  as  an  actual  feeling.      It  becomes 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  183 

an  actual  feeling  only  when  it  meets  another  feeling  by 
which  it  is  felt.  Thus  feelings  are  possible  only  in 
those  organisms  in  which  feelings  are  so  organised  or 
systematised  that  sensations  are  referred  to  the  mem- 
ories of  former  sense-impressions,  and  this  is  accom- 
plished by  the  nervous  system. 

Suppose  a  sense-impression  is  made  upon  a  sentient 
organism  void  of  memories — i.  e. ,  on  an  organism  which 
has  never  as  yet  received  prior  sense-impressions.  The 
isolated  feeling  produced  by  such  a  first  sense-impres- 
sion (if  feeling  it  can  be  called)  is  very  different  from 
later  feelings,  for  its  scale  of  consciousness  is  not  merely 
extremely  low,  but  actually  zero,  there  being  no  other 
feeling  to  apperceive  it.  The  second  sense-impression 
of  the  same  kind,  however,  meets  with  and  revives 
the  trace  left  by  the  first  one.  It  is  received  in  the 
memory-structure  of  the  first  sense-impression  and 
there  it  is  felt.  This  act  of  the  memory-structure  is 
the  weakest  kind  of  apperception  imaginable ;  it  is  the 
first  tiny  appearance  of  consciousness. 

Isolated  feelings  may  be  called  feelings,  but  they 
are  not  felt.  Several  or  at  least  two  feelings  must  meet 
to  be  felt. 

The  stronger  and  the  more  manifold  the  memory- 
structures  grow,  the  more  cognisant  does  apperception 
become.  A  sense-impression  will  in  higher  stages  re- 
vive several  memory  structures,  and  their  feelings  will 
be  concentrated  upon  it.  The  object  of  attention  is 
now  focussed,  and  the  act  of  its  being  felt  js  intensified 


i84  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

by  a  coordination  of  feelings.  Thus  dim  feelings  de- 
velop by  coordination  into  clear  consciousness,  and 
the  organised  memory-structures  form  a  more  and 
more  definite  basis  of  psychic  life,  constituting  a  certain 
character,  which  when  it  reaches  the  domain  of  human 
life,  is  called  personality. 

APPERCEPTION  AND  WILL. 

The  question  has  been  raised  whether  or  not  ap- 
perception is  an  act  of  the  will ;  and  the  answer  de- 
pends upon  the  meaning  we  attach  to  the  word  "will." 

The  most  elementary  kind  of  a  will  is  to  be  found 
in  the  spontaneity  of  the  simplest  processes  of  nature. 
The  actions  and  reactions  of  chemicals,  the  ether  vi- 
brations of  light  and  electricity,  and  also  the  gravita- 
tion of  a  stone  are  motions  that  take  place  because 
the  moving  object  possesses  a  certain  quality  which 
under  special  conditions  makes  it  act  in  a  certain  way. 
These  motions  are  self-motions  or  spontaneous  mo- 
tions. In  this  sense  Schopenhauer  uses  the  word 
''will." 

By  "will,"  however,  we  generally  understand  a 
peculiar  kind  of  spontaneity,  i.  e.,  of  the  inherent  qual- 
ity of  things  which  makes  them  move  :  will  is  the 
spontaneity  only  of  intelligent  beings.  A  tendency  to 
pass  into  motion  is  called  will  only  when  it  is  accom- 
panied by  consciousness.  Will  is  the  incipient  motion, 
the  motive  cause  of  which  is  a  representative  image 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  185 

(generally  called  motor  idea)  in  the  agent's  mind  ;  the 
object  represented  in  this  representative  image  being 
the  aim  or  end  to  be  attained. 

Primitive  apperception  is  a  spontaneous  action, 
the  act  of  apperception  bring  the  outcome  of  the  pe- 
culiar qualities  of  the  acting  organism.  It  is  an  activ- 
ity of  the  feeling  substance  :  it  is  an  apprehending 
and  not  merely  a  passive  state  of  receiving  impres- 
sions. 

The  peculiar  qualities  of  an  organism,  which  make 
apperception  possible,  are  (i)  psychical,  for  the  mem- 
ory-structures are  endowed  with  sentiency,  and  (2) 
mental,  for  they  possess  representative  value,  they  are 
endowed  with  meaning.  Thus  apperception  is  (in  its 
primitive  appearance,  and  of  course  in  a  very  rudimen- 
tary way)  at  once  a  psychical  and  a  mental  process. 
But  it  does  not  become  an  act  of  will  until  the  memory- 
structures  grow  strong  and  independent  enough  to  ex- 
ercise a  choice  and  give  preference  to  a  certain  kind  of 
sense-impressions.  By  the  neglect  of  other  sense  im- 
pressions all  available  sentiency  is  focussed  upon  one 
object  or  upon  the  search  for  one  kind  of  object.  This 
phenomenon,  best  observable  in  the  hunt  for  food,  is 
called  attention,  and  attention  is  "apperception  guided 
by  will." 

Whether  or  not  amoebas  and  protozoa  exhibit  an 
elementary  will  when  hunting  for  food  is  simply  a 
question  of  terminology.  According  to  Schopenhauer 
they  do  ;    according    to  the  customary  usage  of  the 


1 86  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

term,  they  do  not.  Their  tissues  demand  a  restoration 
of  their  waste  products  and  they  seek  to  satisfy  this 
want.  Their  tendencies  are  processes  of  much  higher 
complexity  than  the  affinitiesof  chemical  substances^but 
there  is  no  radical  difference  between  the  two  actions. 
Prof.  Max  Verworn  has  proved  that  the  protrusion  of 
pseudopods  in  the  amoeba  is  caused  by  their  chemo- 
tropy  for  oxygen,  while  their  contraction,  i.  e.  the  re- 
turn of  the  plasma  to  the  nuclear  substance,  after  an 
irritation  of  some  kind  which  changes  their  chemical 
constitution,  is  due  to  a  chemotropy  for  the  nuclear 
substances.  Their  motions  are  tendencies  ;  they  are 
not  actions  of  a  will.  We  can  speak  of  a  will  as  soon 
as  the  irritation  which  causes  the  contraction  of  living 
substance  is  a  commotion  possessing  representative 
value.  There  must  be  memory-structures  present  which 
not  only  feel  the  need  of  a  restoration  of  the  waste  pro- 
ducts in  the  tissues  of  the  organism  but  have  also  a 
recollection  of  its  prior  satisfaction.  This  recollection 
is  the  primitive  form  of  a  motor  idea.  It  serves  as  a 
stimulus  to  the  motor  organs  of  the  organism  to  hunt 
for  food.  Thus  the  cause  of  the  action  is  a  mental 
state,  and  the  action  is  planned,  however  vaguely. 
The  aim  of  the  action  is  the  realisation  of  the  motor- 
idea.  There  is  no  action  of  the  will  without  either  a 
motive,  which  is  the  motor  idea,  or  without  an  end  in 
view  or  purpose,  which  is  the  object  represented  by 
the  motor  idea. 

That  there  is  no  definite  line  of  demarcation  where 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  187 

tendencies  become  purposive  acts  of  will  is  a  matter 
of  course,  which,  as  in  all  analogous  cases  of  evolu- 
tionary products,  detracts  nothing  from  the  distinction 
to  be  made  between  these  lower  and  higher  pheno- 
mena of  organised  life. 

IDEAS  AND  THE  LIFE  OF  IDEAS. 

Perceptions  are  the  simplest  acts  of  soul-life.  But 
in  the  course  of  evolution  a  higher  activity  of  soul-life 
springs  from  them,  as  soon  as  sounds  are  employed  to 
designate  certain  composite  pictures.  These  sound- 
symbols  create  a  new  sphere  of  mental  life,  with  higher 
possibilities.  Meaning-endowed  sound-symbols  are 
called  "words,"  and  the  mechanism  of  words  or  ar- 
ticulate speech  creates  the  domain  of  rational  thought, 
which  in  its  highest  perfection  is  called  science. 

The  meanings  inherent  in  words  and  combinations 
of  words  are  called  ideas. 

And  what  wonderful  things  ideas  are — these  highest 
kinds  of  meaning-freighted  feelings  !  Every  idea  pos- 
sesses an  individuality  of  its  own.  Ideas  grow  and  de- 
velop ;  they  migrate  from  one  brain  into  another,  being 
transferred  through  the  word-symbols  of  spoken  or 
written  language.  Ideas  adapt  themselves  to  new  en- 
vironments ;  they  struggle  among  themselves  ;  some  of 
them  are  victorious,  others  succumb.  Some  are  exter- 
minated, others  survive.  Those  that  survive  suffer 
changes  from   assimilation  among  themselves.      Some 


i88  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

are  powerful,  others  are  weak,  and  a  few  assume  do- 
minion over  their  companions. 

Ideas  are  real  living  beings  :  each  one  of  them  pos- 
sesses a  special  individuality,  and  all  of  them  are,  as  it 
were,  citizens  of  that  wonderful  commonwealth  called 
''the  soul." 

It  has  been  said  that  states,  churches,  and  other 
superindividual  beings  do  not  exist.  We  do  not  intend 
to  discuss  that  problem  now  ;  but  it  appears  that  ideas 
would  have  at  least  the  same  right  to  deny  the  exist- 
ence of  human  personalities,  for  a  human  personality 
is  merely  a  society  of  ideas. 

We  may  compare  ideas  (without  going  astray  or 
being  fantastical)  to  real  persons.  At  least  the  idea 
we  have  of  persons  is  after  all  the  most  appropriate 
simile  we  have  to  characterise  their  being.  Think  only 
of  moral  ideas,  of  ideals,  of  religious  sentiments  !  They 
enter  the  souls  of  men  and  take  hold  of  their  entire  ex- 
istence often  in  spite  of  their  will.  And  what  a  pro- 
found truth  lies  in  the  dogma  of  resurrection  !  Jesus 
the  crucified  has  actually  risen  from  the  dead.  His- 
torical investigations  have  been  made  as  to  whether 
the  apparitions  of  Christ  as  seen  by  his  disciples,  ac- 
cording to  the  Gospels,  were  not  hallucinations  ;  and 
the  possibility  of  his  bodily  resurrection  has  been  de- 
nied. It  is  true,  and  let  it  be  true,  that  corpses  can- 
not be  revived.  But  what  of  that  ?  We  need  not  mind 
the  fate  of  the  body  in  the  face  of  the  truth  that  the 
soul  possesses  immortal  life.     Christ  is  actually  a  liv- 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  189 

ing  presence  in  humanity,  and  his  spirit  was,  and  is 
still,  the  most  dominating  power  in  the  evolution  of 
mankind.  The  dogmatist,  so  called,  and  exactly  so  his 
adversary,  the  infidel,  so  called,  imagine  that  Chris- 
tianity must  be  a  fraud  unless  it  can  be  proved  that 
the  corpse  of  Jesus  became  reanimated.  The  concep- 
tion of  both  the  orthodox  and  the  infidel  is  materialis- 
tic ;  both  overlook  the  reality  and  importance  of  soul- 
life. 

Ye  of  little  faith  and  of  still  less  understanding  !  It 
is  a  pagan  notion  to  build  a  religion  on  the  resurrec- 
tion of  corpses.  True  religion  is  based  upon  the  im- 
mortality of  the  soul ;  and  the  immortality  of  the  soul 
is  no  mere  phrase,  no  empty  allegory,  no  error  or  fraud: 
it  is  a  fact  provable  by  science  ;  it  is  a  reality  without 
which  no  higher  soul-life,  no  progress,  no  evolution 
would  be  possible  :  it  is  the  corner-stone  of  religion 
and  the  basis  of  ethics. 

PSYCHOLOGICAL  TERMS. 

In  consideration  of  the  importance  of  a  clear,  well- 
defined,  and  consistent  terminology,  we  present  the 
following  psychological  definitions  and  explanations  : 

Feeling  is  a  state  in  which  existence  is,  be  it  ever 
so  dimly,  aware  of  itself. 

Sense-impression  is  the  immediate  and  bodily  effect 
of  an  event  upon  a  sentient  being. 

Sensation  is  the  feeling  that  takes  place  when  a 
sense-impression  is  made.      It  is  the  sense-impression 


igo  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

felt.  Sensations  are  the  simplest  psychical  facts  and 
the  ultimate  units  of  our  conscious  subjectivity.  They 
are,  as  it  were,  the  atoms  of  our  soul. 

Sentijuent  is  the  degree  of  intensity  as  well  as  the 
pleasurableness  and  painfulness  of  feelings,  which,  as 
it  were,  give  color  to  them. 

Feelings,  when  strongly  tinged  with  sentiment  and 
liable  to  lead  to  action,  are  called  cnifltions. 

Traces  are  such  modifications  of  the  feeling  sub- 
stance produced  by  sense-impressions  as  persist. 

Memory  is  that  quality  of  sentient  substance  by  vir- 
tue of  which  sense-impressions  leave  traces. 

Memories  are  the  feelings  of  the  various  traces  as 
revived. 

Image  is  the  common  name  given  to  sensations  and 
to  the  traces  of  sensations,  which  latter,  when  revived 
are  felt  again,  and,  as  such,  are  called  ''memory- 
images."  There  are  visual  images,  acoustic  images, 
images  of  taste,  of  smell,  of  touch,  and  of  temperature. 

Composite  images  are  combinations  of  the  traces  of 
many  sense-impressions  of  one  and  the  same  or  a  sim- 
ilar kind,  superimposed  one  upon  another. 

Perception  is  the  feeling  that  attends  the  entrance 
of  a  sense-impression  into  the  composite  image  of  its 
class. 

Percept  is  a  sensation  perceived. 

Every  perception  is  an  elementary  judgment.  It 
is  equivalent  to  a  verdict  that  a  sense-impression  be- 
longs to  the  class  of  traces  among  which  it  is  registered. 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  191 

By  person  we  understand  the  totality  of  the  mem- 
ory-structures and  composite  images,  interrelated 
among  each  other  in  an  individual  organism. 

An  isolated  sensation,  viz.,  a  sensation  which  has 
not  become  a  perception,  which  has  not  been  regis- 
tered in  its  respective  composite  image,  may  be  called 
a  feeling,  but  it  certainly  is  not  felt  by  the  person  who 
has  the  sensation.  Feelings  are  felt  by  being  inter- 
related, and  the  interrelation  of  feelings  alone  can  pro- 
duce perception.  When  a  perception  is  become  inter- 
related with  the  most  important  memory-images  of  a 
person,  including  the  idea  that  represents  the  person, 
it  is  called  apperception. 

The  peculiar  feature  which  is  the  characteristic  of 
all  the  various  apperceptions  is  called  consciousness. 
Thus  consciousness  is  feeling  systematised  or  focussed 
in  a  centre.  It  is  a  coordination  of  sentient  images  and 
an  intensification  of  sentiment. 

The  pronoun  "I"  stands  for  the  person  of  the 
speaker  as  a  whole,  and  its  Latin  equivalent,  "ego," 
has  been  used  to  denote  the  unity  of  a  person  as  it 
appears  in  consciousness. 

Ever  since  we  reached  an  understanding  of  the  na- 
ture of  perception  and  apperception,  the  ego  has 
ceased  to  be  a  mystery. 

* 
*  * 

The  objects  of  the  surrounding  world  (whatever 
may  be  their  other  differences)  must  obviously  differ 


192  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

in  form,  and  this  difference  of  form  naturally  produces 
an  analogous  difference  of  sense-impressions,  of  sen- 
sations and  feelings.  This  accounts  for  the  various 
kinds  of  feeling,  which  are  appropriately  called  forms 
of  feeling. 

Memory-traces,  being  of  various  forms,  analogous 
to  the  various  forms  of  objects,  come  to  represent  or 
symbolise  that  class  of  objects  or  events  through  con- 
tact with  which  they  have  originated.  They  acquire 
meaning ;  and  their  feelings,  having  acquired  meaning, 
are  called  sentient  symbols. 

Ideas  are  the  meanings  of  sentient  symbols. 

Thought  or  thinking  is  the  interaction  that  takes 
place  among  sentient  symbols. 

Impulses  are  feelings  which  tend  to  action. 

Passions  are  strong  sentiments  tending  to  action. 

Will  is  a  conscious  impulse,  brought  about  after  a 
longer  or  shorter  deliberation  by  a  consensus  of  the 
most  powerful  ideas. 

Purpose  is  an  idea  willed,  i.  e.,  a  plan,  the  execution 
of  which  is  determined. 

Action  is  the  motion  of  an  organism,  performed 
after  conscious  deliberation ;  it  is  purposive  motion. 

The  term  psychical  applies  to  feelings  as  feelings. 

The  term  mental  applies  to  thought-operations. 

The  term  spiritual  applies  to  the  representative 
value  of  feelings. 

Soul  is  the  name  given  to  the  system  of  sentient 
symbols  as  a  totality. 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  193 

Soul,  mind,  spirit,  and  character  are  synonyms 
with  different  shades  of  meaning. 

When  using  the  term  soul,  we  think  mainly  of  the 
feeling  element  and  the  various  forms  of  feelings,  of 
sentiments,  passions,  and  emotions. 

When  using  the  word  mind,  we  think  principally  of 
mental  or  intellectual  qualities,  of  thought-operations, 
logical  conclusions,  judgments,  or  ideas. 

When  using  the  word  spirit,  we  leave  out  of  sight 
all  the  corporeal  relations  of  a  feeling  organism,  and 
think  mainly  of  the  meaning  residing  in  psychic  sym- 
bols, in  ideas  and  ideals. 

When  using  the  word  character,  we  think  of  the 
peculiar  nature  of  the  impulses,  desires,  inclinations, 

and  will  of  a  man. 

*  * 

Faculty  is  the  collective  name  given  to  the  various 
features  of  our  psychical,  mental,  or  spiritual  opera- 
tions. 

The  old  doctrine,  that  the  soul  possesses  faculties 
which  have  their  distinct  seats  and  well-defined  prov- 
inces, is  exploded.  Every  faculty  is  a  collective  term 
framed  to  designate  a  certain  kind  of  mental  activity, 
or  a  certain  quality  of  thought-operations.  Thus  we 
speak  of  memory,  of  cognition,  of  judgment,  of  imagi- 
nation, of  attention,  etc.,  as  faculties. 

Imagination  is  (i)  the  free  play  of  ideas;  (2)  that 
quality  of  thinking  beings  which  allows  images  or  ideas 
to  enter  into  all  possible  combinations. 


194  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

Attention  is  the  concentration  of  the  soul ;  it  is  that 
state  of  mind  in  which  one  single  impulse  or  will  pre- 
dominates, either  suppressing  all  other  impulses,  or 
making  them  subservient. 

Cognition  is  conscious  and  deliberate  perception. 
It  denotes  especially  all  complex  processes  of  percep- 
tion, the  analysis  of  complex  ideas,  and  the  arrange- 
ment of  their  elements  in  the  respective  categories  to 
which  they  belong.  Comprehension  is  the  distinct 
perception  of  that  which  is  alike  in  two  or  several  ap- 
parently heterogeneous  phenomena,  thus  rendering 
possible  a  description  of  their  essential  features  in  a 
common  formula,  called  natural  law. 

Intellect  is  the  presence  of  such  conditions  as  make 
cognition  possible. 

Intelligence  is  the  ability  of  practically  employing 
one's  intellect. 

Understanding  is  that  quality  which  makes  thinking 
beings  find  explanations.  It  is  the  recognition  of 
changes  as  transformations,  or,  in  other  words,  the 
tracing  of  causation. 

Reason  is,  (i)  that  quality  of  sentient  beings  which 
makes  thought-operations  possible.  In  short,  it  is  the 
faculty  of  thinking. 

We  have  parenthetically  to  add  that  the  ability  to 
draw  conclusions  from  premises,  which  is  one  of  the 
most  important  functions  of  reason,  is  called yW^w^«/. 

Being  especially  methodical  thinking,  reason  is,  in 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  195 

its  strict  and  proper  sense,  (2)  the  method  of  thinking, 
the  purpose  of  which  is  the  economj'  of  thought. 

Reason  also  denotes  the  means  by  which  economy 
of  thought  is  accomplished.  Economy  of  thought 
being  possible  through  a  systematisation  of  the  uni- 
formities of  experience,  reason  means  (3)  abstract 
thought,  or  the  ability  of  making  and  employing  ab- 
stractions, and  also  those  most  important  products  of 
abstraction — generalisations. 

Lastly,  we  understand  by  reason  (4)  the  norm  or 
criterion  of  thought-operations,  by  which  we  judge 
their  correctness. 


RELIGION. 


CHRISTIANITY. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  Christianity  :  the  one  is  the 
spirit  of  the  lesson  taught  mankind  in  the  life  and  death 
of  Christ,  the  other  is  a  church  organisation  which  his- 
torically originated  with  Jesus  and  claims  that  the  ac- 
ceptance of  certain  dogmas  is  the  indispensable  condi- 
tion of  salvation.  The  former  Christianity  is  the  very 
soul  of  our  civilisation,  the  latter  an  embarrassing  dead 
weight  on  the  feet  of  mankind,  obstructing  all  progress 
and  higher  development.  The  Jesus  of  the  Gospels 
speaks  in  parables,  but  his  followers  prefer  to  have  the 
dead  letter  to  believe  in,  for,  (as  says  Mephistopheles 
in  Goethe's  "Faust,): 

"  An  Worte  Idsst  sich  trefflich  glauben, 

Von  einem  Wort  Idsst  sich  kein  Iota  rauben." 

[On  words  'tis  excellent  believing, 

No  word  can  ever  lose  a  jot  from  thieving.] 

It  is  so  convenient  to  take  parables  literally.  While 
it  is  troublesome  to  understand  the  living  spirit,  it  is 
very  easy  to  believe  in  the  dead  letter.  The  letter  of  the 
Christian  parables  has  been  formulated  by  the  fathers 
and  ancient  bishops  into  a  system  of  beliefs,  which  are 
our  confessions  of  faith  so  called.     There  is  a  wonder- 


THE  PROBLEMS   OF  EXPERIENCE.  197 

ful  logicality  about  them,  and  they  are  admirably  con- 
structed in  their  joints  ;  but  let  us  not  forget  that  they 
are  subject  to  criticism,  for  they  are  the  work  of  man, 
not  of  God. 

The  authors  who  fashioned  these  confessions  of 
faith  stepped  boldly  forward  and  said  to  the  people, 
"These  be  thy  gods,  O  Israel";  and  there  are  to  day 
many  who  still  believe  that  the  historical  documents  of 
their  religion  are  the  words  of  absolute  truth.  But 
civilised  mankind  has  outgrown  these  old  formulations 
of  past  creeds. 

We  do  not  deny  that  parables  are  good  things.  On 
the  contrary,  we  believe  that  parables  are  the  vehicles 
which  convey  truth.  All  our  words  are  symbols,  and 
we  communicate  our  ideas  through  symbols.  Greek 
poets  symbolise  beauty  as  Aphrodite,  time  as  Kronos, 
wisdom  as  Athene,  etc.  There  is  no  objection  to  this 
method  ;  but  he  who  ingenuously  believes  in  the  sym- 
bol itself,  and  not  in  the  meaning  conveyed  by  the 
symbol,  is  a  pagan,  an  idolater,  a  heathen  ;  and  the 
Christian  who  believes  in  the  literal  truth  of  his  sym- 
bolic books,  parables,  and  confessions  of  faith,  stands 
upon  the  same  standpoint :  he  also  is  a  pagan,  and  we 
may  characterise  him  as  a  Christian  pagan. 

Christianity,  the  true  Christianity,  is  a  moral  factor 
in  the  world, — nay,  it  is  the  moral  factor  in  the  evolu- 
tion of  mankind. 

Christianity  teaches  us  that  life  is  serious  ;  it  is  not 
mere  play.     We  do  not  live  for  happiness,  but  for  the 


igS  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

performance  of  duties  ;  and  the  performance  of  our 
duties  can  be  perfect  only  if  the  main-spring  of  our 
actions  is  love — love  of  that  which  is  our  duty,  love  of 
our  neighbor,  love  even  of  our  enemy.  And  our  path 
naturally  leads  per  aspera  ad  astra,  pe7-  crucem  ad  lucem, 
through  self-sacrifice  to  victory.  This  truth,  mytho- 
logically  and  allegorically  expressed  in  the  Gospels  in 
so  many  various  ways,  is  a  truth  that  science  corrobo- 
rates more  and  more.  Let  the  mythology  of  Chris- 
tianity go  ;  the  significance  with  which  its  symbols  are 
filled  is  true  ! 

The  moral  spirit  of  Christianity  exemplified  in 
Christ's  life  and  teachings  is  the  same  as  that  which  is 
taught  by  science  and  is  revealed  to  us  in  the  facts  of 
existence. 

The  churches  of  to-day  are  not  what  they  ought  to 
be.  If  Jesus  of  Nazareth  were  in  our  midst  to-day, 
and  if  he  came  unto  his  own,  they,  most  assuredly, 
would  receive  him  not.  Would  not  the  scene  in  the 
temple  be  repeated?  Would  He  not  again  cast  out 
those  that  sell  and  buy,  and  overturn  the  tables  of  the 
money-changers?  And  would  not  afterwards  the  re- 
sult also  be  the  same,  or  similar? 

While  our  churches  are  not  what  they  ought  to  be, 
we  yet  recognise  that  they  are  not  without  moral  as- 
pirations. The  light  of  science  begins  to  enter  under 
the  influence  of  a  deeper  insight  into  the  foundations 
of  religion  and  morality,  the  struggle  for  the  ideal  as- 
serts itself,  broadening  their  faith  and  developing  it 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  199 

out  of  paganism  into  a  cosmic  religion  of  true  catho- 
licity. 

Our  visible  churches  possess  the  ideal  of  the  in- 
visible church,  and  the  religion  of  the  invisible  church 
is  Christ's  religion  of  morality,  of  sacrifice,  of  love  ;  it 
is  the  religion  of  science  ;  it  is  the  religion  of  truth. 

IDOLATRY. 

Idolatry,  or  the  worship  of  images,  is  the  attrib- 
uting of  divine  honors  to  the  symbols  that  represent 
God  or  are  thought  to  represent  God. 

The  most  primitive  kind  of  idolatry  is  fetishism,  as 
practised  among  savages  ;  the  most  modern  kind  is 
that  which  substitutes  ideas  for  stone  or  wood  figures. 
These  modern  ideas,  however,  are  sometimes  incom- 
parably more  wretched  than  the  carved  idols  of  the 
African  savage  ;  where  the  latter  are  ill-shaped  and 
ugly,  the  former  are  ill-conceived  and  erroneous.  Both 
are  alike  products  of  poorest  workmanship  ;  both  are 
treated  with  a  ridiculous  awe  ;  both  are  made  the  re- 
cipients of  divine  honors  which  are  paid  with  the  more 
scrupulous  attention,  to  the  fetish-images  the  more 
rotten  and  hideous  they  are,  to  the  fetish-ideas  the 
more  errors  they  contain. 

We  look  upon  the  bigoted  dogmatist  who  places 
his  particular  man-shaped  creed  above  God's  universal 
revelation  in  nature,  as  a  man  deeply  entangled  in 
paganism.     Christianity  has  become  a  fetish  to  him  ; 


200  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

he  finds  it  easier  to  worship  Christ  than  to  follow  him 
and  he  must  be  regarded  as  much  an  idolater  as  many 
pagans  before  him. 

The  dogmatist's  idolatry  is  mainly  due  to  indolence, 
and  finds  its  explanation  in  the  conservatism  and  the 
vis  inertice  of  tradition.  His  fault  is  lack  of  courage. 
He  does  not  feel  independent  enough  to  advance  on 
the  road  of  progress.  He  adopts  the  letter  of  Chris- 
tianity and  forgets  its  spirit.  He  is  of  interest  to  the 
student  as  a  living  fossil,  representing  a  certain  histor- 
ical stage  in  the  religious  evolution  of  mankind.  He 
is  a  religious  dodo — a  survival  destined  to  speedy  ex- 
tinction on  the  approach  of  civilisation. 

The  case  is  somewhat  different  with  certain  other 
idea-worshippers,  whose  idolatry,  however,  is  no  less 
inexcusable.  There  are  men,  sufficiently  bold  to  break 
the  spell  of  traditional  authority,  who,  despite  their 
good  intentions,  still  relapse  into  the  most  abject  idol- 
atry. They  make  themselves  images  woven  of  the  del- 
icate threads  of  thought.  Such  idea-worshippers  are 
idolaters  not  from  lack  of  courage  but  from  lack  of  un- 
derstanding. They  are  not  afraid  to  break  with  tradi- 
tional beliefs.  Their  deficiency  is  that  they  lack  in- 
sight. 

Because  it  is  absurd  to  worship  any  clear  and  sound 
ideas  that  serve  real  practical  purposes,  these  idea-wor- 
shippers employ  such  thoughts  only  as  are  unfit  to  be 
used  otherwise.  The  most  absurd  and  self-contradic- 
tory ideas,  such  as  the  absolute,  the  unknowable,  the 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  201 

infinite,  are  the  fittest  objects  of  idolatry.  Ideas  which 
people  do  not  understand  make  their  heads  swim.  So 
they  sink  down  upon  their  knees,  and  being  in  this 
position,  they  have  simply  to  follow  the  old  inherited 
habit  of  worshipping. 

Idolatry  begins  where  rational  thought  ends.  Thus 
as  soon  as  a  man  is  hopelessly  entangled  in  a  problem 
which  he  is  too  weak-minded  to  solve,  he  declares, 
"This  is  a  holy  ground,  take  off  your  shoes  and  wor- 
ship that  which  you  cannot  understand." 

It  is  the  peculiarity  of  idolaters  to  worship  that 
which  they  do  not  understand  because  they  do  not  un- 
derstand it. 

The  worship  in  spirit  and  in  truth,  of  which  Christ 
spoke,  is  the  doing  of  the  will  of  God,  i.  e.,  obedience 
to  the  moral  law  of  nature.  However,  the  worship  that 
consists  in  genuflection  and  "Lord,  Lord"  saying,  is 
pure  adoration,  and  a  worship  of  self-humiliation,  of 
fawning  and  cringing  debases  us  and  shows  how  hu- 
man the  God  is  whom  we  revere. 

The  religion  of  adoration  is  idolatry  ;  it  is  an  in- 
ferior kind  of  religion  which  substitutes  prayers  for 
actions  and  recommends  flattery  as  the  means  of  gain- 
ing the  favor  of  God.  But  the  will  of  God  cannot  be 
changed  by  adulation. 

The  will  of  God  is  written  in  the  unalterable  laws 
of  nature,  especially  in  the  moral  laws  through  which 
alone  human  society  can  exist.  These  laws  contain 
blessings  and  curses ;  and  God's  will  is  that  we  our' 


202  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

selves  shall  work  out  the  blessings  of  his  laws.  To 
pray  that  God  should  not  do  his  will,  that  he  should 
alter  the  laws  of  the  universe,  make  exceptions  in  our 
favor,  or  that  he  should  accomplish  what  it  is  our  duty 
to  accomplish  is  to  reverse  the  prayer  of  Christ,  which 
teaches  us  to  say,  "Thy  will  be  done." 

To  look  upon  prayer  in  any  other  light  than  as  a 
self-discipline,  is  to  share  the  superstition  of  the  medi- 
cine-man who  still  believes  in  the  spells  by  which  he 
thinks  he  is  able  to  change  the  course  of  nature  ; 
and  the  worship  of  adoration  is  as  idolatrous,  as  the 
belief  that  God  is  a  big  human  being  who  is  pleased 
to  witness  our  abject  and  self-humiliating  adulation  is 
pagan.  Adoration  can  be  tolerated  only  as  an  educa- 
tional method  of  attuning  by  a  kind  of  dramatic  sym- 
bolism the  souls  of  the  immature  to  the  harmony  of 
the  moral  world-order.  It  is  a  substitute  only  for  those 
who  do  not  as  yet  understand  the  worth  of  the  moral 
laws  of  life  which  can  be  revealed  in  their  full  glory 

and  sanctity  only  in  the  rehgion  of  science. 

* 
*  * 

A  comparison  between  the  old  dogmatism,  the  idol- 
atry of  traditional  symbols,  and  modern  agnosticism, 
the  idolatry  of  the  Unknowable  (both  being  idolatries 
of  a  different  kind)  shows  the  great  superiority  of  the 
former.  The  God  of  the  dogmatist  is  anthropomorphic; 
but  after  all,  this  image  of  God  contains  some  excellent 
features  of  true  divinity.  The  decalogue  is  rational  and 
practical  in  the  best  sense  of  the  words.     There  is  no 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  203 

nonsense  about  it,  no  confusion  of  thought,  no  absurd- 
ity— if  but  the  allegorical  nature  of  religious  symbols 
be  kept  in  mind.  The  God  who  is  regarded  as  the 
authority  of  the  moral  law  is  not  worshipped  because 
he  is  unknowable,  but  because  his  commandments, 
which  are  obviously  knowable,  are  true,  because  those 
who  neglect  his  commandments  will  bring  down  upon 
themselves  and  others  the  curses  of  the  moral  laws  of 
nature,  while  those  who  obey  them  will  change  the 
curses  into  blessings.  There  is  substance  in  the  old 
religions.      But  there  is  no  substance  in  agnosticism. 

We  grant  that  the  dogmatist's  conception  who  takes 
the  allegorical  part  of  the  parables  in  the  literal  sense 
and  often  regards  it  as  their  most  important  truth,  is 
a  miserable  superstition  and  real  paganisn.  But  the 
worship  of  actually  erroneous  ideas  is  worse  still.  The 
idea-fetishes  are  too  shadowy,  too  vague,  too  misty  to 
receive  any  other  attention  than  the  critic's,  under 
whose  analysis  they  will  have  to  give  up  the  ghost. 

Briefly  :  the  idolatry  of  the  dogmatists  is  an  ana- 
chronism, the  idolatry  of  the  idea-worshipper  is  a  de- 
generation, and  you,  my  dear  reader,  if  you  find  it 
necessary  to  avoid  the  Scylla  of  the  former,  do  not  fall 
into  the  Charybdis  of  the  latter. 

THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE. 

Our  scientists  apply  the  best  methods  of  observa- 
tion and  the  most  rigorous  criticism,  in  order  to  make, 
in  their  diverse  fields  of  inquiry,  a  correct  and  syste- 


204  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

matically  arranged  statement  of  facts.  The  importance 
of  science  as  the  basis  of  human  civilisation  in  its 
broadest  scope  and  as  the  condition  of  further  progress 
is  now  well-nigh  universally  recognised.  It  is  not 
doubted  for  industrial  invention,  nor  for  art,  nor  for 
politics,  nor  economics.  It  is  doubted  only  for  the 
most  important  province  of  human  life — viz.,  for  re- 
ligion. 

Religion  is  the  basis  of  conduct.  All  those  ideas 
are  religious  which  regulate  man's  actions  and  support 
him  in  the  vicissitudes  of  life.  Religion  is  the  ethical 
power  in  humanity,  being  the  norm  of  human  aspira- 
tions, the  authority  of  rules  and  laws  and  injunctions, 
and  the  lofty  ideal  that  sanctifies  existence  with  its 
joys  and  griefs,  consecrating  every  single  individual  to 
a  higher  purpose  than  himself. 

It  is  a  very  strange  fact  that  the  importance  of  sci- 
ence, which  is  admitted  in  every  other  field,  could 
have  been  doubted  for  religion.  The  reason,  how- 
ever, is  obvious  to  him  who  is  familiar  with  the  history 
of  the  various  religions.  Religious  doctrines  are  such 
valuable  possessions  that  their  keepers  always  wanted 
to  shelter  them  from  danger ;  they  were  anxious  to 
guard  them  as  a  sacred  inheritance  and  hand  them 
down  to  future  generations  inviolate.  They  wanted  to 
protect  the  holy  treasures  from  the  vagaries  of  the  sci- 
entist groping  about  after  the  truth  and  often  failing  to 
find  it.  So  they  declared  that  religion  was  independent 
of  science  and  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  it.   They 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  205 

did  not  see  that  scientists  are  not  always  identical  with 
science,  exactly  as  priests  are  not  always  the  true 
prophets  of  religion.  Thus  they  founded  religion  upon 
the  authority  of  tradition,  instead  of  upon  the  rock  of 
ages,  which  is  truth — provable  truth.  They  went  so 
far  as  to  call  human  tradition  a  divine  revelation  and 
to  discredit  that  grand  apocalypse  which  lies  open  to 
every  one  of  us — nature.  The  absurd  was  sanctified  ; 
and  reason,  the  divine  spark  in  man  that  kindles  the 
torch  to  enlighten  his  path,  was  scorned  as  an  ignis 
fatuus. 

Yet,  after  all,  what  is  religion  but  the  trust  in  truth, 
the  search  for  truth,  and  living  the  truth !  Shall  we, 
indeed,  use  the  best  methods  of  searching  for  the  truth 
in  all  domains  except  in  the  most  important  domain, 
in  religion?  To  suppress  the  truth  where  it  is  our  duty 
to  speak  it  out,  is  regarded  as  equivalent  to  a  lie;  and 
rightly  so  !  Shall  we  suppress  the  search  for  truth  in 
religion,  the  essence  of  which  is,  or  rather  ought  to  be, 
truth,  and  which  is  transformed  into  abject  superstition 
when  errors  are  enshrined  upon  the  altar  of  truth  ? 
Religion  is  to  us  inseparable  from  truth;  and  the 
search  for  truth  is  our  holiest  duty. 

All  religions  which  do  not  aspire  to  be  based  upon 
truth  are  superstitions.  There  is  but  one  true  religion, 
which  is  the  religion  of  truth. 

When  we  speak  of  the  Religion  of  Science,  we  wish 
to  indicate  that  our  idea  of  truth  is  different  from  the 
ideas   of   those   who  believe  in  the   duality  of   truth. 


2o6  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

Truth  is  no  Janus  head  with  two  faces.  It  is  an  error 
that  something  may  be  true  in  science  which  is  un- 
true in  rehgion,  that  twice  two  is  four  only  in  the 
multiphcation  tables,  but  not  in  the  catechism,  that 
there  are  other  methods  of  finding  out  or  proving  the 
truth  for  the  religious  prophet  than  for  the  savant — in 
short,  that  science  is  human  truth,  while  religion  is 
divine  truth. 

Truth  is  truth.  There  is  but  one  truth  and  that  one 
truth  is  divine.  Man  is  divine  in  so  far  as  he  partakes 
of  the  truth,  and  science,  the  methodical  search  for 
truth,  is  the  most  important  vehicle  to  help  man  to 
progress,  to  grow,  to  develop,  and  to  become  more 
and  more  divine. 

All  our  religions  have  been  founded  as  religions  of 
truth.  Jesus  of  Nazareth,  the  Messiah  and  Christ  that 
made  the  new  covenant  with  mankind  upon  the  foun- 
dation of  love,  has  nowhere,  so  far  as  our  maturest 
biblical  criticism  can  pierce,  established  any  dogma, 
and  least  of  all  the  absurd  theory  that  above  the  truth 
there  is  another  truth,  and  that  this  higher  truth  stand- 
ing in  contradiction  to  scientific  truth  must  be  believed 
in  because  it  appears,  or  even  because  it  is,  absurd. 

Science  is  holy.  It  is  the  religious  duty  of  the  scien- 
tist to  search  for  truth  in  all  fields,  philosophy,  ecclesi- 
astical history,  and  biblical  research  not  excepted.  And 
it  is  a  religious  duty  of  the  clergy  to  respect  science. 
They  need  not  accept  the  hypotheses  of  scientists, 
but  they  must  revere   truth  whenever  proved  to  be 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  207 

truth,  for  truth  is  sacred  whatever  it  be.  There  is  a 
divinity  in  mathematics,  of  which  the  modern  idolater 
of  dogmatic  Christianity  has  no  idea. 

We  can  nowhere,  either  in  practical  life  or  in  our 
religious  sentiments  and  convictions,  dispense  with 
a  rational  inquiry  into  truth  ;  that  is  to  say,  religion  is 
inseparable  from  science. 

*  * 

Religion  is  not  identical  with  science ;  religion  is 
the  enthusiasm  of  applying  that  knowledge,  of  whose 
truth  and  potency  we  are  unwaveringly  convinced,  to 
practical  life.  Science  is  in  many  respects  opposed  to 
and  very  different  from  religion ;  for  science  is  of  the 
head,  and  religion  is  of  the  heart.  Yet  science  and 
religion  should  keep  abreast  of  each  other.  They 
should  be  allied.  One  should  be  the  complement  of 
the  other.  Schiller  says  in  his  "Philosophical  Let- 
ters": 

"Lassi  uns  hell  denken,  so  werden  wir  feurig  lieben." 
[Let  us  think  clearly  and  we  shall  love  warmly.] 

Philosophy,  science,  experience,  reason,  all  the 
best  methods  of  inquiry  at  our  command,  must  be 
called  upon  to  guide  our  feelings  and  our  religious 
enthusiasm. 

There  is  a  close  connection  between  thought  and 
feeling,  so  close  that  the  tenor  of  our  feelings  will  also 
have  its  effects  upon  our  thought,  and  vice  versa.  Only 
he  whose  heart  is  hopelessly  chilled  by  ill-will  or 
egotism  will  be  little  benefited  by  the  enlightenments 


2o8  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

of  rational  insight  or  science.  Science  may  help  to 
show  him  the  futility  of  ill-will  and  the  irrationality  of 
egotism,  and  thus  slowly  cure  him  of  his  irreligious 
disposition.  But  upon  the  whole,  Faust's  words  will 
remain  true  : 

"  Wenn  ihr's  nicht  fiihlt,  ihr  werdet's  nicht  erjagen." 
[If  you  don't  feel  it,  you  will  never  know  it.] 

* 
*  * 

So  long  as  the  scientist  doubts,  he  inquires,  but  as 
soon  as  he  has  found  the  truth,  he  proclaims  it  and 
solicits  the  criticism  of  his  fellow-workers.  This  same 
method  is  applicable  to  religion.  He  who  doubts, 
must  inquire;  and  he  who  believes  he  has  found  the 
truth,  must  allow  his  fellovv^men  to  criticise  him,  to 
point  out  what  they  regard  as  errors,  and  to  let  his 
views  be  tested  by  criticism. 

Is  it  not  pusillanimous  to  be  afraid  of  criticism? 
And  is  it  true  that  we  have  to  protect  truth  against 
criticism  ?  If  our  religion  is  true,  why  prevent  investi- 
gation ? 

It  is  said  that  the  scientist  may  err,  and  that  his 

critics  may  err,  and  that  errors  are  more  powerful  than 

the  truth.     Yet  we  answer  with  Milton  : 

"  Whoever  knew  truth  put  to  the  worse  in  a  free  and  open 
encounter  ? " 

Those  who  err,  may  be  more  powerful  than  those 
who  speak  the  truth.  Those  who  speak  the  truth  may 
be  put  to  death ;  nay,  they  have  often  been  put  to 
death  ;  and  errors  are  more  plentiful  and  fertile  than 


THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE.  209 

the  truth.  Nevertheless,  truth  is  more  powerful  and 
will  in  the  end  always  prevail. 

Science  is  calm,  impartial,  rigorous  ;  and  many 
warm-hearted  men  and  women  have  a  dislike  for  sci- 
ence, because  of  its  austerity.  They  should  know, 
that  while  the  search  for  truth  must  be  made  by  cool- 
headed  thinkers,  the  application  of  truth  demands  en- 
thusiasm and  fervid  zeal.  The  religion  of  science  is 
the  most  elevating  and  noble  ideal  of  mankind. 

The  old  religions  have  become  dear  to  their  ad- 
herents, and  justly  so.  For  all  the  religions  upon 
earth  are  intended  to  be  religions  of  truth — the  same 
truth  that  scientific  truth  is  made  of.  And  they  are 
the  more  orthodox  (that  is,  possessing  the  right  doc- 
trines) and  the  more  catholic  (that  is,  universally  valid) 
and  the  freer  from  superstitions  (that  is,  freer  from 
absurdities  believed  to  be  exempt  from  scientific  criti- 
cism), the  nearer  they  come  to  their  common  ideal, 
which  is  the  religion  of  science. 

We  do  not  preach  the  religion  of  science  to  de- 
stroy the  old  religions ;  we  preach  it  that  the  old 
religions  may  avoid  false  dogmatism,  and  that  they 
may  adopt  the  method  of  science,  which  is  a  systematic 
search  for  truth  without  reserve  and  open  to  criticism. 
This  will  widen  the  narrowest  sectarianism  into  a  cos- 
mical  religion,  as  broad  as  the  universe,  as  reliable  as 
the  revelations  of  God  in  the  book  of  nature,  and  as 
sacred  as  the  truths  of  science. 

We  expect  that  all  the  various  sects  of  mankind 


210  THE  PROBLEMS  OF  EXPERIENCE. 

will  by  and  by  acknowledge  this  principle  of  the  re- 
ligion of  science.  Indeed,  they  will  have  to  !  For  how 
can  they  otherwise  stand  the  bracing  air  of  progress  ? 
They  need  not  give  up  the  peculiarities  that  are  not 
in  contradiction  to  truth.  They  can,  and  let  us  hope 
they  will,  preserve  their  character,  their  organisation, 
their  brotherly  love,  their  zeal  for  their  special  tradi- 
tion and  form  of  religion.  Only,  let  them  drop  the 
pagan  features  of  their  worship  as  soon  as,  in  the  light 
of  science,  they  recognise  them  as  pagan. 

This  is  our  confession  of  faith  :  We  trust  in  truth, 
and  claim  that  truthfulness  (i.  e.,  fidelity  to  truth  gen- 
erally and  especially  also  to  exact,  provable,  scientific 
truth)  is  the  condition  of  all  religion.  And  this  religious 
ideal  is  holy  to  us.  We  cling  to  it  with  enthusiasm  and 
leave  it  as  the  most  sacred  inheritance  to  future  gen- 
erations. 


INDEX. 


Absolute,  its  definitions,  127,  128,  131; 

its  idolatrous  worship,  127, 128,  200, 
Absolute,  certainty,   meaning  of  the 

expression,   131  ;  existence,   source 

of   the  idea,   132 ;    monarchy,    131 ; 

zero  of  temperature,  131. 
Abstract  idea  of  God  not  prevalent. 

Abstract  ideas,  based  on  sense-im- 
pressions, 135;  compared  to  checks, 
134  ;  do  not  represent  things  in 
themselves,  122 ;  not  explained  by 
association,  175;  not  unreal,  126; 
represent  features  of  reality,  i,  122; 
symbols  of  reality,  34,  121,  133,  134. 

Abstract  thought,  exclusive  preroga- 
tive of  man,  123  ;  generalisations  its 
product,  125  ;  not  so  vivid  as  intui- 
tion, 126;  the  meaning  of  reason, 

195- 

Abstraction,  a  fundamental  psychic 
function, 127;  derivationof  the  word, 
122  ;  impossible  to  animals,  78  ;  its 
functions,  72,  126;  its  nature,  123, 
125  ;  scholastic  use  of  term,  122,  123; 
the  condition  of  formal  thought,  78; 
the  function  of  reason,  194 ;  the 
method  of  thought,  118;  the  source 
of  mathematical  data,  101  ;  various 
uses  of  term,  124. 

Abstracts,  of  reality  called  subjectiv- 
ity and  objectivity,  17;  not  entities 
or  essences,  133;  not  sensations, 
127;  the  particularly  human  in  man, 

134- 
Absurd,  its  sanctification  by  priests, 

205. 

Acoustic  images,  190. 


Action,  its  definition,  192;  chemical, 
a  form  of  will,  184. 

Actions,  estimated  by  motives,  163; 
should  be  inspired  by  love,  198;  the 
expression  of  nature  or  character, 
160,  161,  165,  166;  without  knowl- 
edge mere  reflexes,  39. 

Adoration, idolatrous,  201,  202  ;  tolera- 
ble only  as  education,  202. 

African  idolatry  compared  with  that 
of  civilisation,  199. 

Agnosticism, arises  from  confusion  of 
thought,  120;  avoided  by  monism, 
177;  compared  with  dogmatism,  202; 
fatal  to  philosophy,  iv  ;  of  Comtism, 
2 ;  should  be  abandoned,  4 ;  the 
outcome  of  nominalism,  104 ;  the 
outcome  of  associationalism,  177  ; 
without  substance,  203. 

AiTia  distinguished  from  apxT/,  143. 

Algebra,  a  rigidly  formal  science,  79, 
no.  III ;  tridiinensionality  of  space 
a  problem  of,  99. 

Algebraic  symbols  to  be  considered 
words,  39. 

Alimentation  a  property  of  cells,  168. 

All,  its  identity  with  God,  49 ;  the  only 
absolute,  121. 

Amoeba,  cause  of  its  movements,  186; 
its  exhibition  of  will,  183. 

Anachronism,  dogmatism  an,  203. 

Analysis,  of  experience,  cause  of  sin- 
gle facts,  105  ;  of  sensations,  by  ab- 
stract thought,  126. 

Analytics  of  Aristotle,  quoted,  52. 

Angles,  their  properties,  84. 

Animal  brain,  to  nominalists  a  pic- 
ture of  reality,  104. 


212 


INDEX. 


Animals,  how  man  is  distinguished 
from,  ii8;  incapable  of  abstract 
thought,  78,  123. 

Annihilation  would  be  perplexing, 
156. 

Anschauung,  its  definition,  9,  127 ; 
contrasted  with  abstract  thought, 
126 ;  its  data  the  realities  of  life, 
135 ;  represents  objects,  14 ;  the 
true  meaning  of  intuition,  125;  syn- 
onym for  atsight,  133. 

Anthropomorphic  view  of  nature, 
170. 

Anthropomorphism,  idolatrous,  202  ; 
its  truths,  202. 

Antinomy  involved  in  finitude  of 
space,  97. 

Aphrodite,  a  symbol  of  beauty,  197. 

Apocalypse  of  nature,  26,  205. 

A  posteriori,  axioms  so  considered  by 
Mill,  59  ;  history  of  term,  62,  63,  65  ; 
Kant's  view  of,  31,  33,  66;  popular 
and  philosophic  uses  of  term,  73. 

Appearance,  not  a  sham,  21. 

Apperception,  its  definition,  185, 191 ; 
at  first  spontaneous,  1S5  ;  both  men- 
tal and  psychical, 185  ;  explains  ego, 
191 ;  its  conditions,  185 ;  its  rela- 
tions to  will,  184,  185  ;  the  function 
of  consciousness,  182,  183. 

Application,  a  function  of  science, 
153  ;  of  sciences,  a  function  of  phi- 
losophy, 45. 

A  priori,  definitions  of  the,  61,  73  ;  an 
important  element  of  knowledge, 
88  ;  axioms  as  considered  by  Kant, 
59 ;  better  called  formal,  77 ;  cause 
of  aversion  to  the,  68  ;  dangers  of 
the  idea,  58  :  history  of  term,  62,  63, 
64  ;  Kant's  conception  of  the,  31,33, 
37,  66,  67  ;  its  importance,  35,  73  ;  its 
origin,  36  ;  the  most  fundamental 
problem,  73. 

A  priori,  character  of  mathematical 
reasoning,  56,  loi  ;  construction  of 
triangles,  86;  determinability  of 
certain  truths,  107  ;  determination 
the  problem  of  reason,  106  ;  knowl- 
edge, its  different  kinds,  64. 

Apriorism,  of  Kant,  iii,  177;  recon- 
ciled with  empiricism,  70. 


Aquinas,  St.  Thomas,  his  definition 
of  truth,  46. 

Arbitrariness,  of  existence,  102  ;  of 
geometrical  constructions,  82 ;  of 
maxims,  80. 

Aristotelian  books,  their  authorship, 
145- 

Aristotle,  cited,  52.  62,  63  ;  his  defini- 
tion cf  axiom,  52  ;  his  theory  of  the 
source  of  knowledge,  28  ;  his  views 
of  causation,  143,  144,  150,  156. 

Arithmetic,  a  rigidly  formal  science, 
79,  no.  III ;  illustrates  logical  ne- 
cessity, 115  ;  not  a  mere  fiction,  134. 

' XpX>]  distinguished  from  alria  143. 

Asceticism,  product  of  false  monism, 
24. 

Aspiration,  exists  in  all  worlds,  171 ; 
identical  with  natural  living,  171 ; 
of  moral  endeavor,  167;  religion  its 
norm,  204;  the  grandest  of  nature's 
tendencies,  171 ;  the  universal  law 
of  life,  i6g. 

Association, of  ideas,  173,  174,  175;  not 
the  cause  of  reason,  117  ;  not  the 
fundamental  principle  of  philoso- 
phy, 175- 

Association  philosophy,  contrasted 
with  Kantianism,  177  ;  criticism  of, 
173  ;  its  principles,  175  ;  its  outcome 
scepticism,  agnosticism,  or  ma- 
terialism, 177;  its  view  of  causation, 
176. 

Assumption  of  universality,  how  jus- 
tified, 104. 

Assumptions,  arbitrary  constructions 
not,  82  ;  in  mathematics  and  me- 
chanics, 90;  in  nominalism,  105;  not 

necessary  to  formal  sciences,  in. 

Astronomy  might  be  considered  a 
branch  of  logic,  44. 

Atheists,  their  view  of  universe,  129. 

Athene,  a  symbol  of  wisdom,  197. 

Atsight,  meaning  of  the  word,  9. 

Atsights,  a  synonym  for  phenomena, 
133;  basis  of  abstract  ideas,  126; 
represent  objects,  14 ;  the  data  of 
experience,  9,  125;  their  elements, 
10. 

Attention,  its  definition,  185,  193,  194; 
its  function  in  cognition,  183. 


INDEX. 


213 


Authority,  for  conduct,  167,  170;  of 
reason,  175  ;  the  practical  idea  of 
God,  147,  170. 

Awareness,  the  stuff  of  conscious- 
ness, 10. 

Axiom,  definition  of  the  term,  51  ; 
Newton's  misapplication  of  the 
word,  52 ;  recognised  by  Aristotle, 
52  ;  the  word  not  used  by  Euclid,  52. 

Axiom  of  consistency,  109  ;  of  paral- 
lels, 95,  no. 

Axioms, all  theorems  considered  such 
by  Schopenhauer,  54,  55  ;  arbitrary 
constructions  not,  82  ;  belief  in,  a 
superstition,  51  ;  derived  from  con- 
ception of  space,  56,  80;  how  their 
nature  should  be  determined,  60; 
inadmissible  in  science  and  phi- 
losophy, 55,  58,  67,  7g ;  not  the  basis 
of  investigation,  58  ;  rigidly  formal 
truths  not,  61 ;  supposed  dilemma 
regarding,  59;  their  need  of  dem- 
onstration, 131. 

Bacilli,  their  multiplication,  115. 
Bacon,  Lord  Francis,  his  theory  of 

knowledge,  28. 
Bad  exists  only  in  mentality,  22. 
Ball,  Sir  Robert,  his  views  on  space, 

95.  96.  97. 
Barometer,  illustrates  causality,  142, 

143. 

Basic  problems  of  philosophy,  de- 
clared by  Comtists  insoluble,  2. 

Beauty,  symbolised  by  Aphrodite, 133, 

197- 

Begetting,  represented  by  same  word 
as  knowing,  38. 

Being,  conscious  of  itself,  10;  identi- 
cal with  soul  and  thought,  25  ;  its 
true  nature  exhibited  in  forces,  162. 

Biblical  criticism,  its  results,  206. 

Blessings  to  be  gained  by  obedience, 
202,  203. 

Body,  an  abstract  idea,  4,  19  ;  insep- 
arable from  soul,  23 ;  its  essence 
the  soul,  23,  25  ;  its  resurrection  un- 
important, 188. 

Book  of  nature,  God's  revelation, 
209. 


Boxes  for  storing  abstracts,  119. 

Brahman  monism,  its  one-sidedness 
and  fatal  results,  23. 

Brain,  composite  photography  in  the, 
178;  filled  with  paths  of  associa- 
tion, 173. 

Categories,   a   system    of   relational 

ideas,  78. 

Catholicity,  Christianity  becoming  a 
true,  78  ;  the  religion  of  science,  78. 

Causa  aquat  effectuTtt,  disproved,  150, 
152. 

Causa,  distinguished  from  ratio,  143. 

Causa  sui  an  absurdity,  145. 

Causation,  Aristotle's  analysis  of  it 
revised,  143,  144  ;  a  transformation 
of  matter  and  energy,  144,  152,  155, 
194  ;  denied  by  the  association  phi- 
losophy, 176,  177  ;  confirmed  by  sci- 
ence, 156;  confused  notions  of,  145; 
does  not  affect  substance,  152  ;  gov- 
erns character  and  properties,  166; 
implies  necessity,  160;  its  branches, 
148  ;  its  idea  not  a  mere  association 
of  its  sentiments,  175  ;  its  universal- 
ity, 18  ;  means  conservation  of  mat- 
ter and  energy,  155 ;  not  a  mystery, 
153 ;  not  a  self-evident  principle. 
148;  not  mere  succession,  152;  no- 
tion of,  its  basis,  148  ;  Schopenhau- 
er's view  of,  147  ;  the  test  problem, 

I37. 

Cause,  its  definition,  137,  138  ;  and  ef- 
fect, law  of,  167  ;  continues  to  exist 
in  effect,  142 ;  distinguished  from 
raison  d'et>-e,  143  ;  efiicient  the  only 
true,  144  ;  identified  by  Lewes  with 
law,  149  ;  never  equal  to  its  effect, 
152  ;  the  idea  a  noumenon,  148 ;  the 
object  of  superstitious  reverence, 
159.  160. 

Causes,  their  nature,  153;  always  both 
efficient  and  final,  156;  always  mo- 
tions or  events,  150;  are  facts,  149! 
Aristotle's  classification  of,  143 ; 
misconceived  by  Hume,  151  ;  to  be 
distinguished  from  reason,  139. 

Cells,  their  cooperative  organisation, 
i68. 


214 


INDEX. 


Centralising  of  feeling,  the  function 
of  consciousness,  182. 

Century  Dictionary,  quoted,  123,  124, 
133- 

Certainty,  based  on  formal  laws,  114  ; 
its  formal  operations,  115. 

Chance,  nature  not  governed  by,  158. 

Changes  are  all  transformations,  194. 

Chaos  would  result  from  inconsis- 
tency of  reason,  no. 

Character,  its  definition,  193  ;  analo- 
gous to  properties  of  things,  166  ; 
free  action  its  expression,  160,  165  ; 
implies  determinism,  163 ;  its  im- 
portance, 166;  of  nature,  161,  165; 
the  essence  of  personality,  184. 

Chemical,  action  and  reaction  a  form 
of  will,  184  ;  affinity,  resemblance 
of  protozoan  activities  to,  186;  anal- 
ysis, mathematical  demonstration 
compared  with,  74  ;  substances,  an 
illustration  of  character,  165  ;  sub- 
stances, their  changes  of  shape, 158. 

Chemistry,  its  field  of  inquiry,  43. 

Chemotrophy,  exhibited  in  amoeba, 
186. 

Christ,  a  living  presence  in  humanity, 
188  ;  cited,  50,  201 ;  easier  to  wor- 
ship than  to  follow,  200 ;  his  new 
covenant,  206 ;  his  prayer,  209  ;  his 
resurrection,  1S8  ;  true  Christianity 
his  spirit,  194  ;  true  morality  of  his 
life  and  teachings,  198. 

Christian  mythology,  its  view  of  di. 
vine  paternity,  98. 

Christianity,  dogmatists  have  only  its 
letter,  200;  false,  an  obstacle  to  pro- 
gress, 196  ;  its  meaning  true,  198  ; 
its  relation  to  moral  truths,  27  ;  its 
mission,  49 ;  its  moral  spirit  scien- 
tific, 198  :  its  mythology  unimpor- 
tant, 198  ;  its  two  kinds,  196  ;  not 
dependent  on  physical  resurrection, 
189;  the  moral  factor  of  evolution, 
197;  the  soul  of  civilisation,  196. 

Churches,  have  the  ideal  of  the  in- 
visible church,  199  ;  not  what  they 
should  be,  198. 

Circle,  equality  of  its  peripheral  an- 
gles, 84. 


Circumstances,  distinguished  from 
causes,  137. 

Civilisation,  fatal  to  dogmatism,  200; 
increases  happiness,  6  :  science  its 
basis,  204  ;  true  Christianity  its  soul, 
196. 

Clergy,  their  duty  to  respect  science, 
206. 

Cognition,  its  definition,  181,  193,  194; 
its  conformity  to  objects,  87 ;  its 
simplest  form,  181  ;  Kant's  view  of, 
35,  66  ;  not  mysterious,  181  ;  presup- 
poses general  notions,  181,  182  ;  the 
origin  of  knowledge,  38. 

Coherence  among  facts  of  experience, 
72,  104,  105. 

Cold,  its  perception  an  abstraction, 
127. 

Colors,  reducible  to  three,  100. 

Combinations  and  separations  com- 
pose nature,  in. 

Commissural  fibres  of  brain,  their 
function,  173. 

Common  notions,  in  mathematics  and 
mechanics,  52,  58,  80, 

Composite  images,  definition  of,  190; 
the  elements  of  soul,  178,  179. 

Composite  memories,  the  means  of 
generalisation,  175,  179. 

Composite   pictures  symbolised  by 
sound,  i85. 

Comprehension,  its  definition  of,  155; 
the  universe,  how  attamable,  102. 

Compulsion,  comparable  to  second- 
ary motions,  161  ;  distinguished 
from  necessity,  160;  illustrated  in  a 
magnet,  162,  163  ;  one  kind  of  de- 
termination, 164. 

Comte,  Auguste,  his  idea  of  philoso- 
phy, 45  ;  his  positivism  an  agnosti 
cism,  2;  his  rejection  of  the  a  priori, 
68. 

Concentration  of  feeling  in  appercep- 
tion, 183. 

Concepts,  not  explained  by  associa- 
tion, 175. 

Conduct,  God  its  authority,  147  ;  im- 
moral, its   penalty  destruction,  170. 

Confessions  of  faith,  53,  190,  196,  197, 
210. 


INDEX. 


215 


Conic  sections,  celestial  bodies  move 
in,  85. 

Consciousness,  its  definition,  121,  182, 
191  ;  accompanies  volition,  157,  184; 
dependent  on  memory,  1S3,  1S4  ;  its 
function,  24,  173,  182,  184,  191  ;  its 
relation  to  the  unconditioned,  130; 
its  states,  the  data  of  experience, 
10;  the  characteristic  of  appercep- 
tion, 191. 

Consecration  of  the  individual  to 
high  purpose,  204. 

Consequence,  correlative  with  reason, 
140  ;  distinguished  from  sequence, 
141. 

Conservation  of  matter  and  energy, 
155,  166;  of  tradition,  200. 

Consistency,  of  being,  102,  112  ;  of 
mental  operations,  56,  109. 

Construction  in  geometry,  82,  83,  86, 
91. 

Contents  of  states  of  consciousness, 
II. 

Contiguity,  association  by,  173,  174. 

Contrast,  association  by,  173,  174. 

Coordination  the  function  of  con- 
sciousness, 182,  184,  291. 

Corporeality,  its  perception  an  act  of 
abstraction,  127. 

Correctness  distinguished  from  truth, 
49. 

Cosmic,  nature  of  the  world,  112  ;  re- 
ligion, igg,  207. 

Cosmos,  its  revelation,  166. 

Creation  would  be  perplexing,  156. 

Creeds,  not  to  be  placed  above  uni- 
versal revelation,  199. 

Criterion  of  a  priori  truths,  65 ;  of 
thought-operations,  194. 

Criticism,  its  value,  208;  should  be 
encouraged  by  religion,  209. 

Criticism,  of  Bible,  206;  of  creeds, 197; 
of  terms,  159. 

Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  cited,  30, 
32,  77,  86;  Schurman's   view  of  it, 

75- 

Crystallisation    of    chemical     sub- 
stances, 158. 

Curses  earned  by  disobedience  to 
moral  law,  203. 

Curvature  of  space,  84,  95,  96. 


Curved  line,  definitions  of,  96,  97. 

Data  of  experience,  phenomena,  133; 
single  sense-impressions,  74  ;  states 
of  consciousness,  10 ;  the  realities 
of  life,  135  ;  their  elements,  9,  10. 

Data  of  Psychology,  Spencer's,  cited, 
120. 

Decalogue  rational  and  practical,  202. 

Deductive  reason,  called  a  priori,  63. 

Deeds,  their  immortality,  171. 

Dependence  of  individual  upon  the 
whole,  171. 

Descartes,  his  theory  of  innate  ideas, 
28;  his  use  of  objective  in  old  sense, 
13- 

Descartes's  Discourse,  Huxley's  ad- 
dress on,  120. 

Design  in  nature,  no  conscious  one, 
158. 

Destruction  the  penalty  of  sin,  170. 

Determinableness,  the  problem  of, 
105,  106. 

Determination  of  reason,  iii. 

Determinism,  consistent  with  free- 
dom, 160;  not  fatalism,  106. 

Die  lineale  Ausdehnungslehre,  cited, 

Die  Theilitnff  der  Erde,  cited,  45. 
Dilemma,  about  nature  of  axioms,  59; 

of  teleology,  158. 
Dimensions,    defined,    102 ;  artificial, 

95  ;  problem  of,  102. 
Directions,  infinite  in  space,  94. 
Disobedience  to  God,  immorality,  170; 

punished,  203. 
Divinity, in  mathematics,  207;  of  truth, 

205  ;  truth  in  dogmatic  notions  of, 

202. 
Doctrines,  guarded  by  their  keepers, 

204. 
Dodo,  the  dogmatist  a  religious,  200. 
Dogmas,  false  Christianity  a  system 

of,  196;  none  established  by  Christ, 

206. 
Dogmatic    religions    compared   with 

agnosticism,  203. 
Dogmatism,    compared  with  agnosti- 
cism,   200,   202;     its   mystery,    189; 

should  be  avoided  by  old  religions, 

209. 


2l6 


INDEX. 


Dogmatists,  living  fossils,  200 :  their 
idolatry,  199,  200,  203,  207  :  their  God 
anthropomorphic,  202  ;  their  literal- 
ism absurd,  203. 

Doubt,  leads  to  inquiry,  208. 

Dreams,  sensations,  their  reality,  20, 
21. 

Drobisch,  cited,  124. 

Dualism,  leads  to  triunism,  loi ;  none 
in  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  17  ; 
outcome  of  associationalism,  175  ; 
outcome  of  one-sided  monism,  29  ; 
supported  by  transcendentalism,  67; 
to  be  overcome  by  scientific  pro- 
gress, 4. 

Dualistic  idea  of  gravitation,  164. 

Duality,  of  subject,  and  object  not 
dualism,  17 ;  of  truth  denied  by 
Christ  and  science,  205,  206. 

Duns  Scotus,  first  to  distinguish  sub- 
ject and  object,  12,  13. 

Duty,  gives  value  to  life,  ig8  ;  implied 
by  world-constitution,  167 ;  made 
perfect  by  love,  198  ;  of  clergy  to  re- 
spect science,  206  ;  of  scientists  to 
seek  truth,  206. 

Ear,  its  function  an  abstraction,  127. 

Economy  of  thought,  by  systematisa- 
tion  of  experience,  194. 

Ecstasies,  26. 

Effect,  the  idea  a  noumenon,  148. 

Effects,  always  causal,  157;  their  na- 
ture, 137,  142,  144,  152,  153,  157. 

Efficient  cause,  defined  by  Aristotle, 
144,  all  causes  such,  156. 

Ego,  its  definition.  191  ,  discovered 
by  Kant,  68  ;  explained  by  nature  of 
apperception,  191 ;  its  attempted 
proof  by  transcendentalism,  67. 

Egotism,  an  obstacle  to  scientific  en- 
lightenment, 207,  208  ,  not  the  main- 
spring of  right  effort,  167. 

Eighth  axiom  of  Euclid,  57. 

Electricity  a  form  of  will,  184. 

Elements,  constant  change  in  their 
combinations,  166. 

Eleventh  axiom  of  Euclid,  57,  58. 

Elliptic  geometry,  80. 

Emotions,  defined,  190. 

Empirically  formal,  defined,  79,  86. 


Empiricism  reconciled  with  aprior- 
ism,  iii,  70. 

Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  cited,  60. 

Energy,  its  conservation,  42,  155,  159; 
its  relation  to  the  unconditioned, 
130;  its  transfer  in  audition,  142; 
not  explanation  of  soul,  iig;  not 
matter,  121  ;  transformed  in  causa- 
tion, 152. 

English  school,  its  misunderstanding 
of  the  formal,  75. 

Enjoyment  not  to  be  sought,  7. 

Erkenntnissgrund,  148. 

Error,  its  cause,  22 ;  less  potent  than 
truth  208,  209  ;  purely  mental,  22,  48. 

Essay  on  Human  Understanding, 
cited,  28. 

Eternity  implied  in  existence,  94. 

Ether  vibrations  a  form  of  will,  184. 

Ethical  power  in  humanity,  204;  prin- 
ciple indispensable  to  organisms, 
169. 

Ethics,  how  affected  by  subjectivism. 
23;  its  basis,  4,  5,  189;  the  test  of 
philosophy,  5. 

Euclid,  cited,  97  ;  does  not  use  the 
word  axiom,  52 ;  his  common  no- 
tions and  postulates  not  axioms,  58, 
60;  his  eleventh  and  twelfth  ax- 
ioms, 58  ;  Schopenhauer's  opinion 
of  his  demonstrations,  53. 

Euclidean  axioms  denied  by  modern 
mathematicians,  95. 

Euclidean  geometry,  its  assumption, 
57,  III;  not  only  kind,  80,  log;  purely 
formal,  79. 

Euclidean  space,  an  assumption,  55; 
its  characteristics,  56,  57,  81;  its  con- 
struction, 57 ;  its  existence  denied 
by  Ball,  95- 

Euclidean  straight  lines  possible  even 
if  space  is  curved,  36. 

Evenness  of  space,  a  negative  qual- 
ity, 98. 

Events,  causes  of  things,  137;  ex- 
plainable only  as  transformations, 
36,  105,  156,  176  ;  their  necessity  de- 
terminism, 106,  164. 

Everything  a  cause  and  an  effect,  151. 

Evolution,  Christ  its  dominating 
power,  189,  197 ;  dependent  oy^  iin- 


INDEX. 


217 


mortality,  1S9  ;  does  not  tend  to  in- 
crease happiness,  6;  dogmatists  rep- 
resent a  certain  stage  of,  200  ;  on 
other  planets,  168 ;  revelation  of 
Saviour-God,  loi;  sursum  its  watch- 
word, 171  ;  tends  to  improve  condi- 
tions, 166,  167. 

Evolution,  of  formal  thought,  78;  of 
human  faculties,  171 ;  of  mind  a  ne- 
cessity, 20,  34;  of  religion,  explained 
by  philosophy,  5 ;  of  soul-life,  1S6. 

Existence,  absolute,  source  of  the 
idea,  132;  a  cosmos  not  a  medley, 
112  ;  appears  to  us  arbitrary,  102 ; 
both  subjective  and  objective,  15, 
17;  its  nature,  10,  20,  88;  objectivity 
of  nature  its  apocalypse,  26. 

Experience,  accords  with  formal 
knowledge,  iii  ;  a  psychic  phenom- 
enon, 43  ;  axioms  not  dependent  on, 
59 ;  basis  of  abstract  ideas,  135  ; 
basis  of  science  and  philosophy,  9, 
37,  43;  caused  by  sense-impressions, 
113;  coherence  among  its  facts,  71, 
104,  105  ;  confirms  Christian  moral- 
ity, 198;  its  conditions,  26;  its  data, 
72,  74,  135  ;  its  nature  and  functions, 
25,  26,  34,  154,  207  ;  its  method,  78, 
117;  its  problems  solvable  by  phi- 
losophy, 137;  its  range  widened  by 
science,  42 ;  its  relation  to  knowl- 
edge, 31,  32,  33,  34  ;  its  universal 
features,  105,  117;  methods  of  phi- 
losophy derived  from,  51 ;  repre- 
sented by  abstracts,  118;  same  na- 
ture as  thought,  III ;  sole  source  of 
knowledge,  28,  69 ;  systematisation 
of  its  uniformities,  194  ;  the  founda- 
tion of  ethics,  170;  the  foundation 
of  truth,  49 ;  the  medium  of  revela- 
tion, 37, 117;  unnecessary  for  deter- 
mining certain  truths,  107;  wrongly 
defined  by  associationalists,  177. 

Experiments,  their  object,  166. 

Explanation,  a  function  of  science, 
153  ;  definition  of  the  word,  153,  154. 

Extension,  Huxley's  view  of,  120. 

Eye,  its  function  an  abstraction,  127. 

Facts,  identified  byLewes  with  causes 
and   laws,  149 ;   pictured  in   sensa- 


tions, 39  ;  real  or  unreal,  47  ;  single 
and  concrete  events,  149 ;  the  basis 
of  all  investigations,  2,  58,  go. 

Faculties,  their  nature,  193. 

Faith,  broadened  by  science,  198;  its 
importance,  1C7. 

Falsehood,  exists  only  in  mentality, 
22. 

Fatalism,  a  superstition,  163  ;  its  view 
of  the  world,  165  ;  not  determinism, 
106 ;  not  necessitarianism,  163,  164. 

Fate  of  Romans  not  necessity,  164. 

Father,  God  so  called  in  Christian 
mythology,  49. 

Fathers,  their  misunderstanding  of 
parables,  196. 

Faust,  Goethe's,  quoted,  147,  196,  208. 

Feeling,  common  to  all  states  of  con- 
sciousness, 10;  its  definition,  189, 
113  ;  its  relation  to  thought,  207 ;  its 
various  forms,  10,  190, 192;  the  heart 
of  nature,  20;  the  subjective  side  of 
motion,  16. 

Feeling  substance,  apperception  its 
activity,  185. 

Feelings  arise  from  subjectivity,  17 ; 
cannot  exist  in  isolation,  16,  182, 183, 
191 ;  their  representative  function, 
II,  39,  191 ;  units  of  soul-life,  16. 

Fetish  ideas  compared  with  fetish 
images,  199. 

Fetishism  of  atheists,  128;  of  dog- 
matists, 199;  of  the  absolute,  128; 
the  most  primitive  idolatry,  199. 

Final  causes,  144,  156. 

Finitude  demands  special  explana- 
tion,[93;  of  space  involves  antinomy, 
95,  97- 

First  cause,  a  grotesque  idea,  147; 
means  ultimate  reason,  146. 

Flemming,  his  summation  of  Hegel's 
doctrine,  132. 

Focussing  of  feelings  in  conscious- 
ness, 182,  183,  185,  191. 

Folge  opposed  to  Grund,  140. 

Forces,  not  accounted  for  by  mechan- 
ical laws,  162,  163;  not  causes,  139; 
spontaneous  expressions  of  reality, 
162. 

Formal,  its  definition,  7.:,  7-',  113  ;  a'ld 
sensory,  the  web  and  woof  of  knowl- 


2l8 


INDEX. 


edge,  35;  called  a  priori,  61;  dis- 
tinguished from  sensory  by  abstrac- 
tion, 72;  distinguished  from  ma- 
terial, 114;  its  function,  8g ;  its  ne- 
cessity and  universality,  113;  its 
three  degrees,  79,  86;  Kant's  views 
regarding  it,  30,  31;  same  in  mind 
as  in  things,  88 ;  the  condition  of 
systematised  experience,  78 ;  the 
most  important  part  of  reality,  112. 

Formal  cause,  defined  by  Aristotle, 
143;  cognition,  considered  empty 
by  Kant,  35  ;  combinations,  part  of 
existence  in  general,  72 ;  laws,  their 
relation  to  consciousness,  113,  130; 
magnitudes,  created  by  mental  acts, 
60, 

Formal  sciences,  enumerated,  no; 
explained  by  monism,  178 ;  must  be 
based  on  facts,  91  ;  their  function 
and  value,  71,  78,  134  ;  their  nature, 

35.  86,  :i5. 

Formal  thought,  conditions  of  its  evo- 
lution, 78  ;  impossible  to  animals, 
78  ;  its  practical  value,  78,  107,  116. 

Formal  truths,  not  abstract  generali- 
sations, 61;  not  axioms  nor  intuitive 
principles,  61,  77. 

Form,  a  property  of  all  existence,  72, 
88 ;  as  real  as  matter,  105  ;  attrib- 
uted to  objects  by  mind,  87  ;  objects 
always  different  in,  192;  its  changes 
not  causation,  152;  its  changes  the 
field  of  science,  42,  166 ;  its  laws 
universal,  105  ;  not  a  cause,  144. 

Forms  make  things  what  they  are, 
112;  their  perpetual  flux,  130. 

Forms  of  feeling,   10,   11,  192;  of 
thought,  35,  60. 

Fortnightly  Review,  cited,  95. 

Fourfold  root  of  principle  of  sufficient 
reason,  148. 

Free  actions  immediate  expressions 
of  character,  160. 

Freedom,  illustrated  by  a  magnet, 
162,163;  its  definition,  160;  not  lim- 
ited to  man,  161. 

Free-will,  analogous  to  spontaneity  of 
nature,  162 ;  compatible  with  ne- 
cessity, 160,  164 ;  its  significance, 
159- 


French  positivists,  their  fundamental 
principle,  69. 

Fundamental  problems  disposed  of, 
iii. 

iHision  of  ideas  different  from  asso- 
ciation, 175. 

Future  dependent  on  the  ideal,  169; 
the  best  legacy  to,  210;  the  present 
to  be  sacrificed  to,  168. 

Gallon,  Francis,  invented  composite 
photography,  178. 

Gedankenwesen,  a  synonym  of  nou- 
mena,  133. 

Gegenstand,  coined  to  represent  "  ob- 
ject," 14. 

General  lav;s  superseded  by  univer- 
sal, 155. 

General  notion,  God  not  such,  147. 

General  notions,  empty,  146 ;  ex- 
plained by  monism,  178 ;  presup- 
posed by  particular  ones,  182;  the 
conditions  of  cognition,  181. 

Generalisation,  analogous  to  compos- 
ite photography,  178  ;  lowest  faculty 
of  mind,  182  ;  not  explained  by  as- 
sociation, 195  ;  prior  to  cognition, 
181  ;  product  of  abstract  thought, 
194. 

Generic  images,  their  origin,  175. 

Genesis,  cited,  129. 

Genius,  result  of  work  of  ancestors, 
171. 

Geometrical  figures,  their  value,  116; 
method,  its  fault,  90. 

Geometry,  a  purely  formal  science, 
79,  no.  III  ;  its  analogy  with  logic, 
no  ;  its  presupposition,  55,  57,  in  ; 
its  construction  of  space,  8g,  93 ; 
non-Euclidean  ones  possible,  80,  81, 
82,  109 ;  not  dependent  on  empiric 
space,  96. 

German  terminology  adopted  by 
other  nations,  14  ;  text-books,  their 
definition  of  space,  92. 

Glory  of  moral  law,  202. 

God,  a  moral  idea,  147;  an  abstract 
idea,  19;  concrete  and  real,  147: 
how  revealed  to  man,  37,  201,  209; 
inconceivable  unless  triune,  loi ; 
not  a  big  human  being,  202 ;  not  a 


INDEX. 


219 


general  notion,  147 ;  not  a  great 
world-ego,  147 ;  not  immoral,  170 ; 
not  the  Absolute,  128,  129;  not  the 
author  of  creeds,  19-  ;  not  the  ulti- 
mate reason,  146;  of  dogmatist  an- 
thropomorphic, 202  ;  of  New  Testa- 
ment, 129;  the  all-existence  in  which 
we  move,  49  ;  the  authority  of  con- 
duct, 170;  the  Son  distinguished 
from  Father,  loi  ;  the  Spirit,  pro- 
ceeds from  Father  and  Son,  loi  ; 
worship  of  his  symbols  idolatry, 
199 ;  worshipped  because  his  com- 
mandments are  true,  203. 

God-Man,  implies  Trinity,  lOi. 

Goethe,  cited,  196. 

Goltz,  Professor,  his  psychological 
experiments,  180. 

Gospels,  their  account  of  resurrec- 
tion, 188;  their  teaching  of  self- 
sacrifice,  198  ;  the  Jesus  of  the,  ig5. 

Grassmann,  cited,  53-56,  92. 

Gravitation,  a  form  of  will,  158,  164; 
not  a  law,  but  a  formula,  164. 

Gravity,  not  a  cause,  but  a  property, 
138,  139,  140.  142,  164. 

Greek,  deity  Moira  not  necessity,  164; 
poets  their  symbolisms,  197. 

Growth,  a  property  of  cells,  168. 

Grund  distinguished  from  Ursache, 
143  ;  opposed  to  Fol^e,  140. 

Hallucinations,  real  as  sensations,  21. 

Hamilton,  Sir  William,  cited,  124,125. 

Happiness,  not  basis  of  ethics,  167  ; 
not  increased  by  evolution,  6;  not 
object  of  life,  197. 

Harmony,  of  universe,  158,  177,  202  ; 
produced  by  character,  165 ;  pro- 
duced by  formal  laws,  130. 

Hartley,  his  psychology  of  associa- 
tion, 173. 

Hearing,  its  cerebral  centre,  180. 

Heat,  its  perception  and  abstraction, 

127. 
Heathenism,  its  essence,  197. 
Hegel,  on  the  absolute,  132;  on  the 

trinity-relation,  100. 
Henism,  name  for  one-substance  tlie- 

ory,  3. 


Hobbes,  his  psychology  of  associa- 
tion, 175. 

Hindu,  nations,  causes  of  theirdown- 
fall,  23 ;  philosophies,  their  mys- 
tery, 21. 

Historical  elements  of  religion  unes- 
sential, 196,  197;  interest  of  the  dog- 
matist, 200 ;  investigation  of  resur- 
rection, 188. 

History  of  religions,  204. 

Hoffding,  his  psychology  of  associa- 
tion, 175. 

Holiness  of  the  religious  ideal,  210, 

Homoloidality  of  space,  95,  98,  ni. 

Hope,  its  importance,  167. 

Human  reason,  reflection  of  world- 
reason,  117. 

Humanity,  its  sacrifice,  167. 

Hume,  his  influence  upon  Kant,  30 ; 
his  psychology  of  association,  75, 
175  ;  his  scepticism,  29,  151. 

Huxley,  Professor,  his  confusion  of 
thought,  120,  121. 

Hypotheses,  not  necessary  to  purely 
formal  sciences,  iii;  of  scientists, 
need  not  be  accepted,  206. 

Idea  of  God,  not  a  myth  nor  an  ab- 
straction, 159 ;  superstitiously  re- 
garded, 147. 

Idea  worshippers,  their  idolatry,  200, 
203. 

Ideal,  of  invisible  church,  199  ;  its  re- 
lation to  religion,  204,209,210;  of 
Hindu  subjectivism,  24  ;  the  guide 
of  progress,  169 ;  the  struggle  for 
the,  198. 

Ideas,  defined,  186,  192;  always  gen- 
eral, 118,  181, 182  ;  communicated  by 
symbols,  197 ;  more  empty  when 
more  general,  146;  Platonic  view 
of,  133  ;  symbols  of  reality,  121,134  ; 
the  conditions  of  experience,  65; 
their  association,  173,  174;  their  in- 
dividuality, 187,  188;  their  life,  186; 
their  migration,  187;  their  origin, 
125,  178,  187;  their  power,  188;  their 
relation  to  the  will,  192;  their  ri- 
valry, 1S7;  true  or  untrue,  47;  value 
of  religious,  204. 


220 


INDEX. 


Identity,  the  foundation  of  rational 
thought,  log,  113. 

Idolatry,  its  definition,  200,  201 ;  its 
cause,  200,  201  ;  its  essence,  197  ;  its 
varieties,  202  ;  of  agnostics,  202,  203; 
of  dogmatists,  200,  203,  207  ;  of  the 
Absolute,  128,  200. 

Illusion,  none  in  nature  or  sensation, 
21,  22. 

Illusoriness  of  reason  to  nominalists, 
104. 

Ill-will,  its  futility,  208. 

Image,  definition  of,  90. 

Image  of  God,  the  anthropomorphic, 
202. 

Images,  their  idolatrous  worship,  199. 

Imagination  defined,  193. 

Immanent  teleology  of  nature,  158. 

Immorality,  disobedience  to  God, 170; 
of  nature,  an  absurdity,  170. 

Immortality  of  soul,  1S8,  189. 

Impact  necessary  to  objectivity,  15. 

Impenetrability,  Huxley's  view  of,  120. 

Impressions,  not  received  passively 
in  apperception,  185. 

Impulses,  their  definition,  192. 

Independence,  deficient  in  dogmat- 
ists, 200. 

India  illustrates  fatal  results  of  pes- 
simism, 23. 

Individuality  of  ideas,  188. 

Indolence,  causes  idolatry,  200. 

Induction,  its  problem  in  Mill's  view, 
114. 

Inductive  reason  called  a  posteriori, 

63. 
Inexplicable,  things  not  so,  177. 
Infidels,  189. 
Infinite,   always  tripartite,   100,   102; 

an   absurd  idea,   200 ;    idolatry   of, 

201. 
Infinite-dimensioned  space  possible, 

94- 
Infinitude,  a  matter  of  course,  93  ;  a 

simpler  conception  than  finitude,97. 
Infinity  of  homoloidal   space  not  an 

antimony,  96. 
Innate  ideas,  28. 

Innerness  not  the  whole  of  reality,  25. 
Inquiry,  caused  by  doubt,  208  ;  its  aid 

to  religion,  207. 


Insight  lacked  by  idea-worshippers, 
200. 

Inspiration,  the  source  of  knowledge 
to  mystics,  26. 

Intellect,  its  definition,  194, 

Intellectual  Powers,  Raid's,  quoted, 
148. 

Intelligence,  its  definition,  194. 

Intelligent  beings,  their  spontaneity 
called  will,  184. 

Intensification  of  feeling  the  function 
of  consciousness,  182,  183,  191. 

Interactions  constitute  reality,  18. 

Interpretation  of  sensation  some- 
times erroneous,  22, 

Interrelation  of  feelings,  72,  igi. 

Intuition,  as  viewed  by  mystics,  26; 
contrasted  with  abstract  thought, 
126;  contrasted  with  self-observa- 
tion, 61 ;  furnishes  data  of  sense- 
impression,  125 ;  meaning  of  the 
word,  9  ;  the  great  support  of  false 
doctrines,  69;  the  theory  aban- 
doned, 37 ;  yields  sensations,  127. 

Inventions  in  formal  sciences,  134. 

Invisible  church,  its  religion  true,  199. 

Irreligion,  remedied  by  science,  208. 

Isosceles  triangle,  demonstrated  by 
Thales,  86. 

Israelitic  religion,  its  relation  to 
moral  truths,  27. 

Jesus,  established  no  dogmas,  206; 
his  new  kingdom,  106  ;  his  resur- 
rection, 188,  189  ;  spoke  in  parables, 
196  ;  would  be  rejected  by  churches, 
198. 

Judgment,  its  definition,  193,  194;  its 
origin,  190. 

Kant,  cited,  9,  30-33,  56,  64,  65,  74,  77, 
86,  88,  89,  133,  148 ;  his  apriorism 
reconciled  v/ith  empiricism,  iii;  his 
mistakes,  31,  34,36;  his  theory  of 
knowledge,  26-29,  35,  66,  70,  86,  87, 
177;  his  view  of  axioms,  59;  his 
view  of  the  ego,  68  ;  secret  of  his 
greatness,  36;  source  of  his  trans- 
cendentalism, 113. 

Kantism,  its  truths  and  errors  both 
rejected  by  Mill,  70, 


INDEX. 


■2.ZI 


Kant's  Critical  Problem,  cited,  74, 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  cited,  iii. 

Kiesewetter,  Prof.,  his  discussions 
with  Kant,  33. 

Kingdom  of  heaven,  its  true  charac- 
ter, 49. 

KirchhofE,  his  definition  of  knowl- 
edge, 37. 

Kismet,  of  Mohammedans,  not  neces- 
sity, 164. 

Klein,  his  elliptical  geometry,  80. 

Knowledge,  definitions  of  the  word, 
37.  39>  41 ;  extended  by  formal  sche- 
dules, 116;  impossible  in  nominalist 
theory,  104  ;  its  acquisition  the 
sphere  of  science,  40;  its  source' 
25,  35,  38.  73.  76.  177.  178  ;  not  an  as- 
sociation of  single  sensations,  114; 
purified  by  science,  42;  rendered 
definite  by  naming,  39 ;  the  basis  of 
all  action,  39  ;  the  measure  of  men- 
tality, 39 ;  unnecessary  to  purely 
formal  sciences,  iii. 

Kronos,  a  symbol  of  time,  197. 

Labor  of  past  generations  not  lost, 
171. 

Lambert,  his  definition  of  a  priori . 
64. 

Language,  its  relation  to  thought,  107, 
108,  123,  125,  1S6. 

Law,  identified  by  Lewes  with  causes, 
149  ;  its  uniformity  and  universal- 
ity, 50 ;  of  causation  governs  char- 
acter, 166  ;  of  gravitation  a  descrip- 
tive formula,  164;  of  progression  in 
logic,  56;  of  self-consistency  of 
being,  112;  of  the  ideal,  169. 

Laws,  based  on  universal  and  neces- 
sary truths,  76  ;  of  association,  173  ; 
of  God,  their  blessings  to  be  worked 
out,  202  ;  of  mechanics  a  revelation 
of  spirit,  24;  of  nature,  defined,  i, 
48,  139,  140,  149,  155,  a  mystery  to 
associationists,  177,  immutable,  159, 
202,  not  immoral,  170,  require  fur- 
ther explanation,  154  ;  special,  su- 
perseded by  general,  155  ;  their  au- 
thority, 204  ;  widely  different  from 
thoughts,  149. 

Learned,  their  superstitions,  51. 


Leibnitz,  cited,  13,  29,  63. 

Letter,  easier  to  believe  than  spirit, 
196. 

Lewes,  George  Henry,  his  views  of 
causation,  149,  150,  251. 

Liberty  compatible  with  necessity, 
160. 

Life,  its  true  aims,  6,  197. 

Light,  a  form  of  will,  1S4  ;  its  appre- 
hension an  act  of  abstraction,  107  ; 
path  of  its  rays,  85,  97,  98,  99  ;  the 
quickest  motion  known,  97. 

Limits  between  provinces  of  reality 
purely  ideal,  121. 

Lindemann,  Prof.,  cited,  80. 

Line,  its  definition,  89 ;  its  properties, 
95  ;  new  method  for  its  production, 
95. 

Littre,  his  positivism  really  agnosti- 
cism, 2. 

Lobatschewsky's  space,  8i. 

Locke,  cited,  28 ;  his  definition  of 
cause,  149;  his  theory  of  knowledge, 

29.  75- 

Logarithms,  103. 

Logic,  impossibility  of  a  new  kind, 
109 ;  a  rigidly  formal  science,  79, 
no,  III ;  its  analogy  with  geometry, 
no ;  its  nature,  35  ;  laws  of  progress 
in,  56;  might  be  considered  a  branch 
of  astronomy,  44. 

Logical  categories,  their  nature,  116; 
consequence  of  a  reason,  141  ;  ne- 
cessity, its  mystery,  115;  principles 
universal  and  necessary,  71. 

Logicalness  of  confessions  of  faith, 
196. 

Logos,  the  word  of  truth,  49. 

Love,  should  be  the  mainspring  of  ac- 
tion, 198,  199;  the  foundations  of 
the  new  covenant,  206. 

Lucretius,  cited,  195. 

Mach,  Ernst,  cited,  43. 

Magnet,   an   illustration   of   freedom 

and  compulsion,  162. 
Magnitudes,  their  names  should  be 

constant,  61. 
Man,  creeds  his  wrork  not  God's,  197  ; 

his  origin,  171;  made  divine  by  the 

truth,  205;  not  a  mere  mechanism, 


222 


INDEX. 


165  ;  thought  his  exclusive  preroga- 
tive, 118,  123,  125,  r34. 

Mansel,  cited,  124. 

Material,  cause,  143,  150;  importance 
of  distinguishing  it  from  formal, 
114;  not  a  cause,  144;  world  is  being 
as  it  appears,  23. 

Materialism,  its  errors,  19;  its  view 
of  the  universe,  129  ;  not  true  mo- 
nism, 3. 

Mathematical,  operations  take  place 
in  space,  92;  space  and  abstraction 
not  construction,  loi  ;  symbols  to 
be  regarded  as  words,  39. 

Mathematicians,  do  not  distinguish 
degrees  of  formal,  83  ;  their  recent 
theories  about  space,  95  ;  their  su- 
perstitions, 51. 

Mathematics,  its  nature,  35,91,  116; 
certitude  of  its  principles,  71,  131  ; 
divinity  in,  207  ;  its  data  the  results 
of  abstraction,  loi ;  its  demonstra- 
tions compared  with  chemical  anal- 
ysis, 74  ;  its  presuppositions,  56,  91, 
92  ;  Kant's  view  of  its  truths,  29,  59; 
not  a  mere  fiction,  134  ;  not  so  a 
priori  as  arithmetic,  80;  Schopen- 
hauer's view  of  its  certitude,  53,  55; 
the  model  science,  51;  various  kinds 
invented,  109. 

Matter,  an  abstract  idea,  4,  19 ;  an 
appearance  of  existence,  21 ;  a  qual- 
ity, not  an  entity,  122;  in  motion  a 
true  picture  of  the  world,  21 ;  its 
conservation  implies  causation,  135; 
its  form  and  composition  change- 
able, 166;  its  motions  a  revelation 
of  soul,  22;  its  persistence,  159;  its 
relation  to  the  unconditioned,  130  ; 
its  total  amount  constant,  42,  166 ; 
not  energy,  121 ;  not  the  explanation 
of  soul.  III;  an  element  of  objec- 
tivity, 12, 14  ;  transformed  in  causa- 
tion, 152. 

Matthew,  St.,  cited,  50. 

Maxims  not  the  basis  of  investiga- 
tions, 58. 

Meaning  of  feelings,  11. 

Meanings,  of  structures  the  condition 
of  apperception,  185  ;  of  words  con- 
stitute ideas,  186. 


Mechanical,  explanation  of  nature  in- 
admissible, 161,  162;  laws,  their 
function  and  value,  162;  not  anti- 
spiritual,  24  ;  phenomena  compared 
with  compulsion,  161. 

Mechanics,  its  laws  a  revelation  of 
spiritual  activity,  24  ;  not  so  a  priori 
as  algebra,  80. 

Mechanism,  of  nature  only  an  appear- 
ance, 20 ;  of  nature  and  man  not 
dead,  165. 

Medicine-man,  his  spells,  202. 

Meliorism,  the  true  and  the  false,  5, 
6,  167. 

Memory,  its  definition,  igo,  193  ;  es- 
sential to  consciousness,  183;  the 
condition  of  experience,  26. 

Memory-images,  174,  179,  190. 

Memory-structures,  the  basis  of  psy- 
chic life,  1S4  ;  the  condition  of  ap- 
perception, 183  ;  their  function, 180, 
iSi,  182,  192. 

Mental,  conditions  of  apperception, 
185  ;  life,  its  debt  to  nature,  186. 

Mental  operations,  their  nature,  60, 
III ;  depend  on  internal  experience, 
61  ;  presupposed  by  mathematics, 
92;  the  germ  of  reason,  117;  their 
elements,  116;  the  only  material  of 
pure  mathematics,  116. 

Mentality,  dependent  on  knowledge, 

39- 

Mephistopheles,  quoted,  196. 

Mercury,  as  a  "  cause  "  of  death,  150, 
151. 

Messiahship  of  Jesus,  206. 

Metaphysical,  character  attributed  to 
the  a  priori,  68  ;  conception  of  God 
erroneous,  146;  noumena  not,  133; 
speculations,  to  be  abandoned,  4. 

Methods,  of  philosophy,  51  ;  of  sci- 
ence should  be  adopted  by  religion, 
209;  of  scientific  work,  42;  of 
thought,  118;  the  subject  of  philo- 
sophical study,  45. 

Microscopy  and  mathematics.  n6. 

Middle  Ages,  philosophical  parties 
in,  103. 

Mill,  John,  his  psychology  of  asso- 
ciation, 173. 

Mill,  John  Stuart,  his  empiricism  rec- 


INDEX. 


"ZT.-*, 


onciled  with  apriorism,  iii ;  his 
mistakes,  70,  75,  114,  173;  his  view 
of  the  a  jtriori,  59,  68,  69,  75. 

Milton,  cited,  108. 

Mind,  its  definition,  192,  193  ;  a  neces- 
sary outcome  of  living,  20;  general- 
isation its  lowest  faculty,  182 ;  its 
origin,  22,  25,  178;  its  universal  ac- 
tivity, 88  ;  its  yearning  for  truth,  50; 
no  breach  between  it  and  nature, 
20.  88,  112,  181;  the  basis  of  formal 
sciences,  91. 

Model  of  reality  constructed  in  mind, 
89. 

Modern  idolatry  worse  than  that  of 
savages,  199. 

Mohammedan  Kismet,  not  necessity, 
164. 

Moira  of  Greeks  not  necessity,  164. 

Monism,  its  definition,  3,  19,  50;  ap- 
preciates both  spirit  and  matter,  23; 
avoid  errors  of  Kant  and  associa- 
tionists,  177;  can  alone  give  peace, 
50;  corroborated  by  the  advance  of 
science,  4 ;  derived  from  dualism 
through  triunism,  loi  ;  dominates 
modern  tnought,  i ;  not  a  finished 
system,  4 ;  not  understood  by  its 
opponents,  3;  not  the  one-substance 
theory,  3;  of  Brahmans,  its  one- 
sidedness  and  fatal  results,  23. 

Monist,  The,  cited,  24,  84,  132,  161. 

Monistic  character  of  necessitarian- 
ism, 165  ;  positivism  not  a  new  phi- 
losophy, 4. 

Moon,  measurement  of  its  distance  a 
priori,  106. 

Moral  aspiration,  of  churches,  19S ; 
same  as  natural  living,  171. 

Moral   endeavor,   not  a   matter  of 
choice,  167. 

Moral  idea  of  God,  147 ;  ideas,  their 
power,  188. 

Moral,  laws  true  and  useful,  201-203 ; 
tendency  the  fundamental  law  of 
nature,  169;  truths,  a  natural  growth, 
27  ;  world-order,  its  harmony,  202  ; 
worth,  how  estimated,  163. 

Morality,  its  nature,  7,  168,  170;  agrees 
with  constitution  of  universe,  170 ; 
dependent    on    necessity,    163 ;    ils 


basis,  198  ;  of  traditional  religions, 
correct,  170,  198  ;  of  true  religion, 
:99;  the  means  of  evolution,  171. 

Motions,  an  element  of  objectivity, 
12,  14,  15;  governed  by  mechanical 
laws,  162;  never  aimless,  157;  pri- 
mary and  scondary  constitute  phe- 
nomena, 161  ;  that  of  light  quickest 
known,  97  ;  the  experience  of  exist- 
ence, 51 ;  the  objective  side  of  feel- 
ing, 16;  the  world  composed  of,  iii. 

Motiv,  Schopenhauer's  use  of  the 
term,  148. 

Motor  ideas,  1S6. 

Mailer,  Max,  cited,  107,  108. 

Multi-dimensional  bodies,  their  pos- 
sibility, 92 

Muscular  sense,  its  function  an  ab- 
straction, 127. 

Mysteries  in  philosophy,  146;  in  reli- 
gion, 27,  29. 

Mysteriousness,  of  cognition  denied, 
181 ;  of  things  denied,  177. 

Mystery,  in  natural  law  to  associa 
tionists,  175,  177;  of  logical  neces- 
sity, 115. 

Mysticism,  avoided  by  monism,  177; 
in  Kantian  apriorism,  36,  66,  67,  71 ; 
introduced  into  mathematics  by 
Schopenhauer,  55;  the  outcome  of 
associationism,  177. 

Mystics,  their  view  of  the  source  of 
knowledge,  26. 

Mythological  idea  of  God  not  preva- 
lent, 147. 

Mythology  of  Christianity  unimpor- 
tant, igS. 

Names,  their  function  in  thought,  39, 
123,   124. 

Natura  naiurans,  loi ;  naiurata,  loi. 

Natural  laws,  their  nature,  i,  130,  139, 
140,  148;  a  mystery  to  association- 
ists,  177;  require   explanation,   152. 

Natural  living  identical  with  moral 
aspiration,  171. 

Natural  processes,  analogous  to  men- 
tal operations,  iii  ;  not  explainable 
mechanically,  161. 

Nature,  a  revelation  of  God,  21,  22,  26, 
209  ;  aspiration  the  grandi'st  of  its 


224 


INDEX. 


tendencies,  171  ;  its  character,  164, 
165  ;  its  harmony  and  order,  158  ;  its 
laws  the  written  will  of  God,  201  ; 
its  operations  identical  with  those 
of  mind,  88  ;  its  order  recognised  by 
religious  leaders,  170;  its  spontane- 
ity analogous  to  will,  161,  162,  165, 
184;  its  unchangeableness,  159,202; 
its  universal  activity,  88;  necessity 
not  a  power  above  it,  164  ;  no  break 
in,  181 ;  not  a  dead  mechanism,  165; 
not  immoral,  170;  of  things,  161, 
166;  obedience  to  it  the  true  wor- 
ship, 201  ;  the  grand  apocalypse,  26. 
205  ;  the  ideal  its  law,  i6g. 

Necessary  truths,  denied  by  Mill,  70  ; 
in  logic  and  mathematics,  71. 

Necessitarianism,  distinguished  from 
fatalism,  165  ;  the  foundation  of  sci- 
ence, 163. 

Necessity,  its  definition,  160, 161;  com- 
patible with  free  will,  160,  164  ;  de- 
nied by  association  philosophy,  177; 
distinguished  from  compulsion,  160; 
implied  by  causation,  160;  its  prob- 
lem same  as  that  of  universality, 
105;  logical,  its  mystery,  115;  not 
compulsion,  106,  164;  not  Moira, 
FateorKismet,  164;  of  formal  truths, 
75,  7C,  loS,  175;  of  teleology  in  na- 
ture, 158. 

Nervous  system,  its  function  in  feel- 
ing, 183. 

New  covenant  made  by  Jesus,  206  ; 
Testament,  its  view  of  God.  129. 

Newton,  his  misuse  of  the  word  ax- 
iom, 52. 

Noir€,  cited,  107,  108. 

Nominalism,  described,  103  ;  a  reac- 
tion against  errors  of  realism,  71  ; 
cannot  explain  construction  of  tri- 
angles, 107;  less  true  than  realism, 
70,  108,  174 ;  not  free  from  assump- 
tions, 105 ;  the  source  of  agnosti- 
cism, 104  ;  the  source  of  sensation- 
alism, 177. 

Nominalistic  controversy,  forgotten, 
124;  its  outcome,  122. 

Non-Euclidean  geometry,  its  possi- 
bility, 80-83,  109 ;  space,  its  possi- 
bility, 90,  92. 


Norm,  of  aspiration,  204  ;  of  thought 

194- 
Nose,    its    function    an    abstraction 

127. 
Notions,    derived   from   reality,  117; 

general  and  particular,  182. 
Noumena,  their  nature,   122,  133,  134, 

148. 
Numbers,  their  nature  and  origin,  34, 

78. 

Obedience  to  God,  147,  170,  203. 

Object  and  subject  inseparable,  14. 

Objective,  its  definition,  13,  14;  ex- 
istence disparaged  by  Hindu  phi- 
losophers, 21 ;  experience  necessary 
to  knowledge,  25  ;  formal  and  ma- 
terial inseparable  in  the,  36. 

Objectivism,  a  synonym  for  material- 
ism, 20. 

Objectivity,  its  definition,  12,  16,  17, 
21  ;  an  abstraction,  17 ;  appears  as 
matter  moving  in  space,  12,  14,  15  ; 
furnishes  means  of  experience,  25  ; 
history  of  the  term,  12-14 ;  of  form 
and  relation,  72  ;  of  nature  a  reve- 
lation, 21,  22,  26  ;  of  reason,  117, 175; 
of  relations,  103 ;  of  truth,  48. 

Objects,  always  different  in  form, 
191 ;  Kant's  view  of,  85,  87  ;  of  this 
work,  iii ;  their  real  nature,  14,  15, 
16,  46;  their  representation  in  feel- 
ing, II,  15. 

Observation,  a   function   of  science, 

153- 

Old  religions,  compared  with  agnos- 
ticism, 203;  not  to  be  destroyed,  209. 

One-substance  theory  properly  called 
henism,  3. 

Ontological  school,  its  vice,  90. 

Optimism,  its  definition,  6;  meliorism 
not  a  modification  of,  5. 

Order  of  the  universe,  its  cause,  158, 
159  ;  denied  by  association-philoso- 
phy, 177. 

Organ  of  cognition  in  Kant  s  system, 
66. 

Organisation  and  systematisation  of 
feeling,  183. 

Organism,  ifs  relation  to  appercep- 
tion, )S5 ;  social,  16S. 


INDEX. 


225 


Organisms,  governed  by  ethical  prin- 
ciple, 169. 

Orthodox  conception  of  resurrection 
materialistic,  1S9. 

Orthodoxy,  the  religion  of  science, 
209. 

Outerness  not  all  of  reality,  25. 

Oxygen, its  chemical  effect  on  amceba, 
186. 

Pagan,  elements  in  religion,  39,  220; 
view  of  the  resurrection,  189. 

Paganism,  among  atheists,  128;  being 
eliminated  from  Christianity,  199  ; 
considers  abstracts  real  essences, 
133  ;  its  essence,  197  ;  its  fatalism, 
164  ;  of  dogmatists,  199,  200,  203. 

Pain,  volition  increases  sensitiveness 
to,  6. 

Particular  notions  subsequent  to  gen- 
eral, iSi,  182. 

Parables,  are  vehicles  of  truth,  196; 
taken  literally  by  church  Chris- 
tians, 196;  to  be  understood  alle- 
gorically,  203. 

Parallaxes  of  stars,  their  measure- 
ment, 83. 

Parallels,  axiom  of,  95,  no. 

Passions  exactly  defined,  192. 

Path  of  a  ray  of  light  the  prototype  of 
straight  lines,  97. 

Percept,  its  definition,  190. 

Perception,  cognition  a  form  of,  194  ; 
different  from  sensation,  180;  its 
exact  definition,  190  ;  its  physiolog- 
ical process,  182 ;  Kant's  definition 
of,  33  ;  the  beginning  of  appercep- 
tion, 182 ;  the  simplest  act  of  cogni- 
tion, 38,  181,  186. 

Perceptions,  their  nature,  48,  r7g,  181. 

Peirce,  Charles  S.,  cited,  24. 

Peripatetic  philosophy,  its  theory  of 
knowledge,  28. 

Peripheral  angles  of  a  circle,  their 
equality,  84. 

Person,  its  definition,  191. 

Personality,  its  nature,  184,  188 ;  of 
ideas,  188. 

Pessimism,  6,  23. 

Phenomena,  a  synonym  for  atsights, 
133  ;  their  nature,  148;  their  primary 


and  secondary  motions,  161 ;  their 
relation  to  noumena,  134. 

Philology,  its  explanation  of  reason, 
107. 

Philosophasters,  in   the  majority,  36. 

Philosophers,  should  also  be  scien- 
tists, 46 ;  their  ancient  mistakes, 
133;  their  greatest  difficulty,  118,  iig; 
worship  their  own  errors,  146. 

Philosophical  background,  needed  by 
science,  14  ;  idea  of  God  not  preva- 
lent, 147;  parties  of  the  Middle 
Ages,  103. 

Philosophical,  Letters  of  Schiller, 
cited,  207 ;  Review,  cited,  74. 

Philosophy,  its  definition,  4,  45,  90, 
146;  association  not  its  fundamen- 
tal principle,  175  ;  axioms  inadmis- 
sible in,  58 ;  based  upon  experience, 
9,  37.  51  ;  ignored  by  scientists,  iv ; 
its  most  fundamental  problem,  2, 
73  ;  its  quarrels  over  final  causes, 
156  ;  its  recent  decline,  iv  ;  its  rela- 
tion to  progress,  iv  ;  its  usefulness, 
iv,  4,  207  ;  its  wildcat  banks,  135  ; 
injured  by  use  of  the  term  absolute, 
127  ;  of  association  criticised,  173 ; 
solves  probleins  of  experience,  137; 
tested  by  its  ethics,  5  ;  the  ontolog- 
ical  school  of,  90. 

Phosphorus,  its  properties  an  illus- 
tration of  character,  t65. 

Photographs,  composite,  illlustrate 
generalisation,  178. 

Physics,  its  field  of  inquiry,  43,  44. 

Physiological  process  of  perception, 
182. 

Piano,  an  illustration  of  causation, 
137,  142. 

Plane  geometry,  57,  83,  89. 

Plane,  non-Euclidean,  possible,  58. 

Planets,  evolution  on  other,  168,  171. 

Plato,  his  view  of  ideas,  133. 

Poets  of  Greece,  their  symbolisms, 

197- 
Point,  criticism  of  its  former  defini- 
tion, 91,92;  not  a  real  object,  92; 
used  for  construction  of  space,  89, 

93. 
Point  of  view  of  this  work,  iii. 
Political  songs  of  England,  quoted, 79 


226 


INDEX. 


Polygonal  relations  reducible  to  triple 
relations,  loo. 

Popular  usage  usually  accurate,  143. 

Positive  monism  not  new,  4. 

Positivism,  i,  2,  45,  69. 

Postulates  of  Euclid,  52,  58,  60. 

Practical,  ends  sought  by  science,  42  ; 
life,  religion  relates  to,  207 ;  view  of 
God  as  authority,  147. 

Practicalness  of  decalogue,  202. 

Prayer,  only  a  self-discipline,  202 ; 
should  not  be  precatory,  200,  202. 

Preacher,  usefulness  of  positive  phi- 
losophy to,  4. 

Presence  of  Christ  in  humanity,  189. 

Priests,  not  the  true  prophets  of  reli- 
gion, 205. 

Primer  of  Philosophy,  its  meaning 
and  object,  iii. 

Prhnuni  appellatum,  181. 

Primtan  cognituin,  iSi. 

Principles,  not  the  basis  of  investiga- 
tion, 58  ;  never  self-evident,  148  ;  of 
mathematics,  Kant's  view  of,  59. 

Problem,  of  universality,  necessity, 
and  reason,  105,  106  ;  the  most  fun- 
damental in  philosophy,  73. 

Problems,  (Lewes's,)  cited,  149;  fun- 
damental, disposed  of,  iii;  not  all 
solved,  4. 

Progress,  fatal  to  dogmatism,  210; 
formerly  led  by  philosophy,  iv ; 
guided  by  the  ideal,  169;  its  condi- 
tions, 167,  189,  2C0,  204  ;  its  relation 
to  happiness,  6;  opposed  by  false 
Christianity,  196 ;  scientific,  cor- 
roborates monism,  4. 

Progression,  law  of,  in  mathematics 
and  logic,  56. 

Prolegomena  Logica,  cited,  124. 

Propagation,  a  property  of  cells,  168. 

Protozoa,  their  exhibition  of  will,  1S5, 
186;  their  tendencies  not  different 
from  chemical  affinities,  186. 

Pseudopods  of  amoeba,  their  explana- 
tion, 186. 

Pseudo-reason  impossible,  no. 

Psychical,  its  definition,  192  ;  condi- 
tions of  apperception,  185;  life 
based  on  memory,  189;  the  heart  of 
nature,  20. 


Psychological, mistakes  of  association 
philosophy,  175  ;  terms,  their  defi- 
nition, 189. 

Psychology,  its  domain,  43,  122  ;  its 
function,  44  ;  its  laws,  173  ;  of  asso- 
ciation, its  teachers,  175. 

Purely  formal,  its  function.  89 ;  its  dis- 
tinction from  rigidly  formal  over- 
looked by  Kant,  86. 

Purely  formal  sciences,  79,  no,  in. 

Pure  reason,  its  nature,  91,  112,  117; 
discredited  by  Comte,  68 ;  its  agree- 
ment with  configurations  of  reality, 

107,  112. 

Purpose,  its  definition,  157,  192;  con- 
secration to,  204;  essential  to  will, 
186  ;  its  relation  to  causality,  144. 

Pythagorean  theorem,  Schopenhau- 
er's view  of  it,  53. 

Qualities,  causative,  in  the  cause,  140; 
rational,  in  actions,  166. 

Rciison  d'?tre,  distinguished  from 
cause,  143. 

Rational   inquiry  into  truth  always 
necessary,  207. 

Rational  thought,  its  identity  with  ab- 
stract thought,  123  ;  its  limit  the  be- 
ginning of  idolatry,  201. 

Rationality  of  decalogue,  202. 

Ratio,  distinguished  from  cause,  143. 

Ratio  sui,  its  real  meaning,  145. 

Rays  of  light,  their  nature,  gS;  their 
path,  85,  97. 

Reaction  of  chemicals  a  form  of  will, 
184. 

Realism,  described,  103;  its  extrava- 
gances, 70  ;  versus  nominalism,  71, 

108,  124,  174. 

Reality,  its  natiire,  12,  iS,  20,  105;  as 
conceived  by  two  philosophical  par- 
ties, 103,  104;  contains  both  subject 
and  object,  14 ;  has  features  deter- 
minable by  pure  reason,  107,  112  ; 
how  revealed  to  reason,  108;  inde- 
pendent of  thought,  88,  89;  its  dif- 
ference from  truth,  46,  47  ;  its  reac- 
tion necessary  to  development  of 
mind,  25  ;  its  imiversally  necessary 
features,  70;  its  ultimate  springs, 
162;    its  unity,   119,   121;  of  law  of 


INDEX. 


227 


sameness  in  nature,  112;  of  the 
ideal,  169;  symbolised  in  abstracts, 
118,  121,  134  ;  the  same  everywhere, 
155  ;  the  source  of  notion,  117  ;  truly 
represented  to  senses,  21. 

Reason,  its  nature,  iii,  107,  109,  iii, 
118,  194, 195  ;  always  consistent,  no; 
dependent  on  formal  knowledge, 
77  ;  distinguished  from  understand- 
ing, 30 ;  implies  realism,  104  ;  its  aid 
to  religion,  207  ;  its  authority,  175  ; 
its  function,  117,  118;  its  necessity, 
175 ;  its  norm,  108  ;  its  origin,  108, 
112,  116,  117;  its  possibility,  76;  its 
problem  that  of  determinability,io6; 
its  unity,  108,  109  ;  not  explained  by 
association,  175 ;  not  purely  sub- 
jective, 117,  175  ;  scorned  by  priests, 
205 ;  source  of  its  credibility,  108  ; 
the  method  of  experience,  117  ;  ulti- 
mate, the  source  of  other  reasons, 
146;  universal  in  its  nature,  log. 

Reasoning,  formal,  as  viewed  by 
Kant,  30  ;  its  processes,  60,  64,  91. 

Reasons,  correlative  with  consequen- 
ces, 140  ;  distinguished  from  causes, 
139;  the  object  of  scientific  re- 
search, 154. 

Recollection,  motor-ideas  dependent 
on,  186. 

Reconciliation  of  rival  philosophies, 
iii. 

Reflection,  source  of  notions  of  causa- 
tion, 148. 

Reid,  his  view  of  causation,  148. 

Relations  always  triune,  18,  100,  loi. 

Religio-philosophical  convictions, 
their  importance,  23. 

Religion,  its  nature,  205,  207 ;  ex- 
plained by  positive  philosophy,  5  ; 
identified  with  Christianity,  196, 
199;  inseparable  from  science,  204, 
205,  207 ;  its  basis,  178,  189,  205  ; 
needs  enthusiasm  and  zeal,  209 ;  not 
identical  with  science, 207;  of  invisi- 
ble church  that  of  science,  199;  only 
one  true  one,  205  ;  priests  not  al- 
ways its  prophets,  205  ;  science  the 
basis  of  its  progress,  204 ;  super- 
naturalism,  a  pagan  element  of,  37; 
the  basis  of  conduct,  204. 


Religion  of  science,  its  nature,  203, 
210;  discards  duality  of  truth,  205; 
not  meant  to  destroy  old  ones,  209; 
the  highest  ideal,  209 ;  the  revela- 
tion of  moral  laws,  202. 

Religions,  their  common  ideal,  209; 
their  history,  204 ;  their  morality 
correct,  170. 

Religious,  duty  of  the  scientist,  206; 
evolution  of  mankind,  200;  ideal, 
the  true  and  holy,  210  ;  sentiments, 
their  power,  :8S ;  teachers  of  man- 
kind, 169,  170. 

Representations,    the    contents    of 
states  of  consciousness,  11. 

Resistance  and  extension,  Huxley's 
view  of,  120. 

Resurrection,  its  profound  truth,  1S9; 
pagan  view  of,  18S. 

Revelation,  its  true  method,  37 ;  in 
nature,  21,  199,  209 ;  of  God  in  truth, 
49  ;  of  moral  laws  through  scienc  , 
202;  supernatural,  27,  37  ;  tradition 
as  considered,  205. 

Riemann's  space,  80,  81,  92,  94,  109. 

Right  exists  only  in  mentality,  22. 

Rigidly  formal,  its  function,  88,  8g; 
always  reliable  in  experience,  in; 
character  of  reason,  in  ;  not  dis- 
tinguished by  Kant,  86;  sciences, 
39,  no,  in. 

Robertson,  Prof.  G.  C.,  on  axioms,  60. 

Roman  Fate,  not  necessity,  164. 

Rotation  applied  to  geometrical  pro- 
duction of  lines,  97,  99. 

Rules  of  reasoning,  58,  60. 

Sacredness  of  truths  of  science,  209. 
Sacrifice,  its  importance,  167,  168, 198, 

199. 
Salvation  not  dependent  on  dogmas, 

196. 
Sameness  of  nature,  109.  in,  112,  113. 
Sanctity  of  moral  law,  202. 
Savages,   average  public    compared 

to,    135 ;    their    idolatry    compared 

with  modern  kind,  199. 
Saviour,  implies  Trinity,  loi. 
Scepticism,  of  Huiiio,  its  source,  152; 

the  outcome  of  associationism,  177; 

the  root  of  nominalism,  104. 


228 


INDEX. 


Schiller,  cited,  45,  207. 

Scholastic  philosophy,  terms  in- 
vented by,  62  ;  theorem  on  causal- 
ity, 150,  152. 

Schopenhauer,  his  suggestion  for  im- 
provement of  mathematical  meth- 
od, 5-t,  55  ;  his  view  of  a  priori,  59  ; 
his  view  of  causation,  147,  148  ;  his 
view  of  will,  184,  185  ;  on  Euclidean 
demonstration,  53. 

Schurmann,  Prof.  J.  G.,  cited,  74,  75. 

Science,  its  nature,  41, 145,  205;  a  reve- 
lation of  moral  laws,  202  ;  begin- 
ning to  enlighten  churches,  198; 
corroborates  gospel,  198 ;  corrobo- 
rates monism,  4  ;  full  of  supersti- 
tions, 51  ;  its  aim,  40,  43  ;  its  basis, 
37,43,76;  its  relation  to  religion, 
Z05,  207  ;  its  faith  in  causation,  156  ; 
its  function,  42,  153 ;  its  history, 
209 ;  its  holiness,  206,  209 ;  its  meth- 
ods, 42,  43,  78;  its  need  of  a  philo- 
sophic background,  iv ;  its  produc- 
tion of  religious  progress,  204  ; 
proves  immortality  of  soul,  189  ;  the 
basis  of  civilisation,  204  ;  the  chief 
means  of  progress,  206. 

Sciences,  formal,  their  superiority, 
115;  their  relations  studied  by  phi- 
losophy, 45 ;  their  provinces  arti- 
ficially established  by  abstraction, 

43.  44- 

Scientific,  certainty,  144  ;  discoveries, 
5  ;  inquiry,  45,  170,  178. 

Scientists,  should  be  philosophers, iv, 
46;  their  supposed  vagaries,  205. 

Sects,  their  future,  209,  210. 

Seelentaub,  meaning  of  the  expres- 
sion, i8a. 

Self-consistency  of  being,  its  law,  112. 

Self-discipline,  prayer  only  a,  202. 

Self-evident  principles  do  not  exist, 
148. 

Self-observation,  a  form  of  experi- 
ence, 61. 

Self-sacrifice  the  path  to  victory,  198. 

Sensation,  its  definition,  180,  189. 

Sensationalism,  derived  from  nomi- 
nalism, 177  ;  the  basis  of  positivism, 

69. 
Sensations,   always   real,  47,  48 ;   al- 


ways trustworthy,  21,  22,  39 ;    ana- 
lysed by  abstraction,  126,  127  ;  con- 
stitute experience,  113;  how  trans- 
formed  into   feeling,   183  ;  not  felt 
when  isolated,  igi  ;  not  the  source 
of  notion  of  causation,  148  ;  our  An- 
schauung,  126;  their  cause,  11  ;  their 
relation  to  cognition,  31,  33,  180,181, 
182;  their  significance,  11,  105;  the 
material  of  mind,  72,  77,  190. 
Sense-experience,  always  reliable, 22; 
considered  blind  by  Kant,  35  ;  not 
able  to  establish  a  universal  rela- 
tion, 113;  the  basis  of  abstract  ideas, 
126. 
Sense-illusion,  never  occurs,  22. 
Sense-impressions,  always  systemati- 
cally connected,  71,  72  ;  contains  a 
formal   element,   34,  72;  how   con- 
nected according  to  Kant,  66  ;  inter- 
preted by  memory-structures,  181  ; 
signs  of  things,  179 ;  the  data  of  ex- 
perience, 74  ;  their  data  furnished 
by  intuition,  125  ;  their  registry,  179- 
their  selection  in  evolution,  185. 
Sensory, and  formal, the  web  and  woof 
of  knowledge,  35  ;  contrasted  with 
formal,  72 ;    phenomena,    their   ir- 
regularity, 113. 
Sentiency  of  memory-structures  the 

condition  of  apperception,  185. 
Sentient  symbols  defined,  192. 
Sentiment  defined,  190. 
Seinsgriind,    Schopenhauer's  use   of 

term,  148. 
Separations  and  combinations  com- 
pose nature,  iii. 
Sequence,  distinguished  from  conse- 
quence, 141 ;  not  the  whole  of  causa- 
tion, 176. 
Similarity,   association  of  ideas  by, 

173.  174- 

Sinneswesen,  a  synonym  of  phenom- 
ena, 133. 

Sirius,  used  as  an  illustration,  92,  93. 

Skin,  its  function  an  abstraction,  127. 

Smell,  127,  190. 

Society  dependent  on  moral  laws,  201. 

Solids,  their  geometrical  construc- 
tion, 90. 

Son  of  God,  the  word  of  truth,  49. 


INDEX. 


229 


Sound,  its  perception  an  act  of  ab- 
straction, 127 ;  symbols,  their  rela- 
tion to  soul-life,  186. 

Soul,  its  nature,  4,  19,  25,  119,  1S8, 192, 
193  ;  inseparable  from  body,  23  ;  its 
elements,  179  ;  its  immortality,  188, 
189  ;  its  importance,  24  ;  its  unity 
denied  by  Kant,  68  ;  kingdom  of 
heaven  in  the,  49;  not  in  all  things, 
16  ;  not  knowable  without  objective 
experience, 25;  sensations  its  atoms, 
190. 

Soul-blindness,  iSo. 

Soul-life,  apperceptions  its  acts,  1S6. 

Souls,  of  things  known  through  no- 
tions of  matter,  22;  power  of  ideas 
over,  188. 

Space,  its  nature,  21,  92,  93,  iii,  122; 
an  element  of  objectivity,  12,  14,  15  ; 
defects  of  old  method  of  its  con- 
struction, 91  ;  its  infinity,  94  ;  its 
various  kinds,  81,  90,  93,  109;  math- 
ematical, an  abstraction  not  a  con- 
struction, loi ;  presupposed  by  math- 
ematics,56,  80,  91,  92;  problem  of  its 
homoloidality,  84,  96,98;  problem 
of  its  three  dimensions,  89,  99;  the 
pure  form  of  the  world,  iii. 

Space-conceptions   not  properly 
axioms,  56. 

Space-relations,    homoloidality    a 
method  of  computing,  96. 

Spatial  relations,  no  insight  of  them 
obtainable  from  Euclid,  53. 

Special  laws  superseded  by  general, 

155- 

Spencer,  Herbert,  cited,  120,  175. 

Speech,  creates  rational  thought, 186. 

Spells,  prayer  compared  with,  202. 

Spinoza,  his  theory  of  knowledge,  28; 
his  view  of  causation,  145. 

Spirit,  its  definition,  193  ;  an  abstract 
idea,  4,  19  ;  its  activity  revealed  in 
mechanics,  24  ;  more  difficult  to  un- 
derstand than  letter,  196;  of  God, 
distinguished  from  Father  and  Son, 

lOI. 

Spiritual,  its  definition,  192. 
Spiritualism,  its  errors,  19;  not  true 

monism,  3. 
Spirituality  of  all  existence,  20. 


Spontaneity,  defined,  101 ;  of  intelli- 
gent beings  called  will,  184;  of  na- 
ture, 161,  162,  165,  184;  of  primitive 
apperception,  185. 

Spontaneous  motion  of  things,  162. 

Spring  of  cosmic  life,  172. 

Star  of  Bethlehem,  ethical  principle 
compared  to,  169. 

States  of  consciousness,  their  ele- 
ments, 10. 

Stereometry  a  purely  formal  science, 

79- 

Stone,  its  action  in  falling  sponta- 
neous, 164. 

Straight  line,  its  definitions  and  prop- 
erties, 89,  90,  95-98. 

Straightness,  difficulty  of  defining  it, 
90,  96;  not  a  quality  of  space,  95; 
not  demonstrable  by  moving  point, 
89. 

Subject  and  object  inseparable,  14. 

Subjective,  existence  objective  to 
other  subjects,  16;  experience,  lim- 
its of  its  functions,  25 ;  reason  a 
product  of  the  world-order,  117. 

Subjectivism,  a  synonym  for  idealism, 

17- 

Subjectivity,  an  abstraction,  17;  at- 
tributed to  relations  by  nominalists, 
103  ;  a  universal  feature  of  exist- 
ence, 17;  curious  change  in  its 
meaning,  12-14,  17 ;  formal  and  ma- 
terial inseparable  in,  36;  its  relation 
to  objectivity,  17,  21  ;  of  truth,  48; 
sensations  its  ultimate  units,  190; 
the  condition  of  experience,  25. 

Substance,  its  persistence,  152,  159; 
not  a  cause,  144. 

Subsumption,  the  beginning  of  cogni- 
tion, 182. 

Subtraction,  scholastic  use  of  term, 
123. 

Succession,  causation  more  than, 151, 
152. 

Sufficient  reason,  Schopenhauer's 
use  of  term,  148. 

Sully,  cited,  124,  125. 

Sun,  measurement  of  its  distance  an 
rt /r/c"?-/ determination,  106. 

Superindividual  facts,  their  existence, 
188. 


230 


INDEX. 


Supernaturalism,  an  erroneous  inter- 
pretation of  experience,  37;  its  view 
of  source  of  knowledge,  26,  27  ;  to 
be  abandoned,  4. 

Superstition,  found  even  among 
learned,  51 ;  in  certain  kinds  of 
prayer,  202;  in  fatalism,  163;  reli- 
gion of  science  free  from,  209  ;  reli- 
gions transformed  into,  205. 

Suppression  of  search  for  truth,  205. 

Sursuin,  the  watchword  of  evolution, 
171. 

Syllogism,  axiom  of  parallels  anal- 
ogous to,  110  ;  presents  a  triad  rela- 
tion, 102. 

Symbolic  function,  of  ideas,  134  ;  of 
adoration,  202. 

Symbols,  all  words  are,  197;  Christian, 
true  in  meaning,  198 ;  dogmatism 
their  idolatry,  202 ;  their  worship 
idolatrous,  199. 

System,  its  meaning,  40. 

System  of  Logic   (Mill's),  cited,  114. 

Systematising  and  organisation  of 
feelings,  183. 

Tabula  rasa,  mind  compared  with, 
by  Locke,  28. 

Talents,  their  origin,  171. 

Taste,  127,  190. 

Teachers  of  mankind,  their  insight 
into  nature,  169,  170. 

Teleology,  problem  of,  156,  158. 

Temperature,  nature  of  its  percep- 
tion, 127,  190. 

Temporality  demands  special  expla- 
nation, 94. 

Tendency  distinguished  from  will, 
186,   187, 

Terminology  of  psychology,  189. 

Terms,  old  better  than  new,  159. 

Thales,  his  demonstration  of  proper- 
ties of  triangle,  86. 

Theorems  of  mathematics  made  ax- 
iomatic by  Schopenhauer,  55. 

Thingishness,  12,  14. 

Things-in-themselves,  non-existent, 
122,  131. 

Thomas  Aquinas,  his  definition  of 
truth,  46. 

Thought,  its  nature,  73-77,   m,  125, 


192:  its  criterion,  174;  its  impor- 
tance, 24;  its  method,  118;  its  ori- 
gin, 108  ;  its  relation  to  feeling,  207. 

Time,  its  nature,  122  ;  symbolised  as 
Kronos,  197 

Tongue,  its  function  an  abstraction, 
127  ;  Totality  of  being,  a  unity,  121, 
130;  a  reality,  129. 

Touch,  its  images,  190. 

Traces,  defined,  190. 

Tradition,  its  conservatism,  200;  made 
the  foundation  of  religion,  204,  205. 

Traditional  morality  correct,  170. 

Transformation,  a  universal  law,  156; 
its  nature,  155,  157 ;  its  order,  194; 
reveals  causation,  151,  153,  155,  156; 
the   object   of    scientific    research, 

154. 

Transcendent,  distinguished  from 
transcendental,  67. 

Transcendental  idealism  of  Kant,  66, 
87,  113. 

Transcendentalism,  to  be  abandoned, 
4;  unfortunate  influence  of  word, 
66. 

Triangle,  its  geometrical  properties, 
83-85,  106,  107 ;  in  the  nature  of 
things,  100  ;  used  as  an  illustration, 
113,  141. 

Tridimensionality  of  space,  an  alge- 
braic problem,  99  ;  its  arbitrariness, 
93,  102  ;  knowable  only  by  experi- 
ence, 82,  III. 

Trinity,  characteristic  of  all  relations, 
18,  100,  loi  ;  must  be  attributed  to 
God,  loi. 

Triunism,  identical  with  monism,  loi. 

Truth,  its  nature,  22,  46  ;  always  needs 
to  be  proved,  52;  both  subjective 
and  objective,  48  ;  distinguished 
from  correctness,  49  ;  distinguished 
from  reality,  46,  47  ;  importance  of 
its  search,  205,207;  its  attributes; 
3.  49.  50.  205,  206,  207 ;  its  criterion, 
3,  50;  its  suppression  a  lie,  205, 
more  powerful  than  error,  209  ;  not 
dual,  205  ;  of  Gospel  confirmed  by 
science,  198 ;  only  predicable  of 
mental  relations,  46;  originates  to. 
gether  with  mind,  48 ;  parables  its 
vehicle,  196;  science  the  search  for 


lA'DEX. 


231 


it,  41,  42 ;  should  welcome  criti- 
cism, 208 ;  the  basis  of  religion,  205, 
the  fulfilment  of  mind,  50 ;  the  reve- 
lation of  God,  49. 

Truths,  of  reason  the  cement  of 
knowledge,  76 ;  of  science,  their 
sacredness,  209 ;  their  varying  dig- 
nity, 47. 

Truthfulness  the  condition  of  all  reli- 
gion, 210. 

Twelfth  axiom  of  Euclid,  57,  58. 

Ueber  die  vierfache  Wurzel  des  Satzes 
vom  zureichenden  Grjind,  cited,  148. 

Ufbersichilick,  defined,  40. 

Uebcrsichtlichkeit,  lacking  in  certain 
mathematical  demonstrations,  54. 

Ultimate  Eifect,  prayer  to  the,  147. 

Ultimate  reason,  146. 

Unconditioned,  the,  128-130. 

Understanding,  defined,  194;  distin- 
guished from  reason  by  Kant,  30; 
its  supposed  pre-existence,  33. 

Uniformities  of  universe,  114,  177. 

Unity,  absolute,  would  be  non-exist- 
ence, loi ;  of  reality,  iig,  I2i  ;  of 
soul  a  fallacy,  68  ;  tendency  of  liv- 
ing beings  to  higher,  168. 

Universal  truths,  70,  71,  89. 

Universality,  a  fact  of  experience, 
105,  108 ;  its  problem  same  as  that 
of  necessity,  105;  justification  of  its 
assumption,  104  ;  of  formal  truths, 
75,  76,  i04;athe,  problem  of  reason, 
106. 

Universals,  as  viewed  by  different 
pliilosophies,  103. 

Universe,  as  viewed  by  different  phi- 
losophies, 103;  governed  by  me- 
chanical laws,  158  ;  has  no  universal 
key,  147;  its  laws  unchangeable,  202; 
its  order,  159,  176;  not  absolute,  129; 
the  source  of  its  life,  172. 

Unknowable,  does  not  exist,  \TJ,  200  ; 
idolatry  of  the,  200,  202;  origin  of 
the  conception,  36;  the  outcome  of 
confusion  of  mind,  120;  the  sup- 
posed haven  of  philosophy,  iv. 

Unknown  reached  through  necessary 
truths,  70. 

Unniorality  of  nature,  170. 


Unrelated,  not  predicable  of  any  form 

of  existence,  129. 
Ursache,  distinguished  from  Grund, 

143  ;     opposed    to     Wirkung,    140; 

Schopenhauer's  use  of  term,  148. 

Vi  rites  de  raison,  75. 

Verworn,  Prof.  Max,  cited,  i85. 

Vices  and  virtues,  their  effects,  27 
their  resemblance,  165. 

Victory,  obtained  through  self-sacri- 
fice, 198. 

Vision,  its  cerebral  centre,  180. 

Visionary  knowledge  rejected,  37. 

Visions  all  mistakes,  26. 

Visual  images,  190. 

IVeli  als  IVille  und  Vorsielliifi^,c'i\.eA, 

53- 

Will,  its  definition,  161,  162,  184,  192; 
caused  by  image  of  end  to  be  ob- 
tained, 184, 185;  displayed  by  proto- 
zoons,  185 ;  distinguished  from  ten- 
dency, 186,  187;  how  developed,  185; 
its  relation  to  apperception,  184, 
185  ;  never  acts  without  a  motive  or 
aim,  186;  of  God,  iGi,  162,  201,  202; 
of  things,  161;  spontaneity  of  nature 
its  simplest  form,  161,  184. 

IVirklichkeii,  explanation  of  term,  18. 

IVirkung,  opposed  to  Ursache,  140. 

Wisdom,   symbolised  by  Athene,  197. 

Wolf,  cited,  63. 

Words,  their  function,  39  ;  their  sym- 
bolic character,  186,  197  ;  used  cor- 
rectly by  the  masses,  143. 

Works,  their  value,  171. 

World,  an  abstract  idea,  4,  19  ;  an  ap- 
pearance but  a  revelation,  25  ;  ex- 
plainable whenever  its  wants  are 
transformations,  156 ;  governed  by 
same  laws  as  thought,  112;  pictured 
truly  to  senses,  21  ;  reason  for  its 
existence  unknown,  93. 

World-conception,  evils  of  a  false,  23; 
implied  in  gravitation,  164  ;  to  be 
based  on  verifiable  facts,  2. 

World-ogo,  God  not  a,  147, 

World-flight,  23,  24. 

World-order,  117. 


232 


INDEX. 


World-reason,  human  reason  its  re- 
flection, 117. 

Worship,  of  error  by  philosophers,  146, 
201 ;  sectarian,  its  pagan  features, 
210;  true,  201. 

Wright,  Tom,  quoted,  29. 

Wrong  exists  only  in  mentality,  22. 


Yearning   for  truth   the   deepest  im- 
pulse of  mind,  50. 

Zero,  the  absolute,  131. 
Zoology,  its  field  of  inquiry,  43. 
Zweckmassigkeit  of  nature,  158. 


BOOKS    AND   ESSAYS    ON    KINDRED 
TOPICS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 


PHILOSOPHY. 

FUNDAMENTAL  PROBLEMS.  Second  edition.  Pages,  373. 
Cloth,  $1.50;  Paper,  50  cts. — Contains  discussions  of  the  basic 
problems  of  philosophy,  such  as  Ontology  and  Positivism  ; 
The  Foundation  of  Monism  ;  Form  and  Formal  Thought ; 
Metaphysics,  the  Use  and  Meaning  of  the  Word  ;  The  Problem 
of  Causality  ;  Is  Nature  Alive  ?  God  as  the  Moral  Law;  Ag- 
nosticism and  Positivism  ;  Causation  and  Free  Will ;  The  Im- 
portance of  Art. — The  Appendix  contains  a  number  of  replies 
to  various  critics,  among  which  may  be  noted  a  series  of  con- 
troversies on  Agnosticism  (The  Relativity  of  Knowledge,  The 
Insolvable  Problem,  The  Agnosticism  of  Modesty,  etc.).  A 
discussion  on  divine  reason  entitled  The  Sin  Against  the  Holy 
Ghost.     The  Error  of  Materialism,  In  Reply  to  a  Materialist. 

OUR  NEED  OF  PHILOSOPHY.  An  Appeal  to  the  American 
People.  An  Address  Delivered  Before  the  World's  Congress 
of  Philosophy  at  Chicago,  111. — Pages  14.     Price,  5  cents. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  THE  TOOL.  A  Lecture  Delivered 
Before  the  Department  of  Manual  and  Art  Education  of  the 
World's  Congress  Auxiliary. — Pages,  25.     Price,  10  cents. 

THE  NATURE  OF  THE  STATE.  Contains  the  following 
chapters  :  Does  the  State  Exist  ?  Was  the  Individual  Prior  to 
Society?  The  State  a  Product  of  Natural  Growth;  The  Mod- 


234  WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 

em  State  ;  The  Authority  of  the  State  and  the  Right  to  Revo- 
lution ;  The  Modern  State  Based  Upon  Revolution ;  Treason 
and  Reform. — Pages,  56.     Price,  15  cents. 

ARTICLES. 

THE  CRITERION  OF  TRUTH.  Inquires  into  the  Problem, 
What  is  Possible?  It  shows  that  "men  who  have  the  same 
world-conception  will  also  have  the  same  criterion  of  truth.' 
The  main  difficulty  lies  in  distinguishing  between  facts  and 
our  interpretation  of  facts.  —  The  Monist,  Vol.  I.,  No.  2.  Page 
229. 

THE  CONTINUITY  OF  EVOLUTION.  The  Science  of  Lan- 
uage  Versus  the  Science  of  Life,  as  Represented  by  Prof.  F. 
Max  Muller  and  Prof.  George  John  Romanes.  Prof.  F.  Max 
Miiller  finds  a  gap  in  the  evolution  of  life  at  the  origin  of  man 
which  renders  the  origin  of  language  mysterious.  The  present 
article  insists  on  the  essential  differences  between  man  and 
animal  but  refuses  to  acknowledge  that  this  constitutes  a  gap 
in  nature,  discussing  both  the  idea  of  a  creator  as  the  God 
who  moulds  the  world  in  its  development,  an  argument  in  fa- 
vor of  continuous  evolution.  —  The  Monist,  Vol.  II.,  No.  i, 
page  70. 

THE  ORIGIN  OF  THOUGHT  FORMS.  I.  Thought  Forms 
and  the  Forms  of  Existence.     II.  The  Problem  of  Apriority. 

III.  The  Conservation  of  Matter  and  Energy  and  Causation. 

IV.  Why  Is  Mr.  Mill's  Proposition  Untenable.  V.  The  Mean- 
ing of  "Necessary."  VI.  Modern  Logic. —  The  Monist,  Vol. 
II.,  No.  I,  page  III. 

COMTEAN  POSITIVISM.  (A  review  of  Hermann  Gruber's 
book.)  The  positivism  of  Comte  and  Littre  was  practically 
fin  agnosticism.     The  positivism  upheld  in  The  Monist  and  in 


WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR.  235 

Dr.  Carus's  books  is  a  new  positivism  which  is  a  positivism  in 
the  true  meaning  of  the  word.  —  The  Monist,  Vol.  II.,  No.  i, 
page  133.  The  same  subject  is  treated  in  a  controversy  with 
Louis  Belrose,  Jr.,  The  Monist,  Vol.  II.,  No.  3,  pages  410-417, 
under  the  title  Emile  Littre's  Positivism. 

ARE  THERE  THINGS-IN-THEMSELVES  ?  I.  Things-In- 
Themselves  and  Noumena.  II.  Kant's  View  of  Space  and 
Time.  III.  Form  Not  Imported  by  the  Mind  Into  Reality. 
IV.  Professor  Jodl's  View  of  the  Thingin-Itself.  V.  Clif- 
ford's and  Schopenhauer's  Conceptions  of  the  Thing-in-Itself. 
VI.  Things  and  Relations.  VII.  Is  the  Ego  a  Thing-in  Itself  ? 
VIII.  The  Ego-Centric  View  Abandoned.  IX.  Personality 
and  Evolution.  X.  Professor  Mach's  Position.  XI.  Truth  in 
Mythology.  XII.  The  Oneness  of  Subjectivity  and  Objectiv- 
ity.—  The  Monist,  Vol.  II.,  No.  2,  page  225. 

THE  DOCTRINE  OF  NECESSITY.  A  controversy  with  Charles 
S.  Peirce.  I.  Mr.  Charles  S.  Peirce's  Onslaught  on  the  Doc- 
trine of  Necessity  (David  Hume  Redivivus).  II.  Causation 
Not  Mere  Sequence.      III.    Mr.   Peirce's  Logic  of  Science. 

IV.  Necessity  in  Thought  Presupposes  Necessity  in  Facts. 

V.  Mr.  Peirce's  Idea  of  the  Evolution  of  Law.  VI.  World- 
Constructions.  VII.  Facts  and  Laws.  VIII.  Laws  Not  In- 
explicable. IX.  Conclusion. —  The  Monist,  Vol.  II.,  No.  4, 
page  560. 

KANT  AND  SPENCER,  (i)  The  Ethics  of  Kant.  (2)  Kant  on 
Evolution.  (3)  Mr.  Spencer  on  the  Ethics  of  Kant. —  The  Mo- 
nist, Appendix  to  Vol.  II.,  No.  4,  page  512.  A  letter  from 
Mr.  Spencer  appears  in  The  Monist,  Vol.  III.,  No.  2,  page  272. 

THE  IDEA  OF  NECESSITY,  ITS  BASIS  AND  ITS  SCOPE. 
I.  The  Basis  of  Necessity  (The  Idea  of  Sameness  ;  Sameness 
and  Mind  ;  Samenesses  a  Fact ;  Eindeutig  Bestimmt).  II.  The 
Scope  of  Necessity  (Necessity  and  Chance ;   Free  Will ;  Me- 


236  WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 

chanical  Philosophy;  Spontaneity).  Conclusion. — The Monist, 
Vol.  III.,  No.  I,  page  68. 

THE  FOUNDER  OF  TYCHISM,  HIS  METHODS,  PHI- 
LOSOPHY, AND  CRITICISMS.  In  Reply  to  Mr.  Charles  S. 
Peirce's Criticism.  I.  Differences  of  Method  (Attention  to  De- 
tail ;  Originality;  A  Modern  Procrustes  ;  Occam's  Razor  ;  The 
Application  of  Learning  ;  The  Principle  of  Positivism  ;  Lop- 
ping Off  the  Absolute;  The  Theory  of  Probable  Inference; 
Zvveideutig  Bestimmt ;  Explanation).  II.  Mr.  Peirce's  Phi- 
losophy (Duns  Scotus,  Mr.  Peirce's  Patron  Saint ;  Mr.  Peirce's 
Cosmogony  ;  Tychism  Unsatisfactory  ;  The  Negative  Argu- 
ment a  Logical  Fallacy).  III.  Mr.  Peirce  as  a  Critic  (The 
A  Priori  ;  Determinism  and  Fatalism ;  Natural  Laws,  De- 
scriptions ;  Causation ;  The  Future  in  Mental  Causation ; 
Mental  Causation).  IV.  Stray  Shots.  V.  Retrospect. —  The 
Monist,  Vol.  III.,  No.  4,  page  571. 

MONISM  AND  HENISM.  A  controversy  with  Lester  F.  Ward 
and  Dr.  Robert  Lewins,  criticising  the  materialistic  and  the 
solipsistic  conceptions  of  monism.  —  The  Monist,  Vol.  IV.,  No. 
2,  page  228.  The  same  subject  is  treated  in  "Mind  Not  a 
Storage  of  Energy,"  in  reply  to  Mr.  Lester  F.  Ward.  —  The 
Motiist,  Vol.  v.,  No.  2,  page  282. 

THE  METAPHYSICAL  x  IN  COGNITION.  The  Faust  Atti- 
tude in  Philosophy  ;  Professor  Jodl's  Discrimination  Between 
Scientific  Knowledge  and  Philosophical  Knowledge ;  Locke's 
Unknowable  Essence  of  Things  ;  Hume's  Scepticism  ;  Kant's 
Identification  of  the  Ideal  and  the  Subjective  ;  Professor  Deus- 
sen's  Attempt  at  Modernising  Metaphysics ;  Philosophy  De- 
fined ;  The  Monistic  Conception  Outlined  ;  Professor  Mach's 
Anti-Mechanicalism  in  Physics  ;  The  Metaphysical  x  Not  Un- 
known :  The  Conclusion,  —  The  Monist,  Vol.  V.,  No.  4,  page 
^lO. 


WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR.  237 

ON  CHINESE  PHILOSOPHY.  Introductory  ;  The  Yang  and 
the  Yin  ;  Fu  Hi  and  Yu  ;  The  Yih  and  the  Kwa  ;  The  Milfoil 
and  the  Spirit  Tortoise  ;  The  Map  of  Ho  and  the  Writing  of 
Loh  ;  The  Great  Plan  in  Nine  Divisions ;  The  T'ai  Kih,  the 
Ultimate  Ground  of  Existence  ;  The  Monism  of  Chinese  Phi- 
losophy, or  Cheu-tsz's  Philosophy  ;  Chu  Hi's  Doctrine  of  Li 
and  K'i  the  Immaterial  Principle  and  Primary  Matter;  Filial 
Piety  ;  The  Significance  of  the  Yih  ;  Tien  and  Shang  Ti,  the 
Belief  in  a  Personal  God;  Lao-tsz' and  Confucius;  Conclu- 
sion.—  The  Monist,  Vol.  VI.,  No.  2,  page  188. 

A  DISCUSSION  ON  AGNOSTICISM,  including  a  discussion  of 
Professor  Haeckel's  monism. —  The  Open  Cotirt,  Vol.  V.,  No. 
212. 

THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  CLEARNESS  AND  THE  CHARM 
OF  HAZINESS.  — 77-:^  Open  Court,  Vol.  V.,  No.  209. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

THE  SOUL  OF  MAN.  An  Investigation  of  the  Facts  of  Physi- 
ological and  Experimental  Psychology.  Pages,  458.  Illus- 
trations, 152.  Price,  Cloth,  $3.00.— I.  The  Philosophical 
Problem  of  Mind  (Feeling  and  Motion  ;  Is  the  Soul  a  Mechan- 
ism? The  Origin  of  Mind).  II.  The  Rise  of  Organised  Life 
(Vitalism;  Memory;  Feeling  as  a  Physiological  Process).  III. 
The  Physiology  of  the  Brain  (the  development  of  the  brain 
from  moner  to  man,  profusely  illustrated).  IV.  The  Immor- 
tality of  the  Race  and  the  Data  of  Propagation  (the  problems 
of  fecundation  and  sex  formation).  V.  Experimental  Psychol- 
ogy (Hypnotism  ;  Somnambulism  ;  Dreams  ;  Hallucinations ; 
Suggestion  ;  Dangers  of  Hypnotism).  VI.  The  Ethical  and 
Religious  Aspects  of  Soul-Life  (Pleasure ;  Pain  ;  Nature  of 
Thought ;  Rise  of  Consciousness  ;  Whence  Came  Death  ?  Im- 
mortality; The  Soul  of  the  Universe). 


238  WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 


ARTICLES. 

SOME  QUESTIONS  OF  PSYCHO-PHYSICS.  A  controversy 
with  Prof.  Ernst  Mach,  a  disquisition  on  the  parallelism  be- 
tween feeling  and  motion,  which  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that 
feeling  and  motion  are  two  abstractions  of  the  same  process. 
They  are  not  identical  but  they  are  one.  They  are  different 
and  yet  inseparable.  As  to  the  origin  of  life,  the  differences 
of  soul  and  body  are  recognised.  Ideas  such  as  we  read  in 
books  do  not  consist  of  paper  and  ink,  nor  do  paper  and  ink 
contain  ideas,  nor  can  paper  and  ink  be  regarded  as  a  physical 
basis  of  ideas,  and  yet  ideas  do  not  possess  a  ghost-like  ex- 
istence as  things-in-themselves. —  The  Monist,  Vol.  I.,  No.  3, 
page  401. 

OPTICAL  PARADOXES.  A  review  of  Prof.  Franz  Brentano's 
article  on  the  same  subject.  —  The  Monist,  Vol.  III.,  No.  4, 
page  651. 

ON  THE  NATURE  OF  PLEASURE  AND  PAIN.  In  Com- 
ment on  Professor  Ribot's  Theory.  —  The  Monist,  Vol.  VI., 
No.  3,  page  432. 

ETHICS,  RELIGION,  ETC. 

HOMILIES  OF  SCIENCE.  Pages,  310.  Cloth,  Gilt  Top,  $1.50. 
— Fifty-nine  brief  sermons  preached  from  the  standpoint  of 
science,  on  topics  such  as  :  Religion  Based  on  Facts  ;  Religion 
of  Progress  ;  Ethics  of  Evolution  ;  Design  in  Nature  ;  Con- 
ceptions of  God  ;  The  Conquest  of  Death  ;  Immortality  and 
Science  ;  Free  Thought,  Its  Truth  and  Its  Error  ;  The  Lib- 
eral's Folly;  The  Ethics  of  Struggle  ;  Monogamy;  Aristocrat- 
omania  ;  Do  We  Want  a  Revolution  ?  The  American  Ideal ;  etc. 


WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR.  239 

THE  RELIGION  OF  SCIENCE.  Pages,  131.  Price,  Cloth, 
50  cents  ;  Paper,  25  cents. — A  Systematic  E.xposition  of  the 
Doctrines  of  a  Religion  Based  Upon  the  Facts  of  Both  the 
Religious  Life  and  the  Investigations  of  Science.  The  booklet 
contains  nine  chapters:  I.  Doctrines  Not  Dogmas;  II.  The 
Authority  for  Conduct ;  III.  Ethics  ;  IV.  The  Nature  of  the 
Soul;  V.  The  Importance  of  Immortality;  VI.  Mythology  and 
Religion  ;  VII.  Christ  and  the  Christians  (including  an  inqui- 
sition on  prayer)  ;  VIII.  The  Catholicity  of  Religion  ;  and  IX. 
Reply  to  a  Freethinker. 

THE  ETHICAL  PROBLEM.  Three  Lectures.  I.  Ethics,  a 
Science  ;  II.  The  Data  of  Ethics  ;  III.  Theories  of  Ethics. 
Pages,  105.  Price,  Cloth,  50  cents  ;  Paper,  30  cents. — These 
Lectures  are  a  criticism  of  the  ethical  movements  which  pro- 
claim an  ethics  without  reference  to  any  authority  for  conduct, 
be  it  religious,  scientific,  or  philosophical. 

THE  IDEA  OF  GOD.  Fourth  edition,  revised  and  enlarged. 
Pages,  33.  Paper,  15  cents. — I.  The  Nature  of  Ideas;  II.  The 
Etymology  of  the  Word  God  ;  III.  God  an  Abstract  Idea ; 
IV.  The  Conceptions  of  God  ;  V.  Definition  of  the  Idea  of 
God  ;  VI.  Entheism  the  Monistic  Conception  of  God. 

SCIENCE  A  RELIGIOUS  REVELATION.  An  Address  De- 
livered Before  the  World's  Congress  of  Religions  at  Chicago, 
111. — Pages,  21.     Paper,  5  cents 

ARTICLES. 

THE  CRITERION  OF  ETHICS  AN  OBJECTIVE  REALITY. 
A  controversy  with  Prof.  Harald  Hoffding.  The  utilitarians 
consider  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  of  the  greatest  num- 
ber as  the  criterion  of  Ethics,  which  is  a  subjective  criterion. 
Scientific  ethics,  however,  must  be  based  upon  an  objective 
criterion.     There  is  no  objection  to  utilitarianism,  but  there 


240  WORK'S  B  V  THE  SAME  A  UTHOR. 

is  an  objection  to  defining  utility  in  terms  of  pleasure.  As 
justice  cannot  be  established  by  majority  vote,  so  the  greatest 
happiness  of  the  greatest  number  is  no  criterion  for  that  which 
is  morally  good. —  The  Monist,  Vol.  I.,  No.  4,  page  552. 

THE  CLERGY'S  DUTY  OF  ALLEGIANCE  TO  DOGMA 
AND  THE  STRUGGLE  BETWEEN  WORLD-CONCEP- 
TIONS. The  dawn  of  a  new  world-conception  with  a  deeper 
scientific  insight  into  the  facts  of  experience,  imperceptibly 
changes  the  significance  of  religious  dogmas  and  the  problem 
arises.  Are  clergymen  under  the  obligation  of  believing  the 
dogmas  of  the  church  in  the  old  interpretation,  or  are  they  at 
liberty  to  change  the  interpretation  of  the  dogmas  in  accord- 
ance with  a  more  scientific  conception  ?  The  reply  is  that  their 
oath  of  allegiance  is  made  in  the  bona  fide  conviction  that  the 
dogmas  are  the  truth.  The  implications  of  this  problem  are 
discussed  in  detail  from  the  legal  standpoint,  and  parallel  in- 
stances are  quoted  from  other  fields. — The  Monist,  Vol.  II., 
No.  2,  page  278. 

LABOR  DAY.— 77/^  Open  Court,  No.  367.  A  discussion  of  I.  La- 
bor as  Drudgery;  II.  Origin  and  Nature  of  Labor  ;  III.  Bless- 
ings of  Labor  ;  IV.  Dignity  of  Labor  ;  V.  The  Labor  Problem. 

ETHICS  AND  THE  COSMIC  ORDER.  A  Criticism  of  Prof. 
Thomas  H.  Huxley's  Position.  Insists  on  ethics  being  in  agree- 
ment with  and  derivable  from  the  cosmic  order  of  the  uni- 
verse.—  The  Monist,  Vol.  IV.,  No.  3,  page  403. 

THE  LATE  PROFESSOR  ROMANES'S  "THOUGHTS  ON 
'KElAGlOYk."— The  Monist,  Vol.  V.,  No.  3,  page  385. 

PROF.  ADOLF  HARNACK  ON  THE  RELIGION  OF  SCI- 
ENCE.—7:^<?  Mo7iist,  Vol.  IV.,  No.  4,  page  494. 

THE  MESSAGE  OF  MONISM  TO  THE  ^O^ISD.  — The  Mo- 
nist,  Vol.  IV,,  No.  4,  page  545. 


WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR.  241 

DEBATE  ON  CHRISTIAN  MISSIONS —7V/<?  ilA7«/j7,  Vol.  V., 
No.  2,  page  274.  The  question  whether  or  not  a  religious 
propaganda  is  right  is  answered  in  the  affirmative,  for  that  re- 
ligion is  dead  whose  adherents  have  no  desire  to  propagate 
their  faith. 

THE  WORLD'S  RELIGIOUS  PARLIAMENT  EXTENSION. 
—  The  Mollis i,  Vol.  V.,  No.  3,  page  345.  The  first  annual  re- 
port of  the  movement. 

THE  DAWN  OF  A  NEW  RELIGIOUS  ERA  -  The  Monist, 
Appendix  to  Vol.  IV.,  No.  3,  page  481.  A  review  of  the  his- 
tory of  the  Religious  Parliament  and  its  significance. 

KARMA  AND  NIRVANA.— 77/<?  il/(7;«j/,  Vol.  IV.,  No.  3,  page 
417. 

BUDDHISM  AND  CHRISTIANITY.  — T^^  Monist,  Vol.  V., 
No.  I,  page  65. 

THE  NEW  ORTHODOXY.  — 77/<'JA;«/.f/,  Vol.  VI.,  No.i,  pagegi. 

IS  THE  INFINITE  A  RELIGIOUS  IDEA?— 77/^  Open  Court, 
Vol.  v..  No.  185. 

THE  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  MORAL  Ol^GHT.— The  Open 
Court,  Vol.  VI.,  No.  236. 

REASON  AND  FAITH.  — 77;^  Open  Court,  Vol.  VI.,  No.  244. 


IN  A  LIGHTER  VEIN. 

KARMA.  A  Story  of  Early  Buddhism.  A  tale  which  was  trans- 
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Russian  by  Count  Leo  Tolstoi.  Count  Tolstoi  writes  about 
Karma  :   "I  have  read  this  tale  to  children  and  they  liked  it. 


242  WORKS  BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 

"And  amongst  grown-up  people  its  reading  always  gave  rise 
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The  following  are  in  preparation  : 

The  Philosophy  of  Ancient  Lndia.     By  Prof.  Richard  Garbe. 

Buddhism  and  Christianity.     By  Paul  Carus. 

The  Lost  Manuscript.     A  Novel.      By  Gustav  Freytag. 

llie  Study  of  Sanskrit.     By  Prof.  H.  Oldenberg. 

Old  Testamejit  History.     By  Prof.  C  H.  Cornill. 

On  Germinal  Selection.     By  Prof.  August  Weismann. 


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This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below 


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NOV   2 


DEC  9 


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MAR  8      1958 

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